When recipient design fails: Egocentric turn-design of instructions in driving school lessons leading to breakdowns of intersubjectivity

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English Abstract
Recipient design is a key constituent of intersubjectivity in interaction. Recipient design of turns is informed by prior knowledge about and shared experience with recipients. Designing turns in order to be maximally effective for the particular recipient(s) is crucial for accomplishing intersubjectively coordinated action. This paper reports on a specific pragmatic structure of recipient design, i.e. counterfactual recipient design, and how it impinges on intersubjectivity in interaction. Based on an analysis of video-recordings data from driving school lessons in German, two kinds of counterfactual recipient design of instructors' requests are distinguished: pedagogic and egocentric turn-design. Counterfactual, pedagogic turn-design is used strategically to diagnose student skills and to create opportunities for corrective instructions. Egocentric turn-design rests on private, non-shared knowledge of the instructor. Egocentrically designed turns imply expectations of how to comply with requests which cannot be recovered by the student and which lead to a breakdown of intersubjective cooperation. This paper identifies practices, sources and interactional consequences of these two kinds of counterfactual recipient design. In addition, the study enhances our understanding of recipient design in at least three ways. It shows that recipient design does not only concern referential and descriptive practices, but also the indexing intelligible projections of next actions; it highlights the productive, other-positioning effects of recipient design; it argues that recipient design should be analyzed in terms of temporally extended interactional trajectories, linking turn-constructional practices to interactional histories and consecutive trajectories of joint action.

Keywords: recipient design – counterfactual recipient design – egocentrism – intersubjectivity – misunderstandings – corrections – requests – driving school

German Abstract
Der Adressatenzuschnitt von Äußerungen (recipient design) ist eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für die Herstellung von Intersubjektivität in der Interaktion. Adressatenzuschnitt speist sich aus präinteraktivem Wissen bzw. Einschätzungen bezüglich des Interaktionspartners und aus gemeinsamen Interaktionserfahrungen. In diesem Beitrag wird eine spezifische Form des Adressatenzuschnitts, nämlich kontrafaktischer, d.h. nicht den Gegebenheiten des faktischen Adressaten entsprechender Adressatenzuschnitt untersucht. Auf der Grundlage von Videoaufnahmen

*Keywords*: Adressatenzuschnitt – kontrafaktischer Adressatenzuschnitt – Egozentrum – Intersubjektivität – Missverständen – Korrekturen – Aufforderungen – Fahrschule

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1. Intersubjectivity, recipient design and egocentrism

1.1 Two facets of intersubjectivity

The notion of intersubjectivity has recently gained currency in conversation analysis. Building on earlier writings by Heritage (1984:254-260) and Schegloff (1992), conversation analysts have come to conceive of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity in interaction as lying at the heart of conversational cooperation (Deppermann 2008, 2015a; Sidnell 2014; Finnish Centre of Excellence in Research on Intersubjectivity in Interaction²). Still, intersubjectivity is not a homogeneous concept. We need to distinguish at least two very different understandings and facets of intersubjectivity: intersubjectivity as idealization (henceforth: intersubjectivity-1) and intersubjectivity as practical accomplishment (henceforth: intersubjectivity-2).

The term 'intersubjectivity' was introduced by Husserl (1929:§§42-62) in his Cartesian Meditations. For Husserl the objectivity of the life-world rests on primordial intersubjectivity-1. It guarantees that the world-for-me is considered as an objective world, because it is basically experienced in the same way as we suppose that others experience the world as well. In Husserl's analysis, this primordial intersubjectivity-1 is revealed to be constituted by the transcendental ego. Intersubjectivity-1 ultimately is a monadic product of the individual consciousness (whose general structures, however, are impersonal and species-generic). Extending Husserl's ideas in the pursuit of developing a "proto-sociology" of subjective foundations of human sociality, Schütz (1974[1932]), and Schütz/Luckmann (1979, 1984) have elaborated the notion of intersubjectivity-1 by exploring in more depths what Schütz (1974[1932]:137) calls the "general thesis of the alter ego". It includes the "idealizations of the reciprocity of perspectives" (Schütz/Luckmann 1979:88f.), most importantly the "Austauschbarkeit der Standpunkte" (interchangeability of standpoints) and the "Kongruenz der Relevanzsysteme" (congruence of the relevance systems). Intersubjectivity-1 is presumed by speakers as a communicative apriori, i.e. in order to communicate. It needs to be presumed as the belief that the recipient will be able to understand a meaningful, i.e. not causally effective action. In the absence of this presumption, it would be futile to communicate. Intersubjectivity-1 concerns a set of very general, formal taken-for-granted assumptions guiding the understanding of social action (see also Garfinkel 1967). It does not concern a specific stock of knowledge, the meaning of particular linguistic forms and actions, and specific ascriptions about emotional states, intentions etc. to individual recipients. Intersubjectivity-1 amounts to treating the recipient as an alter ego, i.e. as another subjectivity endowed with the most general structures of intentionality, which are prerequisites for constructing intersubjectivity-2 (see also Duranti 2009).

