

How to Do Emotions With Words: Emotionality in Conversations

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In this chapter, emotions are not regarded primarily as internal-psychological phenomena, but as socially proscribed and formed entities, which are constituted in accordance with social rules of emotionality and which are manifested, interpreted, and processed together communicatively in the interaction for definite purposes by the persons involved. In the elaboration of such an interactive conception of emotionality, the following aspects are treated: the value of emotionality in linguistic theories; emotions as a specific form of experiencing; the rules of emotionality; communication of emotions as transmission of evaluations; practices of manifestation, interpretation and processing of emotions in the communication process; fundamental interrelations between emotions and communication behavior; and methodology of the analysis of emotions and emotionality in specific conversation types. Finally, the developed theoretical apparatus in the analysis of two short conversation sections is elucidated.

EMOTIONALITY IN LINGUISTIC THEORIES

It is a common conception that people's experiences and feelings influence and occasionally even determine their communicative behavior and the course of conversations. Utterances like *His voice was raised in anger* or *It was no longer a reasonable discussion. The two only poisoned each other* express this concept. Linguists, however, have difficulties handling the connections between emotionality and conversational behavior, and more generally, the interrelations between emotions and language. In many linguistic and communication theories, emotionality has no role or no systematic value (e.g. theory of signs, grammar theory, speech act theory, conversational analysis, etc.). Although there have been a series of attempts to develop these theories to include emotionality (e.g., for the theory of signs by the connotation concept, for the speech act theory by

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the explication of the category “expressive speech act” [cf. Marten-Cleef, 1991]), these theories at their core and in their fundamental assumptions do not provide for emotionality.

If the interrelations between emotions and language or communication is taken as the explicit subject of investigation, this very frequently happens on a *theoretical* level, because a fundamental requirement for clarification exists, (e.g., Bamberg, 1997; Battacchi, Suslow, & Renna 1996; Fries, 1996; Konstantinidou, 1997) and/or on a *pragmatic* level (e.g., Caffi & Janney, 1994; Dane, 1987; Herrmann, 1987,) without reference to empirical data. The range of questions and methods in these studies is too broadly scattered and heterogeneous to be covered here (cf. the literature surveys of Fiehler, 1990a, paragraph 2.1 and Drescher, 1997, chap. 2). The views regarding emotions in these studies are strongly influenced by theoretical concepts prevalent in the disciplines “responsible” for emotions like anthropology, philosophy, sociology, and especially psychology (for a newer overview of emotion theories in these disciplines cf. Cornelius, 1996).

When an empirical approach to the interrelations between emotions and language or communication is taken, the studies tend to be *experimental* investigations in which test subjects are presented with emotional language content in predefined situations or asked to produce it as a result of a controlled inducing of emotion (Fries, 1991; Tischer, 1993, gives an overview of appropriate investigations in chap. 3). Even when the degree of situation definition and the restriction of the courses of action for the study participants are manipulated to differing intensities according to the directions of the experiment, so that as one pole conversations—induced and performed by instruction—seem to result (e.g., Thimm & Kruse, 1993), nevertheless all these linguistic data are produced for the purpose of their investigation.

Although the literature regarding the connections between emotions and communication/language has achieved a significant scope and an amazing diversification, only a few works have taken emotions in *everyday communication* as their subject and empirically investigated the manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotions in interaction using natural conversations.

Emotions are a thorny scientific subject for two primary reasons: First, science is dominated by conceptualizations of humans as primarily *purposeful, rational beings*. This conceptualization is prevalent in the most diverse disciplines and theories—beginning in theories of action, moving to interactional theories and right up to cognitive linguistics. Accordingly, scientific theories have likewise tended to regard communication and conversation as cognitively determined, purposeful, rational, and instrumental. Second, the prevailing conceptualization of emotions as *internal-psychological phenomena* makes their linguistic handling difficult.

Increasing demands for both predictability and reliability lead emotionality to appear increasingly socially dysfunctional and lead to an accordingly negative valuation of emotions (Elias, 1981). A picture of the human being emerges from these demands—surely far from the actual state of affairs—in which people are conceived as purposeful, rationally behaving, thoughtful beings—in their communicative and conversational behavior as well. The postulate of isolated linguistic signs in semiotic theory, the separation of denotation and connotation, as well as the reduction of the communication process to information exchange by means of the denotative component of signs, are milestones on the way to theories conceptualizing language and communication without consideration of emotionality. This cognitive and purposeful–rational orientation is recognizable from the central positions of the concepts of “goal” and “purpose” in theories of verbal acting (speech act theory, discourse analysis) and in the limitation of modeling to exclusively cognitive processes. Another example is conversational analysis. Its strict orientation toward the “communicative surface” prevents the explicit consideration of internal psychological processes such as intentions, cognitions, and emotions. As a result, emotions cannot be integrated systematically into theoretical formulations. Even if they are not eliminated completely, emotions can only be included as “a leftover category of the linguistic view of language” (Ehlich, 1986, p. 319).

On the other hand, it is precisely the common understanding that emotions are primarily internal-psychological phenomena that makes their linguistic and conversation-analytic handling so difficult. In contrast, my assumption here is that emotionality has its place in interaction: Only during processes of manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotions can they be grasped through linguistics and conversational analysis.

Thus one can be interested in emotions from two different perspectives: First, emotions can be examined in the context of the *personal system*. They are then understood as elements of personal interior life. From this perspective, one can ask, for example, what relationship emotions have to other elements of interior life (e.g., cognitions, motivations, dispositions) and how they come to expression. This is the prevailing everyday point of view as well as the scientific perspective.

On the other hand, emotions can be examined as *public phenomena in social situations of interpersonal interaction*. From this perspective, one can examine the function and value of emotional manifestations in interaction, independent of whether the participants also actually feel the manifested emotions. The focus from this perspective is on how emotions are manifested, mutually interpreted, and processed during interaction, and on the *practices* participants use to manifest, interpret, and process emotions. This perspective considers emotions primarily as elements of interaction and emphasizes their functionality for interaction. At the same time, it regards emotions as socially regulated

phenomena and stresses their social figuration. “Such a conceptualization focused on the social and particularly the discursive reality of the feelings is, in my opinion, the only one, that opens the problematics for linguistic questions at all” (Drescher, 1997, p. 112).

