
Der abschließende Beitrag von *Maria Koptjevskaia-Tamm* und *Bernhard Wälchli* würde eine eigene Rezension verdienen. Sie geben nicht nur eine umfassende, gut strukturierte und kritische Zusammenschau arealtypischer Phänomene der OstseearainerSprachen und ihrer Behandlung in der bisher häufig nur Spezialisten bekannten Forschungsliteratur, sondern präsentieren auch neue, eigene Forschung (so zu Pluralia tantum). Vor allem aber zeigen sie, wie Areallinguistik oder Arealtypologie sinnvoll betrieben werden kann und erreichen damit, dass man ihren Beitrag und auch das gesamte Werk nicht als „Abschlussbericht“ versteht, sondern im Gegenteil als Anregung zu weiterer Forschung.


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In the „Classical“ view of figurative language, metaphors are a decorative (and possibly clarity obscuring) addition to plain language, while from the „Romantic“ perspective metaphor is a way of interpreting the world and provides evidence for the role of the imagination in conceptualizing and reasoning (cf. Saeed 1997:303).
Lakoff/Johnson (1980) took the Romantic view, arguing that metaphors express the basic mode of thought whereby abstract concepts (target domains') are understood in more concrete terms (source domains'). Expressions such as cheer up, high spirits and gestures like 'thumbs up' are analyzed as manifestations of a single conceptual metaphor, i.e. HAPPY IS UP. Such analyses are presented as evidence for the cognitive linguistic view that linguistic knowledge and general cognition cannot be separated. There is a further claim that conceptual metaphor is often grounded in bodily experiences: HAPPY IS UP is related to the throwing up of arms, standing tall and its association with health and power (Lakoff 1993). Natural associations grounded in experience can be considered metonymic, yielding the notion of metonymy-based metaphors, which are explored in the present volume.

Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads comprises fifteen papers by authors working in the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. There is sparse reference to work predating Lakoff/Johnson (1980) and none to work on figurative language in other frameworks since then. In Cognitive Linguistics metaphor and metonymy are both defined as mechanisms which partially project one domain onto another. Metonymy differs from metaphor in that both domains are included in a single superordinate domain. Thus The pig is waiting for his check, uttered by a waiter referring to an unpleasant customer, is metaphoric because customers and pigs belong to different domains (people versus animals) whereas The ham sandwich is waiting for his check, referring to a customer who ordered a ham sandwich, is metonymic because the ham sandwich and the customer belong to the same conceptual domain, i.e. the restaurant domain. Maybe so, but why don't customers and pigs belong to one domain (e.g. mammals) and customers and ham sandwiches to different domains (e.g. creatures versus things)? Antonio Barcelona proposes that the decisive criterion is psychological: the categorization on a „conscious conventional level“ (p. 9). Arguably there was more substance in Ullmann's (1962) definition, in which metaphor is conceptually based on similarity whereas metonymy is based on contiguity, defined as associations not based on similarity, such as physical or causal associations (cf. also Jakobson 1956). Dirven's (1993) claim that metonymy differs from metaphor in that no meaning transfer occurs, seems particularly worthy of discussion, not least because it evokes the etymology of the terms, i.e. metaphor 'transfer'; metonymy 'change of name'. (This view also makes sense of the presumably different reactions of the respective customers overhearing the waiters mentioned above.) The reader who turns to the present volume to better understand the essence of metonymy vis-à-vis metaphor will be disappointed. Fundamental issues such as the purpose of metonymy are not discussed. The theoretical contributions are driven by an agenda: to erase the boundaries between metonymy and metaphor, between literal and figurative Speech, between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. In the introduction Barcelona proposes an extremely broad notion of metonymy, covering cases like This book is heavy, categorized as metonymic because the whole domain BOOK is mapped onto one of its subdomains, PHYSICAL OBJECT (p. 14). Whether or not this extension of the notion metonymy is useful, one would like to see a discussion of what distinguishes this example from more typical cases. The explanation that „in typical metonymies, the source and the target are neatly distinct subdomains“ (p. 14) (as opposed to metaphors, which involve two separate domains) left this reader exasperated.

The extremely vague (but central) use of the term „domain“ is symptomatic of a general problem which permeates the book: poor motivation of basic claims and
concomitant lack of explanation. This criticism is illustrated below with comments on selected papers.

Barcciona's claim that all metaphor is based on (broadly defined) metonymy raises the question of which metaphors are ruled out for lack of metonymic motivation. A single example is given: *It was a fife (for literal gaudy) color (p. 46). (Not based on similarity and therefore unacceptable as a metaphor, Ullmann might have said.) Taylor's (1995) examples of metaphors not based on metonymy were misanalysed, says Barcelona. Yet, his counter-analyses are often unconvincing. For instance the claim that high in high notes on a piano involves the (metonymically based) metaphor MORE IS UP raises the question in what sense high is experienced as MORE in music.