In contrast to intersubjectivity-1, intersubjectivity-2 is a practical accomplishment which results from a sequential trajectory of interaction (Schegloff 1992; Sidnell 2014; Deppermann 2015a). Intersubjectivity-2 arises over a minimal sequence of three positions:

² www.intersubjectivity.fi
For any action-to-be-understood in interaction, recipients are expected to display how s/he understands the action-to-be-understood; the producer of the action-to-be-understood has to display if s/he accepts what s/he takes up as recipient's understanding of his/her turn.

In the third positioned turn, thus, the producer of the action-to-be-understood can (and is expected to) display his/her reflexive, 2nd order display of understanding, which is a display of intersubjectivity-2 (cf. Schneider 2004:325ff.). Of course, intersubjectivity-2 needs neither be established nor settled once for all by the minimal three-position-sequence (see Schegloff 1992; Deppermann 2008, 2015a), and it is always only accomplished for practical purposes and until further notice. What counts for our current discussion, is that intersubjectivity-2 is an emergent, observable, shared product of the interaction. It amounts to "grounding" (Clark/Brennan 1991; Clark 1996) the meaning of prior turns, making them part of the participants' common ground to be used to build further cooperation on. In contrast to intersubjectivity-1, intersubjectivity-2 is not species-general and formal, but partner-specific and action/content-specific: It concerns the meaning of a specific action, reference, interactional modality etc. and it is accomplished with regard to specific elements of knowledge, emotional states, intentions, etc.

1.2 Recipient design and intersubjectivity

The concept 'recipient design' was canonically introduced by Sacks et al. (1974: 727):

By 'recipient design' we refer to a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are co-participants. In our work, we have found recipient design to operate with regard to word selection, topic selection, admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and obligations for starting and terminating conversations etc.

Recipient design is a key feature in accomplishing intersubjectivity in interaction. It is crucial for building the bridge between intersubjectivity-1 and intersubjectivity-2 in interaction. Recipient design rests on speaker's prior experience with the recipients of a turn (or a larger trajectory of actions) to be produced. If relevant shared experiences are lacking, recipient design is based on expectations derived from (common) membership in social categories. This, however, quickly is overridden by common ground from shared experience as soon as it is available (Isaacs/Clark 1987). Recipient design is intrinsically intertwined with intersubjectivity in several ways:

(1) Like intersubjectivity-1, it rests on and embodies the speaker's assumptions about recipients.

(2) Unlike intersubjectivity-1, but rather like intersubjectivity-2, it concerns local, specific ascriptions of attention, knowledge, intentions, probable understand-

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3 See already Sacks (1992:230) for an earlier use of the term.
ings, etc. (henceforth: subjective states) which just this/these "particular other(s)" (Sacks et al. 1974:727) entertain(s) at the particular interactional moment with respect to the particular turn/action to be produced. By this, recipient design is a particularization of species-specific intersubjectivity-1 with respect to the precise, fleeting (mental, physical) states of the recipient(s) as they matter for the here and now of the interaction.

(3) Unlike intersubjectivity-1, but akin to intersubjectivity-2, recipient design often does not only implicitly presuppose recipients' properties, but it may explicitly formulate or relatively unequivocally index relevant facets of the recipient.