EMOTIONS AND EXPERIENCE

People experience a multiplicity of internal–psychological processes and states in everyday life, not all of which they would define as “emotions.” For example, one can be strained, surprised, curious, fascinated, and so forth. *Experience* and *action* are the two central strands of the personal–environmental reference. Experiencing is a totalizing mode, in which people experience themselves in their relationships with the environment and with themselves. Experiencing results from actions, accompanies actions, and leads to actions.

Emotions and feelings—which are used here interchangeably—are specific forms of experiencing. One can experience annoyance, disgust, and joy, which represent prototypical emotions. But one can also experience irritation, uncertainty, curiosity, tiredness, and hunger, which are not emotions or at least not “pure” emotions. For example, certain cognitive processes play a substantial role in feelings of uncertainty, and physical conditions play a role in feelings of tiredness and hunger. In addition, emotions can be dominant in the experiential process, but they can occur also in various combinations and mixtures with other forms of experience—and this is probably the rule.

RULES OF EMOTIONALITY

The social basis of emotions becomes particularly clear when we consider the rules of emotionality; rules that determine, to a great extent, how people feel, manifest, and process emotions (Hochschild, 1979). Four types of rules of emotionality can be distinguished, each of which regulate the occurrence of emotion at different levels and within different areas: *emotion rules*, *manifestation rules*, *correspondence rules* and *coding rules*.

Emotion rules indicate the type and intensity of feelings viewed as appropriate and socially acceptable within a given type of situation, from the perspectives of both the person concerned and the other participants. As Scherer, Summerfield, and Wallbott (1983) observed, “There seem to be relatively clear cultural expectations as to how appropriate particular emotions and particular

intensities of emotion are in particular situations” (pp. 360-361). Coulter (1979) similarly noted that, “Types of situations are paradigmatically linked to the emotion they afford by *convention*. The link is neither deterministic nor biological, but socio-cultural” (p. 133). The *general form* of emotion rules can be stated as follows:

If a situation is interpreted as type X,
it is appropriate and is socially expected,
to have an emotional experience of the type Y.

For example, if a situation is interpreted to involve an irreparable loss, then sadness is appropriate and socially expected. If I am in such a situation in which there has been an irreparable loss, I expect to feel sadness, and on the basis of this emotion rule, my interaction partner expects that I will feel this way and interprets my behavior in this light.

Manifestation rules regulate the type and intensity of emotions that may be expressed in a particular situation, regardless of what emotion one is actually feeling. For example, if a boy’s dog is run over he might cry. The expression, *big boys don’t cry*, codifies a manifestation rule that specifies that when men are sad, it is appropriate and socially expected that they will *not* display their feelings of sadness by crying.

Correspondence rules regulate the types of emotions and manifestations expected from conversational partners in response to a person’s feelings or displays of particular emotions. If, for example, I see that my conversational partner is sad, I should not continue to feel relaxed and merry, at least I should not show it.

Coding rules are conventions that describe and determine which behaviors count as manifestations of an emotion. Thus they pertain to both the behaviors by which a feeling can be manifested and to the indicators in a person’s behaviors that enable interactional partners to recognize that he or she is experiencing an emotion.

In essence, in this model of a system of emotionality rules, not only are the expression or manifestation behaviors subject to social standards and conventions, but there are also *rules for the emotions themselves* toward which those participating in the interaction orient themselves. If an individual experience deviates from the rules, an individual or interactive tuning between emotional requirements and individual emotions can take place via *emotion regulation* (Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 87-93). The system of emotionality rules is socially diverse: The rules vary specifically according to roles, gender, situation, and (sub)culture. The rules of emotionality are thus not by any means universal.

COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONS AS TRANSMISSION OF EVALUATIONS

Interaction can be understood as a complex hierarchy of tasks that must be fulfilled to achieve certain goals and purposes. Processes of *evaluation* and *statement* always play a role in the solution of these tasks. These evaluations and statements are likewise to be understood as tasks to be solved either individually or interactively. A number of procedures are available to participants for solving the tasks of evaluation. What we commonly call *emotions* or *emotional processes* can be understood as a *specific procedure* for the solution of such tasks of evaluation and statement. Differently formulated: A part of these evaluation tasks is solved on the emotional level.

From a functional perspective, each emotion can be described as an evaluating statement. The following schema can clarify this:

Emotion A is an evaluating statement
about X
on the basis of Y
as Z.

Table 4.1 shows the allocations that are possible for X, Y, and Z:

TABLE 4.1
Emotions as Evaluating Statements

<i>About X</i>	<i>On the basis of Y</i>	<i>As Z</i>
(1) Situation (2) Other person Action Characteristics (3) One's Self Action Characteristics (4) Events and circumstances (5) Articles (6) Mental productions	(1) Expectations (2) Interests, desires (3) Social norms and morals (4) Self-concept (5) Picture of the other one	(1) In agreement (2) Not in agreement

For example, if I am annoyed at myself because I have knocked over a vase, this can be understood as an evaluating statement about oneself (or an action one has performed) on the basis of one's self-concept (or expectations over my behavior) as not in agreement. If I am pleased with the thought that I will receive a visit tomorrow, then this can be described as an evaluating statement about a mental production on the basis of my desires (or expectations) as in agreement.

If an emotion is communicated in the interaction, this is equivalent to communication of an evaluating statement or, more generally, an evaluation. If the emotion “disgust” is expressed through behaviors (e.g., mimicry, shuddering, vocal characteristics) or by words (e.g., *I am disgusted by this meal*), then a specific negative evaluation—here, of the meal—is communicated to the interlocutor. This same evaluation could, of course, also be conveyed in ways other than by communication of an emotion (e.g., by evaluation descriptors or formulations: *Terrible!* or *I find the meal repulsive*, etc.).

In order to determine the value of emotional communication for interaction, communication must be understood as multidimensional—as more than just the exchange of information by signs. One must assume instead that communication always has at least two aspects of equal standing: the communication of circumstances *and* the communication of evaluations. Evaluations are always communicated as part of any exchange on any topic. Some of this evaluative content is communicated via emotions.

This fundamental evaluative dimension of utterances has been systematically neglected in linguistic conceptions of communication in favor of the information dimension. But the systematic value of emotional communication can only become clear *as special form of communication of evaluations* when both the evaluative and informative dimensions of communication are taken into account.

COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONS IN THE INTERACTION

With respect to emotions in interaction, participants solve specific *communication tasks* by means of specific *communicative practices*. Three broad classes of communication tasks can be distinguished: the *manifestation of emotions*, the *interpretation of emotions*, and the *interactive processing of emotions*.