Susanne Niemeier also concludes that all metaphors are based on metonymies. To support this claim 65 English „heart“ expressions are classified in four categories depending on the perception of a metonymic basis, from clear to obscure (but nonetheless existent). To get a sense of the four categories, consider the expressions heart of stone, aching heart, fainthearted, and to know in one’s heart, which alleged exhibit a decrease in experiential grounding. Oddly, Niemeier asserts that emotions are not abstract concepts since „generally we have a very good idea what we are talking about“ (p. 210). Are the heart expressions not prototypical cases of understanding abstract concepts such as love, compassion in terms of („folk models“ of) a concrete body part?

Verena Haser contributes examples from non-Indo-European languages in support of Sweetser's (1990) notion of metaphorically motivated universal paths in semantic change. Stating that „it has become received wisdom that polysemy relations are diagnostic of semantic change“ (p. 174) Haser presents 27 sets of polysemy patterns, some presented as shifts (e.g. see → watch, guard), some simply as pairs (e.g. count – read). No attempt is made to systematically identify source and target domains in the examples, a distinction which is crucial to work on figurative language (e.g. English watch hardly illustrates a see → watch, guard metaphoric shift as watch originally meant „to remain awake, to keep vigil“).

Margaret Freeman proposes a new theory of literature, „cognitive poetics“, which is „superior to any other literary theory previously or currently held“ (p. 265). The superiority of this theory is said to result from its testability. Unfortunately, the nature of the test is not made explicit. Does she really claim that her theory predicts the range of possible literary texts („account for what is there and why it should be there“, p. 277) or the range of their possible interpretations? Freeman’s identification of a forged poem attributed to Emily Dickinson, presented as a triumph for cognitive poetics, makes one wonder which „sensitive readers“ and „accomplished critics“ fell for the forgery, which could hardly differ more crassly from the poems by Dickinson presented in the text.

Diane Ponterotto claims that metaphor plays a „pivot-like“ role in conversation, determining the integration of new information and giving cohesion to utterances. Two brief dialogues, including an „authentic“ conversation, are presented to illustrate the claim. The proposal that „cognitive metaphor plays a role in memory by somehow aiding the storage and retrieval of information during discourse processing“ (p. 287) could in principle be tested, a possibility that is not discussed.

1 One author, Kurt Feyaerts, does consider the Cognitive Linguistic definition of the metaphor/metonymy distinction in terms of domains to be too „malleable“ (p. 63) and adopts Ullmann’s definition.
Günter Radden argues that metonymy and metaphor are the endpoints of a continuum in which metonymy-based metaphors occupy the fuzzy middle. (Here, too, a proper characterization of the two endpoints of this continuum is lacking.) Four types of metonymy-based metaphors are distinguished: (i) Common Experiential Base, (ii) Implicature, (iii) Category Structure and (iv) Cultural Models, where the basis for categorization is not always clear. For instance, THE MIND IS A BODY metaphor is categorized as type (i) because of „the close interdependence of body and mind“ (p. 97), while the (obviously related) metaphor (PSYCHIC) HARM IS PHYSICAL INJURY is assigned to type (iii) because of „the fundamental distinction which we tend to make between the concrete and the abstract“ (p. 102).

Some of the stronger papers are confined to either metonymy or metaphor. Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg offer a unified analysis of various polysemous expressions in English, in contrast to corresponding German expressions, in terms of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. Esra Sandikcioglu follows an important strand of research on the use of metaphor in propaganda, illustrated with the coverage of the Persian Gulf War in news magazines (cf. Lakoff 1992, Pancake 1993).

Friedrich Ungerer’s paper concludes the volume with an entertaining account of advertisement strategies, focusing on the interaction of linguistic and pictorial metaphors and metonymies. His point that in advertising clever use of metonymy and metaphor is often more effective than stating the desirability of the product is not heeded by Barcelona, who in his introduction heaps praise on the contributions („excellent“, „ground-breaking“, „brilliant“). The book would have benefited from more careful editing: redundancies abound (e.g. „recent new trends“ p. 7), there are obvious mistakes, and, most disturbingly, there are too many unsubstantiated claims.

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2 Their claim that for non-actional verbs such as fall and blush, the acceptability of imperatives „drastically increases“ (p. 223) under negation (Don’t fall into the water versus ?Fall into the water) because avoiding the relevant behavior is under one’s control seems questionable. Whether or not imperatives are typically negated appears to be determined not primarily by controllability but by desirability: avoidance of blushing and snoring is not under one’s control, yet negated imperatives are common because the conditions are seen as undesirable. Expressions like Sleep well, again not under anybody’s control, occur more often without negation because they express desirable conditions.