(4) Recipient design is itself responsive to intersubjectivity-2: It is engendered and continuously adapted and reworked by virtue of (shared) interactional experiences, which allow the speaker to infer recipient's subjective states, which can be presupposed for the production of a turn. Recipient design can often be seen to be adjusted online during turn-production by reacting to recipients' (mainly embodied) simultaneous responses to the turn-in-progress (Goodwin 1979). Turn-production itself therefore is already often under intersubjective control. Recipient design thus rests on an emergent and continuously updated cognitive "partner model" (Deppermann/Blühdorn 2013). Recipient design itself, however, is not a cognitive process, but it is a design feature of discursive action. It may more or less overtly communicate those aspects of the partner model, which account for the recipient design. However, given a specific recipient-designed turn, the underlying partner model may also stay largely opaque to the recipient. While the relevant aspects of the partner model may be made explicit by recipient-designed turns, they may as well only be indexed, remain highly ambiguous or even unrecoverable.

(5) Like both intersubjectivity-1 and intersubjectivity-2, recipient design does not simply mirror properties of the factual recipient, but it is productive in nature. While recipient design may and mostly does rest on experiences with the factual recipient (when available), it may also be highly constructive in other-positioning the recipient as a recipient with certain locally relevant properties (on positioning in interaction see Deppermann 2015b). Like intersubjectivity, recipient design always and necessarily relies on the recipient as conceived of by the speaker, but never on the factual recipient. There is an ontological difference between recipients from the speaker's point of view and factual recipients, which may also include unintended or unexpected recipients. In addition, the speaker may produce a counterfactual recipient design of turns for some strategic reason. By 'counterfactual recipient design', I refer to cases in which the speaker positions the recipient as someone the speaker knows the recipient is not in order to achieve certain communicative effects (see sect. 4 below).

In this way recipient design is decisive for building the bridge between presumed intersubjectivity-1 and accomplished intersubjectivity-2 in interaction. This bridging works in two ways: Firstly, recipient-designed turns index partner-specific and action/content-specific assumptions about intersubjectivity-1; secondly, recipient design is constantly updated on the basis of emerging intersubjectivity-2, i.e. by virtue of partners' displays of their understandings, intentions, emotions,
etc. This crucially implies that speakers are provided with a proof procedure (Sacks et al. 1974:728) for the adequacy and efficiency of the recipient design of their turns, thus allowing them for adaptations of the recipient design of their future turns.

1.3 Prior research on recipient design in CA

In CA, 'recipient design' is often used as an analytical notion and even presupposed as an unquestioned assumption in the sense that every turn or action is recipient-designed. In contrast, there is a surprising lack of studies which are specifically devoted to practices, sources, properties, dimensions and interactional consequences of recipient design. Classic studies have dealt with the choice of referential terms for persons (Sacks/Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1996) depending on the knowledge of the recipient. Preferences for recognition and minimization of reference forms were identified. Another seminal study along these lines, although not explicitly using the term 'recipient design', is Schegloff (1972), which focuses on place formulations. Deppermann and Blühdorn (2013; Deppermann 2014) study the use of negation as a practice for excluding unwanted interpretations of speaker's turns which the recipient does or might be seen to entertain.

The prime relevance of recipient design for turn-construction becomes particularly evident in multi-party-interaction. In an early study, Goodwin (1979) showed how a speaker expands his turn while changing addresses (after failed uptake), thereby changing the ongoing action and conveying different information about the subject matter tailored to the states of knowledge of the different recipients. Hutchby (1995) shows how hosts and invited experts in radio-phone-ins design their advice turns and summaries with respect to both the individual caller and the anonymous audience, for which the problem talked about might be interesting in a more generic version. In a similar vein, Hitzler (2013) shows how social workers produce different versions of descriptions in so called Hilfeplangesprächen ('care-planning-sessions'). Depending on whether professional colleagues, children or parents are the primary addressees, descriptions are adapted to the kinds and state of knowledge and to the degree of epistemic authority attributed to the party addressed. Mondada (2015) analyzes the multimodal practices by which a moderator simultaneously manages to attribute positions and authorship to individual participants while reformulating summaries of proposals and assessments to a large audience.