During the course of an interaction, emotions can be *manifested* and communicated to partners through various patterns of behaviors and utterances (especially phenomena of emotional expression and verbal thematizations of emotions), independent of whether the emotions are actually present or not.

In particular, if experience was displayed in an interaction-relevant manner, but also independently of this, the emotional presence is *interpreted* in interaction situations more or less intensively mutually. This emotion task does not necessarily require communication tasks. An interpretation may be made privately, but the results of this interpretation can become relevant to the interaction. An interpretation may also involve communicative sequences in the form of questions (e.g., *Are you angry?*), projective experience thematization (e.g., *Don't be so sad*), or negotiations.

Once an experience or an emotion has been established as an interactive “fact” through manifestation and interpretation, it can be *processed* communicatively. Strategies for processing emotions include “entering,” “analyzing,” “calling into question,” and “ignoring.”

Manifestation of Experiencing and Emotions

People can use two different strategies to communicate emotions and experiences: They can give them expression in different ways or they can make them the explicit topic or subject of the interaction. Thus, we can distinguish between practices for the *expression* of experiences and emotions and practices for the *thematization* of experiences and emotions.

In thematization, an experience or an emotion is made the topic of the interaction by a verbalization. Expression, however, is not limited to verbalization (although expressions may naturally accompany verbalizations). Emotional expressions also do not necessarily make experiences although they are manifested as the topic of the interaction. A splenetic *Can you perhaps be on time sometime?* certainly expresses an emotion by means of speech rate, intonation contour, vocal characteristics, and so forth. However, it does not thematize the experience, as would be the case with *Your perpetual lateness really annoys me!* In the latter example, emotional experience is explicitly made the topic of verbal communication, allowing people to communicate about emotions. This is the essential structure of *thematization* of emotions and experiences.

Most often, however, the topic of verbal communication will be something other than emotion, but *besides and at the same time* people communicate emotions by the manner in which they communicate about the topic. The emotions function as evaluating statements with respect to the topic, as well as with respect to further aspects: to other persons, their actions, ourselves, and so on. This is the essential structure of the *expression* of emotions and experience.

Expression

The communication of emotions consists to a high degree of *expressions* of emotions and the interpretation of these expressions. Emotional expression, as it happens at a certain place in the interaction, is a function of *underlying emotions* on the one hand and, on the other hand, of *display rules* specifying what expressions are socially appropriate and expected in a given situation. Emotional expression is thus understood as not exclusively a consequence of internal emotions (this is the usual view), but as determined *equally* from internal emotions *and* manifestation rules.

By *emotional expression* I mean all behaviors (and involuntary physiological reactions) in the context of an interaction that are manifested by a participant with the awareness that they are related to emotions and/or that are perceived and interpreted by the interaction partner accordingly. In this way, emotion expression is conceptualized from the outset in terms of its communicative function within interaction.

The relationship between expression and emotion can be determined on the following basis: In specific situations, specific behaviors and physiological reactions of individuals or groups are understood by other individuals or groups as the expression of a certain emotion of a certain intensity. These expressions may or may not actually express such an emotion. For this determination, the following considerations are relevant:

- Emotion expression, or that which is considered as such, can vary by situation and by person or group.
- Interacting persons do not always interpret emotion expression as a sign of “real” emotions.
- Emotion expression has a conventional aspect.
- Emotion expression is a complex phenomenon, usually consisting of more than one behavior or physiological reaction.
- Any behaviors and physiological reactions can be interpreted by a recipient as emotion expression— independent of how the acting person understands these behaviors and reactions.

Thematization

We can distinguish at least four practices in the *thematization* of experiences and emotions: (a) verbal labeling of experiences and emotions, (b) description of experiences and emotions, (c) designation or description of the events and circumstances relevant to the experience and (d) description or narration of the situational circumstances of an experience.

Verbal Labeling of Experiences and Emotions. Emotions can be thematized by verbal experience labels. Terms for emotions are socially preformed interpretative possibilities for personal experiences; they are socially standardized possibilities of typing and of defining an experience. The whole of these designations forms the *emotion vocabulary or lexicon* of a language. Emotion terms exist at both the general (*feeling, mood, experiencing*) and specific (*fear, joy, fascination*) levels. They are present in nominal, verbal, and adjectival form. The emotion vocabulary cannot be clearly delimited, due to the fact that most expressions we use for internal states also have cognitive, evaluating, motivational, and physiological components of meaning, with which they can become relevant in communication (Fiehler, 1990c).

Descriptions of Experiences and Emotions. Descriptions of experiences and emotions are more or less detailed attempts to clarify a specific experience to the interaction partner by rewritings. Important linguistic means for the implementation of descriptions of experience include, among other things, the use of (a) experiential declarative formulas, (b) frozen metaphorical idioms (phraseologies), and (c) the metaphorical use of expressions:

Experiential declarative formulas are expressions that define what occurs in their scope as experience or emotion. Examples of these expressions include: *I felt (myself) X; I had the feeling X; to me, it was X*, and so on. The scope of these formulas can include experience-designating terms (*I felt anxious/depressed/happy/etc.*), short comparisons (*I felt empty/put upon/etc.*) and comparisons or images using *like* or *as if* (*I felt like the sun king/as if the earth had slid away under my feet/etc.*). *Frozen metaphorical idioms* are conventional figurative-metaphorical expressions for emotions or experiences, such as: *Es kocht in mir (it boils within me); Das haut mich aus den Schuhen (that knocks my socks off); Du treibst mich auf die Palme (you are driving me nuts)*, and so on. *Metaphorical use of expressions* refers to other, nonconventional figurative uses of expressions to describe an emotion or experiences, such as: *Ich hänge durch (I am sagging); Die Prüfung steht mir bevor (my exam is impending); Ich war völlig zu (I was completely blocked)* and so on.

If one analyzes the full range of figurative language used to describe experience (experience-declarative formulas with short and developed comparisons, fixed metaphorical idioms, metaphorical use of expressions, etc.), one can derive fundamental everyday conceptualizations of emotions which structure and determine our understanding of emotions and their functioning (Kövecses, 1990). Except by labels, experience and emotions can hardly be talked about except by representing them in analogy to other (more concrete) areas (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Frequently these are not single analogies, but rather, certain domains are the source for a multiplicity of figurative descriptions of experience. I briefly mention some substantial and productive domains.