While these studies mainly focus on practices on recipient design which presuppose certain properties of the recipient, some other studies deal with the emergence and changes of recipient design over interactional episodes. In an early study, Terasaki (2004) showed how pre-announcements of news are designed as to adapt a projected news delivery to the knowledge status of the recipient. Perspective display sequences (Maynard 1989) are means to elicit assumptions about the recipient in order to use them to impart news that are adapted to what the partner expects. Deppermann and Schmitt (2009) show how recipient design is systematically prepared in the interactional process by a speaker who tests his recipient's knowledge by constructing interactive tasks. Online-analysis of the recipient's performance is then used to adapt consecutive pedagogic turns to what has been revealed about the recipient's knowledge, self-assessment and self-position-
ing. The recipient's locally relevant properties, i.e., his/her knowledge, motives, stances, identity features, etc., to which turn-design is adapted, are not settled once for all. Relevant properties of the recipient change and evolve continually over an interactional episode. Schmitt and Knöbl (2013) consider how recipient design is produced multi-modally. They argue that recipient design evolves over an extended process of action as a holistic gestalt: Recipient design makes use of design-resources, which only amount to a distinctive, partner-specific recipient design with an individual fingerprint by virtue of combinations of resources over temporally extended interactional trajectories. The linguistic features of recipient design, motivations for it and its function thus have to be analyzed with an eye to the interactional history of the parties, which accounts for the unique adequacy (Psathas 1995) of situated recipient design.

Malone (1995, 1997:ch.5) takes a different approach, considering recipient design as a strategy of alter-casting (Weinstein/Deutschberger 1963), i.e., persuading the recipient strategically. In Malone's work, as in Deppermann/ Schmitt (2009) and Schmitt/Knöbl (2013), the potential of recipient design to other-position the recipient design productively, beyond what s/he already revealed him/herself to be in the past, is highlighted.

1.4 Prior research on recipient design in cognitive social psychology

Conversation analysts are not alone in being interested in recipient design. Preferring the notion 'audience design', cognitive social psychologists have also a history of studying experimentally, if and how speakers adapt their actions and turn-design to what they know about their interlocutors (for overviews see Schober/Brennan 2003; Kecskes/Mey 2008; Brennan et al. 2010). Part of this research provides ample evidence that and how speakers adapt their actions, in particular, their choice of referential expressions, to their shared conversational experience with specific partners (e.g. Clark/Marshall 1981; Clark/Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Isaacs/Clark 1987; Brennan/Clark 1996; Horton/Gerrig 2005; Horton 2008). This is evidenced e.g. by the use of definite NPs, demonstratives, increasingly shorter and dyad-specific referring expressions ("conceptual pacts", Brennan/Clark 1996).

1.5 Prior research on the egocentric speaker in cognitive psychology

Whereas Herbert Clark and his followers try to prove that people regularly use metacognitive reasoning and take the addressee's perspective into account when producing turns-at-talk, other cognitive researchers argue that speakers prefer to act mostly egocentrically (e.g. Keysar 2008). They hold that the speakers do not regularly take the partner's perspective and what is shared as common ground into account when designing an action. According to this position, intersubjectivity is mostly accomplished by automatic alignment of representations without explicit meta-representation of the partner's knowledge (Pickering/Garrod 2004). Speakers can be shown to underestimate how ambiguous their actions may be for recipients and how they may be misunderstood. They neglect to use partner-specific knowledge when designing their actions (Keysar 2008), especially under conditions of multi-tasking and reduced capacity of working memory (Lin/Keysar/
Epley 2010). These researchers argue that speakers act basically egocentrically. According to this position, intersubjectivity is a by-product of egocentric action, which succeeds in accomplishing shared understandings at least in routine cases. People do not orient to accomplishing intersubjectivity with a specific partner in their turn-design, except for cases in which trouble (i.e., misunderstandings, unexpected responses, repair initiation, etc.) occurs or when acting strategically to achieve some persuasive effect or even to deceive (Keysar 2007, 2008).

Other cognitive researchers claim that experimental data do not sufficiently support the hypothesis of the "egocentric speaker" (see Schober/Brennan 2003; Brennan et al. 2010). In addition, the ecological validity of socio-cognitive experiments and their generalizability to other interaction types is doubtful in many respects: Speakers are faced with restricted possibilities to act, having to put up with impoverished sources of knowledge about recipients and being tied to acting according to an experimentally predefined agenda of artificial communicative tasks. Still, it seems worth considering to which degree speakers recipient-design their actions and when, under what conditions and for which uses they fail to take common ground, i.e., what they do or could know about the partner's subjective state, into account. It is clear that recipient design is always fallible, because it rests on the recipient as conceived of by the speaker and not on the factual recipient. It is also evident that recipient design may attend to different facets of the recipient, so that there are always different possibilities of recipient-designing a turn with respect to the same topic or action. Still it remains to be explored in more depths whether recipient design is rather ubiquitous, a matter of varying degree or the exception to the rule and what the interactional consequences of different ways to attend to the recipient in turn-production are. In sum, this paper aims to contribute to discovering the phenomenology of egocentric conduct in interaction and its empirical and theoretical relevance to the study of intersubjectivity in interaction.

2. Research questions and data

The present paper contributes to these issues dealing with properties and consequences of egocentric turn design in naturally occurring interaction, namely, driving school lessons. In contrast to psychologists' experimental settings, egocentrism here is studied as a phenomenon which occurs in turns produced by a participant, the driving school instructor, who is highly entitled to produce a certain action, i.e. requests, on behalf of his institutional and professional authority. Requests are highly routine, recurrent actions in this context. They provide for the basic pragmatic structure of driving school interactions. We will deal with the following questions:

- How are driving school instructors' requests recipient-designed?
- How does egocentrism figure in the turn design of instructors' requests?
- What are interactional consequences of egocentric turn design?
- How can sources of turn design be methodologically identified in data from naturally occurring interaction?
The data to be analyzed stem from a corpus of video-recordings of more than 70 hours of driving school lessons in Germany (2 instructors, 8 students, 2 cameras recording street view and participant view). Three extended request sequences exhibiting properties of instructors' egocentric recipient design which recur throughout the corpus will be analyzed in detail here.

For various reasons, driving school lessons are a perspicuous setting (Garfinkel 2002) for the study of the recipient design. For the purpose of this paper, it is crucial that in driving school lessons, it becomes immediately observable by the student's driving actions if and how the student understands the instructor's requests and instructions. The student's actions and the car's behavior are direct displays of understanding and skill to the instructor (cf. Broth et al. i.pr.). His/her evaluative and corrective responses in turn show whether expectations are fulfilled and intersubjectivity has been accomplished. This is in contrast to many other types of interaction (e.g. narrative interaction), in which it is often not transparent to both the teller and the researcher whether recipient design was effective, because there are no unambiguous displays of understanding which show that and how the partner orients to the recipient design chosen.

3. The sequential and multimodal organization of task-performances: Counterfactual requests and corrective instructions

We will start with one complex single case of a complex task-performance. We will first show the basic, recurrent sequential and multi-modal structure of the organization of task-performances in driving school lessons (sect. 3). Then, using the same case, we show how the pedagogic and egocentric properties of counterfactual request design unfold over the trajectory of the task performances (sect. 4).

Task-performances in driving school are trajectories of instructed actions. They are initiated by the instructor setting a complex task which requires from the student to perform a series of actions which are needed to complete the task (like 'turn right at an intersection', 'change lanes', 'reverse park the car'; see De Stefani/Gazin 2014; Deppermann forthc.). The student's task in the case to be analyzed is to turn left at the third intersection. Extract #1 consists of the initial, task-setting request by the instructor, followed by a series of corrective instructions concerning the student's ongoing task-performance. Finally, the practical completion of the task and instructor's accounts and comments concerning the students' actions during the previous task-performance close the sequence.