Negative experience is frequently conceptualized as PHYSICAL VIOLATION or disturbance of the physical integrity (something *hurt me terribly, left a wound, scars, gnaws at me, I shred myself, something hits me like a shot to the heart, or goes under the skin*). Furthermore emotions are conceptualized as SENSORY PERCEPTION (*that left a bad taste in my mouth, stinks, I can't stand the smell, it doesn't scratch my itch*). Further concepts are HEAT and COLDNESS (*that left me cold, it boils within me*), the pressure rising to the explosion (*it tore my heart, I exploded*) and taking off from the ground (*who will fly up in the air*). Close relationships exist between these concepts, and they spill over into concepts used to describe emotional dynamics: RISING AND FALLING OF WATER (*a feeling of fear flooded over/through*

me, then it ebbed), INFLAMING AND BURNING, as well as WIND AND STORM.

Positive feelings are conceptualized as, among other things, DECREASE IN WEIGHT, which makes it possible to float or fly (*it took a load off my mind, what a relief, I floated as on clouds, felt like I was in seventh heaven*). This is a special case of conceptualizations that use the dimension *height/depth*, whereby positively evaluated feelings are high, and negatively evaluated are deep (*I am down, torn down to the ground*). The investigation of which conceptualizations are the basis of the descriptions of emotions, how they are connected with more general conceptualization practices and which mixtures or overlays of metaphoric domains are possible, results in a most interesting way of explaining the everyday understanding of emotions.

Labeling/Describing Events and Circumstances Relevant to an Experience.

By labeling or describing events or circumstances that have clearly negative or positive consequences for the speaker, experience connected with these events can be made the topic of the interaction. This is particularly true if the utterances are accompanied by appropriate expression phenomena, for example, *My dog was run over yesterday!* (with appropriate mimicry and intonation).

Description/Narration of the Situational Circumstances of an Experience.

One's own or other's past experiences can be thematized, as the situational circumstances or the flow of the events are described, reported, or told. They are reported or told, *in order to* clarify an experience in the situation concerned. The aim of such reports or narrations in experience-thematizing intention is to have the listener call the narrated situation to mind and, resorting to the emotion rules valid for this type of situation, grasp how the other one felt in that situation. The description of the situational circumstances and order of events can thereby consist exclusively of the playback of actions and cognitions of the persons involved in the situation concerned. In more complex experience thematizations, verbal designations and descriptions of the experience may be used in addition to descriptions of the situational circumstances. I speak of a *complex experience thematization*, if the speaker uses more than one of the practices I have specified for thematizing a particular experience.

Elements in Thematizations of Experiences and Emotions

The thematization of an emotion can focus on different aspects of the experience, including:

1. the carrier of experience: *P*
2. the type of experience: *E* (for unspecified experience), *A* (for a specific emotion)

- 3. the intensity of experience: *I*
- 4. the dynamics or process of experience: *D*
- 5. the object or point of reference of experience: *O*
- 6. the bases of experience and the yardsticks of the evaluating statement: *G*

One can easily recognize in these aspects the definition given above that experience / emotion *E* is an evaluating statement (specific according to type *A*, intensity *I* and dynamic/process *D*) of a person *P* to something *O* with the statement grounded on a specific basis *G*. However, thematization can also be determined by a number of further aspects:


- 7. the initiator or the reason of the experience: *V*
- 8. the localization of experience in the body: *K*
- 9. the appearance of expression and somatic-physiological effects of the experience: *AUS*
- 10. the consequences of the experience: *F*

With the help of these aspects of focusing, we can completely analyze all utterances that thematize an experience on the basis of the practices of verbal labeling or description. First the analysis of two examples of *verbally labeling experience thematizations*:

A. "I was in complete despair."




B. "He had a disgusting feeling in his gut because of the discussion."




Now three examples of the analysis of *experience descriptions*:

C. "You are gradually getting on my nerves."



D. "It boils inside me."



- 5.3. Verbal thematization of experience
 - 5.3.1. Verbal labeling of experience
 - 5.3.2. Description of experience
- 6. Conversational behavior
 - 6.1. Topic (e.g., selection of a sad topic).
 - 6.2. Type of conversation (e.g., silly jokes).
 - 6.3. Conversational strategies (e.g., demonstrative denial, shameless openness).
 - 6.4. Organization of conversation (e.g., overlap, interruption).
 - 6.5. Conversation modality (e.g., engaged, loosely, ironically).

This system shows how broad the spectrum of the phenomena is by which emotions can be manifested. They distribute themselves over the entire spectrum of communicative behavior.

Interpretation of Experiences and Emotions

Interacting individuals interpret others' experiences and emotions all the time, although with changing intensity and accuracy. The interpretation consists of the fact that (a) specific experiencing is imputed to the other person—also independent of indicators present, that (b) behaviors and physiological reactions are interpreted as emotion expression, and that (c) experience thematization is interpreted. The ascription of an emotion is *a result* of these three components.

In the majority of situations, experience is imputed more or less differentially to the interaction partner. Even when no emotional indicators are present or perceived, emotions can be imputed to others on the basis of (a) the emotion rules that apply to the specific situation, (2) the projection of one's own emotional disposition on the other, and (3) potentially, knowledge about one's partner's emotional disposition.

During an interaction, a partner's behaviors and physiological reactions may be interpreted as an expression of his or her experience and emotions. When other's reactions are interpreted in such a way, I call them *experience and emotion indicators*. For the interpreting person, they are indicators of certain emotions within the situation concerned, but they are not indicators in a general and objective way. In principle, *all* of one's partner's behaviors and physiological reactions can serve as possible forms of an expression of experience and emotions and thus used to interpret their emotional state.

Finally, the interpretation of experiencing also supports itself by the interpretation of the experience thematization of the other person.

Processing of Experiences and Emotions

Once experiences and emotions are established as common fact for the participants by manifestation and interpretation, they can be handled or processed in the interaction. We can distinguish analytically among four processing strategies: (a) “entering” refers to all strategies with which the interaction partner accepts the displayed emotion as appropriate and handles it with expressions of sympathy; (b) “analyzing” refers to strategies by which the suitability of the manifested emotion in terms of intensity and/or type is problematized; (c) “calling into question” refers to strategies by which displayed emotions are not accepted as appropriate; and finally (d) “ignoring” refers to strategies by which the interaction partner—despite having perceived and interpreted the emotion—consciously and obviously avoids acknowledging it and dealing with it interactively in manifest way. The demonstrative character of the avoidance process differentiates between “ignoring” and “passing over.” These four strategies can also occur in combination. It is obvious that the three first strategies mentioned are tied to verbal communication processes.

A range of possibilities of the interactive handling of emotions has developed into communicative patterns of action. Patterns of action are socially standardized and conventionalized practices that serve to realize specific functions and purposes that frequently return during social processes (Ehlich & Rehbein, 1986). So, for example, a “sympathy-pattern” is central to the “entering” strategy (Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 150-156), whereas a “divergence” pattern of action—with which a manifested emotion becomes an object of negotiation—is central to “analyzing” and “calling into question.” I illustrate the divergence-pattern by a (fictitious) example:

- A: C could have saved himself his silly remarks!
 B: Don't be so annoyed at yourself. It isn't worth it.
 A: Let me, anyway. I want to excite myself at times.

In this example, an emotion expressed by A is called into question by B. B interprets A's expressive phenomena (e.g. word selection, intonation) as annoyance. B's suggestion in the context of the negotiation that starts with his utterance is directed toward a modification of the intensity of experience (“so”). The suggestion for the modification of the experience is implemented in the form of a direct request. The reason recurs due to an emotion rule, according to which a high intensity of experience is coupled to a high importance of the event, which does not exist in B's opinion. The correcting function of the suggestion is predominant. B's attempt to interactively regulate emotion is rejected by A, however, who then uses another experience label (“excite”).

This example illustrates that emotions can very probably be “negotiated” and that this negotiation can concern not only the manifestations but also the emotions themselves. Such negotiations are delivered on the basis of implicit or explicit mentioned emotion rules. Feelings are thereby argued on the basis of conceptions about emotions such as whether they are appropriate or inappropriate, justified or unjustified, and so forth. Negotiations of this type make it clear that feelings are by far not a private thing but are socially standardized.

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EMOTIONS AND COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

Thus far, we have considered the tasks that take place during the handling of emotions in interaction from a *process* perspective—that is, from the point of view of the interacting partners—with particular focus on how partners solve emotions tasks in and through communicative processes. Now, we will take an “interactional analysis” perspective—the perspective of a person analyzing a previously documented interaction—and consider what phenomena in the conversation can be used to detect that emotions were manifested, interpreted, and processed by the participants. Phenomena which appear from a process perspective to be, for example, *manifestations* of an emotional experience, will appear from an interactional analysis perspective, if it considers the results of an action, as the *effects* of the emotional experience on the utterances, or, more generally, on communicative acting. The emotional experience affects and modifies the communicative action and is thus evidenced there.

Connected with this idea is the question regarding *fundamental systematic connections* between emotions and communication behavior. Two such general connections can be identified: First, *emotions modify a communicative behavior*. Here, we can distinguish between cases in which an emotion accompanies a communication behavior (which would have taken place without the presence of the emotion) and *affects* the form of the message, and cases in which the emotion *motivates* a communicative behavior and thus is the cause for the utterances, which would not have taken place in such a way without it. Second, *communicative behavior modifies emotions*. In this second connection, we can further distinguish between cases in which the communication behavior influences *one’s own* emotionality and cases in which it influences the emotionality of the *interlocutor(s)*. In the first case, verbal techniques of personal emotion regularization are involved.

Three basic assumptions are prerequisites for these considerations of different connections between emotional and communicative behavior. They are explicitly identified here because they are not unproblematic and are not necessarily shared

(even though they are constitutive for the common understanding of the connections between emotions and communication; cf. Fiehler. 1990a, pp. 163-167 for the problems of these assumptions):

- Emotional experience and communicative behavior can be understood as entities that are, in principle, *independent* from each other.
- The first assumption implies that emotions can be the *cause* or the *reason* for communicative activities, and also, in contrast, that communicative behavior can be a cause and reason for emotions.
- The third assumption means that there can be an unemotional or *emotionally neutral* mode of communicative activities and that this is the basic mode. If emotions occur, then they modify this neutral way of communication in a recognizable and specific way. According to this view, communicative processes are built up from unemotional (neutral, objective, calm) passages and emotional phases, in which the communicative behavior is affected and modified more or less strongly by emotions.

If one asks where in communication behavior emotions work themselves out or to which phenomena must one pay attention, one can orient oneself to the manifestation areas specified above. In each of these areas, phenomena can be identified that are brought into connection conventionally with the working of emotions and by the presence of which it can be considered that with their causation, emotions were in play or that they are indicators for emotions (cf. Fiehler 1990a, pp. 168-174).

METHODOLOGY OF EMOTION ANALYSIS

Insofar as it is interested in the interdependencies between communication and emotions, the analysis of conversation involves examining these connections in conversation recordings and transcripts. The general questions of such an emotion analysis are: (a) Which processes of manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotional experience can be found in a conversation? and (b) How are these processes presented in the participants' communication behavior? Because it is not evident during recordings of natural conversations whether and which emotions play a role there, and emotionality usually only is thematized to the smallest extent, an explicit methodology of emotion analysis is of central importance for such investigations. In the following, a six-step methodology is sketched out that makes it possible to ask the questions mentioned, at least to some extent.

The *first* step of the emotion analysis consists of determining what is *thematized* in emotions and emotion interpretations in the participants' interaction. Indicators for thematization include explicit experience labels and

descriptions. On the basis of this thematization, one can examine whether specific emotion indicators corresponding to these thematizations can be recognized.

The target of the *second* step is to realize, on the basis of empathy, which emotions and which experiences can play a role for the participants in an interaction of the type concerned and in the specific situation. This step makes the *scope of expected experience* of the participants explicit on the basis of emotion rules.

In the *third* step, the interaction is examined for *indicators* by which emotions and emotion interpretations express themselves. So that this step does not go over the line, it is limited first to sequences of the interaction that are particularly “emotional.”

In the *fourth* step, the selected sequences are examined *utterance by utterance* in view of both of the types of systematic connections between emotions and communicative behavior previously specified. That is, it is now sequentially examined as to whether and how the imputed emotions modify the participants’ communicative behavior and whether and how this communicative behavior modifies the participants’ emotional states.

In the *fifth* step, the analysis, which in the third and fourth steps focused only on selected sequences, is expanded to the entire interaction.

The *sixth* and last step of the analysis pursues another direction. It examines whether communicative patterns of emotion processing can be found in the interaction (e.g., the sympathy pattern, the divergence pattern). This analysis step can also be executed independently of the others.

EMOTIONALITY IN SPECIFIC CONVERSATION TYPES

In the following, I concentrate on investigations that examine emotionality in natural conversations on a interpretive and conversation analytic basis.