**#1 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 31:43-32:00**

01 IN: ich MÖCHt e, (0.2)  
I would like

02 das ist die ERste ampel,  
 this is the first traffic light

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4 Transcripts conform to the transcription convention GAT2 (Couper-Kuhlen/Barth-Weingarten 2011) with additional multimodal transcription according to Mondada (2014a). References to parts of transcripts are labelled "SXX", meaning segments which correspond to an intonation phrase each.
at the third traffic light to the left

in-g: +looks into left side mirror+
st-g: %looks at overtaking car% looks ahead-->

fig.1: Instructor monitors if student monitors traffic which is about to overtake in the left side mirror.

in-h: klicks pen twice

in-g: +looks into left side mirror+

IN: ich würde +SCHAL%ten,

I would shift

st-h: %indicates and looks into interior mirror-->
in-g: %looks into interior mirror------>

IN: ich würde +SCHAL%ten,

I would shift

IN: BREM%sen,+

brake

st-h: %shifts to higher gear-->
The instructor's request that the student should turn to the left at the third traffic (S01-03) projects a complex task involving a sequence of different, coordinated activities. Unlike the first pair-part of an adjacency pair (cf. Schegloff 2007), the request does not simply make just one single next action by the student conditionally relevant. Rather, it is only one aspect of the expected action, namely, the goal, the final move of a series of actions, which is formulated explicitly (Deppermann forthc.). In order to produce it, a series of precision-timed, finely coordinated actions is required from the student. Most importantly, she has to adapt the type, the timing and the indexical design of her actions to the locally specific and in part permanently changing situation on the road, which is reflexively changed by her own actions. This involves taking into account whether other cars are about to overtake, attending to changes in the traffic lights and an emerging traffic jam in front of the car, monitoring road signs, etc.

The initial request thus implies an open-ended set of implicit, taken-for-granted expectations to be taken into account when producing the requested response (Deppermann forthc.; cf. Amerine/Bilmes 1998; Garfinkel 2002; Mondada 2014b). By its formulation, it presupposes that the student already disposes of the knowledge and the practical skills needed for the adequate situated response. This crucially implies that the student will self-select a series of not previously specified actions in order to comply with the request.

The instructor closely monitors the student's actions, observing when and how she performs what is tacitly expected from her. How situated sensitivity of the actions is required is nicely evidenced by the multi-activity pattern of the instructor's monitoring: He shifts repeatedly between monitoring the student's driving activities and her monitoring the traffic in the mirrors and ahead of her, which enables, calls for or blocks certain actions (like indicating, speeding up, braking, changing gears etc.). The instructor's gaze constantly moves between the side mirrors (which make potential overtaking cars available, S06-08, 10-11), the interior mirror (which shows the distance of the traffic following the car, S09), the road ahead (next traffic light, distance to cars ahead, S12-13, 16-17), and the student (S16), including monitoring the way she monitors the traffic (S04, cf. fig.1).
The instructor's following requests are produced in response to student's failures to produce actions (at all or in the correct way) which the instructor deems to be necessary in order to fulfill the request, given the local traffic situation and its emergent changes. Consecutive requests thus are corrective instructions.

3.1 Corrective instructions

In this paper, I distinguish between task-setting requests and corrective instructions. Task-setting requests set complex navigation tasks (cf. De Stefani/Gazin 2014). They formulate "what to do" (like parking the car, driving back to the driving school, turn left at the next intersection, etc.). Many task-setting requests in driving school lessons are basically not different from those which passengers might address to drivers in non-pedagogical settings (see Haddington 2013). They are to be distinguished from corrective instructions. Corrective instructions are dealing with how to perform the task. They presuppose high entitlement of their producers and are a constitutive part of pedagogic action (cf. Ekström/Lindwall 2014; Hindmarsh et al. 2014). They concern the manipulation of the car, asking the student to perform or inhibit some driving action. They respond to student's failures to produce locally expected steps of task performance. Corrective instructions may, like in extract #1, follow up on task-setting requests. They adapt the initial task-setting request, producing a more granular formulation of the next locally relevant action to be taken by the student, given the nature of the student's failure and its relationship to the local contingencies of the emerging traffic situation. In extract #1, corrective instructions occur in segments

- 07: instruction to indicate, i.e., the student should display publicly that she wants to change to the left lane;
- 10: instruction to change gears, i.e., student should gear down in order to accelerate as a preparation for changing lanes, because traffic on the left lane is running faster than on the right lane;
- 11: instruction to "look", i.e., check in the left side mirror, whether she may change lanes without running into danger, because other cars may be taking over;
- 13-16: three instructions to brake in a row, as the instructor notices in the left mirror that a car on the left lane is approaching so fast that it is not advisable to shift to the left lane before it;
- 20: instruction to brake and clutch, because the car had stalled when the instructor stopped the car, because the student did not engage the clutch simultaneously.