It is obvious that attention was directed first toward such conversation types, which according to the everyday understanding are “emotionally pregnant,” particularly disputes or therapeutic communication. On the basis of authentic conversations and transcripts, very different investigation questions are possible. On the one hand, in the sense of a case analysis, the reconstruction of the emotionality of a single conversation can be the aim, on the other hand, systematically limited questions can be processed:

- Incidents and processing of a certain experience or a certain emotion (e.g., embarrassment [after errors in instructions; Brünner, 1987], feelings of indebtedness [Vangelisti, Daly, & Rudnick, 1991],

astonishment [Selting, 1995], rage [Christmann & Günthner, 1996], indignation [Schwitalla, 1996], edginess [Hartung, 1996])

- Incidents of specific means or forms of the manifestation (e.g., exaltation [Kallmeyer, 1979a], emphasis [Selting, 1994], interjections and reduplications [Drescher, 1997]).
- Incidents of specific communicative patterns and forms of emotion processing (e.g., sympathy pattern [Fiehler, 1990a; Schwitalla, 1991], tone of appeasement [Schwitalla, 1997]).
- Specifics of the manifestation, interpretation and processing of emotionality in a certain type of conversation, and so on.

Among the particularly emotionally pregnant conversation types are *conversations between physician and patient* (cf. Bliesener, 1982; Bliesener & Köhle, 1986; Fiehler, 1990b; Gaus & Köhle, 1982; Lalouschek, 1993; Löning, 1993; Lörcher, 1983). This type of conversation is characterized by a special problematic concerning the manifestation of experiences and emotions by the patient. Although diseases are frequently connected with intense experience, the somatically oriented medical field expects the patient to keep his or her emotions out of the situation and to limit his or her participation to cooperatively and materially supporting the physician's anamnestic, diagnostic, and therapeutic measures. This frequently succeeds only partially with the patients, however, so that a processing of the manifested emotions then becomes necessary within the physician-patient conversation. This emotional processing often ends unsatisfactorily.

Physicians or medical personnel frequently carry out "feeling work" (Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suezek, & Wiener, 1980) during the treatment as a purely instrumental function to ease their own work. "Feeling work" refers to dealing with a thematized or anticipated experience of the patient "in the service of the main work process" (Strauss et al., 1980, p. 629).

Therapy conversations are also emotionally intensive in a special way (e.g., Coulter, 1979; Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 239-247; Käsermann, 1995). One of the central goals in such interactions as client-centered therapy is the *verbalization of the contents of emotional experience*. Accordingly, processes of thematization, interpretation, and processing of experience and emotions play a substantial role in therapeutic conversations of this type: The purpose of the therapy sessions is to bring the client's emotions into focus. On the one hand, the client's emotions connected with the *current therapy situation* are processed. On the other hand, the client's *past experiences* are brought into the therapy situation by narrations and reports. The client's *manifestations* and *thematization* of experiences in client-centered therapy differ quantitatively but not qualitatively from those in other conversation types. They are much more frequent and are more developed and differentiated (e.g., complex experience thematization, experience declarative

formulas with developed comparisons), and thematizations are over-represented in comparison with the expression of emotions (cf. the following analysis). Qualitative differences, however, exist in the *interpretation* of experience manifestations (by the therapists) and in the *processing* of manifested experiences (by client and therapist).

One of the therapist's central actions is to redirect attention away from the client's reports, narrations, and reflections, to the experience dimension of the reported events. For this, the therapist's most important tools are the focusing and interpretation of experience. During *experience focusing* the therapist does not formulate interpretation, but rather motivates the patient to explore and verbalize his or her experience. In addition, the therapist can formulate an *experience interpretation* more specifically by using a label or description with a hypothetical or determining character. With such experience interpretations three things can occur: they can be ignored, the client can make them his or her own, or they can become an article of a negotiation. The *experience negotiation* can thereby refer to both the intensity and type of experience imputed by the therapist. These differences regarding manifestation, interpretation, and processing of experience and emotions are a direct reflection of the therapeutic theory, which is made operational in the conversation with the client.

A third type of emotionally pregnant communication is *disputes* (Fiehler 1986, 1990a; Kallmeyer, 1979b). If different views, opinions, and interests meet, if a diversity of opinion, a controversy, or a conflict is present, then, for the participants, this is frequently connected with emotions, which manifest themselves in the interaction. However, usually the experience of the participants is not the topic of the interaction but rather is manifested by expression parallel to the argument about another topic. A prerequisite for conflicts is that a contrast exists so that a *position* and an *opposite standpoint* are interactively built up and negotiated. This can cover a pair of utterances or long interaction sequences. The existence of an opposition means that the positions are mutually evaluated as not compatible or contradictory and that on the basis of these evaluations, the opposite standpoint is formulated. In this manner, each contribution for delivering of oppositions contains *components of evaluation*. This is essential for understanding the role of emotions in the delivery of oppositions: A part of these evaluations is communicated by the expression of emotions.

A final example of emotionally intensive communicative activities are *narrations* (e.g., Bloch, 1996; Fiehler, 1990a; Günthner, 1997). The cause for many narrations is that a person has felt particularly strong emotions or has had unusual experiences that were associated with intense emotions. The purpose of the narrations is to clarify these experiences or emotions for another person. This

clarification typically takes place in narrations less by means of experience labels or descriptions, but more by description of the situational circumstances and the flow of the events whereby the emotions concerned can and must be inferred on the basis of emotion rules.

This short overview shows that the empirical analysis of emotionality in natural conversations is still in its beginning.

EXAMPLE ANALYSIS

To illustrate the statements regarding therapy conversations in the previous paragraph and to show that empirical data can be analyzed by means of the conceptual instruments presented here, I now examine two short exemplary transcriptions from therapeutic sessions. The following transcription originates from the initial phase of such a session. At the beginning of a session, it is typical for clients to report events relevant to experience from the period between the sessions. This also occurs here. The transcription is segmented with indicated lines, so that the analysis can be followed more easily.

(1) Giving and taking 10: Transcript Section 1,1-20

Transcript name: Giving and taking 10

Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (10th session)

Interacting persons: K: Client (female), B: Therapist (male)

Audio recording: B; open

Transcription: R. Weingarten

Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schütze *(better look at Appendix (1))*

1, 1 K	<u>...mir gings-, die ganze Woche-, _also ich hab die Woche über</u>
	How the whole week went for me? Then I have to think the week over
	<u>_1</u> <u>_2</u>
2 B	
3 K	<u>nich mehr-, so furchtbare Stimmungsschwankungen gehabt ne'</u>
	Never before, never had such terrible mood swings
4 B	
5 K	<u>_ so-..ging mir eher-, äh bescheiden. ..._(langsam) stimmungs-</u>
	so granted, I have rather, um, tendency
	<u>_3</u> <u>_4</u>
6 B	mhm
7 K	<u>mäßig +... ähm... ja, was jetzt so akut grade war' gestern hat</u>
	moderately +?... eh... yes, now what I felt so acutely yesterday has...
	<u>_5</u>
8 B	

9 K	mich mein Freund angerufen- <u>das war doch n ziemlicher</u>
	my friend calling me? That was nevertheless a considerable
	<u>6</u>
10 B	Mhm
11 K	Schlag vors Kontor wieder' <u>weil ich hatte das Gefühl-</u>
	Shot across the kidneys again ' because I had the feeling
	<u>7</u>
12 B	mhm <u>hat dich</u>
	mhm you had
	<u>8</u>
13 K	ich weiß es nich, hinter-
	I didn't know it, behind
14 B	irgendwie mitg-, mitgenommen schon.
	somehow it had happened already.
15 K	her ich hab mich selbst so-, einerseits ha-, hats mich nich
	A while ago, on the one hand hecar, hadn't
16 B	
17 K	so ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte ne' so-
	Knocked me out of my socks like it did' -?
18 B	<u>mhm, hattest</u>
	Mhm, had
	<u>9</u>
19 K	aber- ja'
	however
20 B	dir so-, wirklich so vo- (k) <u>schlimmer</u> vorgestellt. denn
	because you had so, really made out so badly (k) .

The transcript shows a *complex experience thematization*, which also covers a report of a past situation. With this complex experience thematization, the client brings a past experience into the therapy situation, where it is then processed by therapist and client in specific ways.

In segment 1 [... I felt-, the whole week-], the client begins with the experience declarative formula "mir gings" (I felt). As segment 2 shows [weil I didn't have such terrible mood swings all week], a recapitulatory description of the experience is to be given. This is implemented in segment 2 by a negatively defined experience label "nicht mehr so furchtbare Stimmungsschwankungen" (not such terrible mood swings). In segment 3 [so-. I felt more-, mhm moderately], experience is formulated positively, now again with an experience declarative formula and a short comparison. I characterize this as a short comparison, because in my opinion "bescheiden" (moderately) does not represent

a conventional experience label. Segment 4 [(slowly) concerning mood], which is related to 3, shows and clarifies retroactively that this was meant as experience thematization. This elucidation may be connected with the fact that the suitability of “bescheiden” (moderately) for thematization of the experience appears questionable to K. Segment 5 involves the thematization of an experience by designation of an experience-relevant event: “gestern hat mich mein Freund angerufen” (yesterday my friend called me). From what follows, it becomes clear that this concerns the ex-friend. For all participants it is evident, and this also is supported by the introduction “was jetzt so akut grade war” (what just now was so acutely) that this event must have been connected with an intensive experience for K. The event is identified to thematize the concerning experience. Even if this experience had not been more exactly specified in the following utterances by means of other practices, B could have inferred it on the basis of emotion rules from the designated event. Segment 6 is then a description of the experience [that was still a considerable shot across the kidneys again]. Together with segment 5 and segment 7 [because I had the feeling-] K here supplies a complex experience thematization. The description of the experience in 6, which is carried out with a fixed figurative-metaphorical idiom, above all focuses the aspects of the intensity (considerable), the dynamics of the experience concerned (suddenness: “shot”) and probably the type of experience.

It is notable that the client uses the figure of speech “shot across the kidneys.” This German idiom is usually phrased “a shot to the kidneys.” We can speculate that this is a confounding of two idiomatic phrases: “shot to the kidneys” and “shot across the bow.” However these speculations transcend what should be demonstrated here. If something meaningful lies behind this slip of the tongue, it is of more concern to the therapist or analyst than to the linguist. In segment 7, the client sets up a reason for the intensity and dynamics of the experience described, which is initiated with an experience declarative formula “ich hatte das Gefühl” (I had the feeling). Now however in segment 8 B intervenes with a determining experience interpretation “hat dich irgendwie mitgenommen schon” (still stirred you anyhow). This is a typical communicative activity of therapists in client-centered therapy. There are several conceivable explanations for this intervention: The therapist can be of the opinion that the client has not thematized the experience clearly enough with the figurative description, or that it does not focus the relevant aspects of the experience. B focuses the consequences of the experience in his intervention. Last but not least, it is also conceivable that B only wants to paraphrase the description of the experience to ensure his understanding.

K understands the intervention as a focusing of possible consequences of the experience and rejects the imputed consequences: “einerseits hats mich nich so

ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte" (on the one hand it didn't knock me out of my socks in the way I thought it would). This figure of speech clearly focuses the possible consequences of the experience, whereby the whole utterance represents a statement regarding the unexpectedly small intensity of the experience. Again B intervenes with an utterance, which conceives the intensity verbal designative: "hattest dir *schlimmer* vorgestellt" (you thought it would be worse). This may throw a light on the intention of the first intervention retroactively. Under the circumstances, B would like to reflect back the figurative descriptions of the experience to K in the form of verbal labels. A resort to socially preformed and standardized verbal labels surely creates clarity for K with the interpretation of his emotional life. However, this use remains to be weighed against the plasticity and intensity of figurative descriptions of the experience.

The first transcription emphasized the manner in which the client brings her experience into the therapeutic conversation. In the next example, we focus on a typical activity of the therapist: the *experience focusing* already mentioned. In this example, it leads to a developed *experience exploration* of the client.

(II) Marriage problem 1, Transcript Section 23,35 - 24,18

Transcript name: Marriage problem 1

Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (1st session)

Interacting persons: K: Client (male), B: Therapist (male)

Audio recording: B; open

Transcription: R. Weingarten

Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schütze (better look at Appendix (II))

23,35 K	daß da n Verhältnis is.
	that there is a relationship.
36 B	äh, wär das für Sie irgendwie (&) wenn
	Um, if that was so for you somehow (&) if
37 K	
38 B	Ihre Frau das denken würde oder sie denkt ja, + em-, was emp-
	Your wife would think that or she thinks yeah, + em, what fee-
39 K	... (leise) was emp-
	...(quietly) which fee-
40 B	finden Sie dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt.
	Do you find that your wife thinks that.
24, 1 K	find ich dabei + ...ich fühl mich ja an und für sich ziemlich
	I think... I feel quite the same for myself and her
2 B	
3 K	unwohl dabei. ..(holt Luft)
	unwell with it. (draws a breath)
4 B	ähä, (leise) was is das dann fürn Gefühl +
	aha, (quietly) what kind of a feeling is that then?

5 K	wie soll ich das erklären,(sehr leise) es is n Gcfühl- (7 Sek. Like I say, (very quiet) it is a feeling-(7 sec..
6 B	
7 K	(Pause) tja ich, + also auf jeden Fall in mir dieses Unwohl- (Break) Yeah, I, in any case there is this sick feeling in me.
8 B	
9 K	sein. (h) äh is vorhanden äh its. (h) um is available um
10 B	ähä is da son Stück schlechtes Ge- Uh huh, you have a bad conscience about it.
11 K	ja,könn ich (k) könnte man wohl sagen (sehr yes, can I (k) one could probably say (very much)
12 B	wissen dran',so daß know something about it, so that
13 K	(leise) das is sone Art- es is ne Art + schlech- (quietly) There is some type ...it is a type + bad
14 B	daß man eigentlich sowas nicht tut,oder was that one actually does not do something like that, or which
15 K	tes Gewissen schon dabei. aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was bad conscience already. However I still believe most of it
16 B	ja yes
17 K	anderes. (8 Sek. Pause) ich mache mir ja auch-,äh so Gedanken other one. (8 sec. break) I also, um, have thoughts like this.
18 B	Ähä uh-huh

K takes the perspective of his wife in a problem description and sees the authorization for her suspicions that he has a relation with another woman. Thereupon B changes the perspective and focuses K's experience with the question: "was empfinden Sie dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt" (what do you feel that your wife thinks that) (23,38-40). K repeats the question for himself and begins an experience exploration. He describes his experience with an experiential declarative formula "ich fühl mich" (I feel) (24,1) and the label "unwohl" (unwell) (24,3). Thereupon B requires a further specification "was is das dann fürn Gefühl" (what kind of a feeling is it) (24,4). B thematizes his difficulties during the description formulaically and repeats it (24,5-9). That is, he is not capable of a specification here. Now B continues with an designative projective experience interpretation: "is da son Stück schlechtes Gewissen dran" (you have a bad conscience about it) (24,10-12). B agrees with that, hesitating, but then determines: "aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was anderes" (however the essential I believe is something else) (24,15-17). This is not executed however,

but after a break K changes to a new topic, with which he leaves the level of focusing on the experience, without B insisting.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The attempt to understand emotionality from a decidedly interactive and social perspective is not only the prerequisite for making it accessible for a linguistic and conversation analytic handling but helps also to release emotions from a tendency to reify them as natural phenomena and "strange powers." They become recognizable as quantities that can be shaped and influenced communicatively and as resources in the process of interaction.

Likewise it becomes clear that they are not a purpose in themselves. Manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotions always take place in larger frames for superordinate purposes. Emotions are manifested, interpreted, and processed in order to comfort someone, to solve problems, to carry out a conflict, to have fun together, to give therapy to a person, and there may be still other purposes. Communication processes related to feelings are embedded functionally in more global social practices. Apart from extensive analyses of emotions in different natural conversations, the explication of these frames belongs among the pending research tasks.

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11 K: Schlag vors Kontor wieder' weil ich hatte das Gefühl-
 12 B: mhm | 7 | hat dich
 | 8 |
*shot across the kidneys again' because I had the feeling-
 mhm still*

13 K: ich weiß es nich, hinter-
 14 B: irgendwie mitg-, mitgenommen schon.
*I don't know, afterwards
 stirred you anyhow*
 !

15 K: her ich hab mich selbst so-, einerseits ha-, hats mich nich
 16 B: *I asked myself-, on the one hand it didn't knock*

17 K: so ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte ne' so-
 18 B: mhm, hattest
 | 9 |
me out of my socks in the way I thought it would
 mhm

19 K: aber- ja'
 20 B: dir so-, wirklich so vo- (k) schlimmer vorgestellt.
 but- yes'
 you thought it would be worse.

(II) Marriage problem 1, Transcript Section 23,35 - 24,18

Transcript name: Marriage problem 1

Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (1st session)

Interacting persons: K: Client (male), B: Therapist (male)

Audio recording: B; open

Transcription: R. Weingarten

Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schütze

- 23,35 K: daß da n Verhältnis is.
 36 B: äh,wär das für Sie irgendwie (&) wenn
that there is a relationship.
um, how would that be for you if
- 37 K:
 38 B: Ihre Frau das denken würde oder sie denkt ja,+ em-,was emp-
your wife would think that or she thinks yeah,+ fee-,what do
- 39 K: ... (leise) was emp-
 40 B: finden Sie dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt.
... (quietly) what do
you feel that your wife thinks that way.
- 24, 1 K: find ich dabei + ...ich fühl mich ja an und für sich ziemlich
 2 B: *I feel + ...all in all I feel rather unwell*
- 3 K: unwohl dabei. ..(holt Luft)
 4 B: ähä,(leise) was is das dann fürn Gefühl +
with it. ..(draws a breath)
uh huh, (quietly) what kind of a feeling is it +

5 K: wie soll ich das erklären, (sehr leise) es is n Gefühl- (7 Sek.)
6 B:

how can I explain, (very quietly) it is a feeling- (7 sec.)

7 K: Pause) tja ich,+ also auf jeden Fall in mir dieses Unwohl-
8 B:

break) yeah I,+ in any case there is this sick feeling in

9 K: sein. (h) äh is vorhanden äh
10 B: ähä is da son Stück schlechtes Ge-
me. (h) um is available um
uh huh is there a bit of bad conscience

11 K: ja,könnst ich (k) könnte man wohl sagen (sehr
12 B: wissen dran',so daß

*yes,I could (k) you could say that (very
with it',so that*

13 K: leise) das is sone Art- es is ne Art + schlech-
14 B: daß man eigentlich sowas nicht tut,oder was
quietly) that is a kind- it is a kind of + bad
that one shouldn't really do something like that,or what

15 K: tes Gewissen schon dabei. aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was
16 B: ja

*conscience already. but the essential I believe is some-
yes*

17 K: anderes. (8 Sek. Pause) ich mache mir ja auch-,äh so Gedanken
18 B: ähä

*thing else (8 sec. break) I also have-, um thoughts like this
uh-huh*