Corrective instructions have a much higher granularity than the task-setting request: They explicitly formulate individual steps of the larger sequence which were tacitly made relevant by the initial request, and they immediately respond to the emerging local contingencies of the student's actions and the changes in the traffic situation. The corrective instructions are emergent, local adaptations of the recipient design of the initial request: They do not only correct student's actions, but they also repair on the action design of the initial request which had revealed
itself to be counterfactual. While the initial request by its design tacitly presupposed sufficient knowledge to perform the task, corrective instructions are occasioned by the failure of the student to comply with taken-for-granted expectations implied by the initial request. Expected individual steps of action now are explicitly formulated. However, corrective instructions themselves are also highly indexical. They are formulated as *reminders* presupposing unproblematic situated intelligibility. This is reflexively indexed by their highly elliptical linguistic design (e.g., lack of object arguments, no directional phrases). E.g. the instructor does not formulate if the student has to indicate to the left or to the right (S07), which gear she should switch to (S10), where she should look (S11), which brake she should use (S13-20). The use of these elliptical and highly indexical constructions makes the instructions recognizable as reminders that actions are due which are expected to be already within the student's repertoire of skills and which are not in need of further explanation and justification (which consequently are not produced).

In sum, task-performances like those analyzed in this paper are organized according to the following sequential pattern (adapted from De Stefani/Gazin 2014):

1- IN: Request (counterfactual recipient design)
2- ST: Failure to produce locally expected steps of response
3- IN: corrective instruction (retrospectively adapted recipient design)
4- ST: Driving response
repeat 2-4 until task completion
5- IN: Final assessment and discussion of task-performance (see extract #3 below)

4. Counterfactual recipient design:
   Pedagogic vs. egocentric turn design

4.1 Counterfactual recipient design as a pedagogic practice

The design of the instructor's task-setting request in extract #1, S01-03 presupposes that the student is able comply with the request. However, the student does not respond to the request in the way the instructor deems to be correct and he makes her correct her driving. Still, at least none of the first four corrective instructions (S07-13) exhibit any sign of surprise or frustration on the part of the instructor, which might have indexed that he really expected the student to produce the requested response without correction or support from his part. If this were the case, the student's failures would lead the teacher to revise his assessment of the student's skills and, consequently, of the adequacy of his recipient design. The trajectory of task-performance thus suggests that the recipient design of the instructor's initial request was strategically counterfactual.

Counterfactual recipient design is a generic pedagogic strategy. The combination of requests informed by counterfactual recipient design and consecutive corrective

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5 Let us for now leave it open whether the student does not possess the relevant skills or whether she has a different idea than the instructor about how to deal with the task.
instructions makes the driving lesson a hybrid interaction type. It combines a test established by the initial request with a teaching lesson provided by the corrective instructions. Counterfactual recipient design is paradoxical: It positions students, who are still learning, as if they were already fully competent drivers. It does so as part of the very process of teaching by setting up a test which allows diagnosing the student's skills by making them observable in practice and by thus creating occasions to correct the student's performance in situ. Pedagogic counterfactual recipient design deliberately treats the student as someone who already has learnt certain skills which, however, the instructor does not expect the student to master already routinely and perfectly. Counterfactual recipient design uses a turn-design which is adequate for a model recipient similar to the "model reader" which Umberto Eco considers to be the idealized addressee of literary production (Eco 1979: ch.3). Most importantly, as model readers of a literary text are able to fill the gaps in a literary text by themselves, using their own knowledge and imagination to create coherence (cf. also Iser 1976), the model recipient of counterfactual pedagogic design is able to activate and use relevant knowledge and skills which are needed for a successful performance of the instructed action. The already-been-learnt and could-have-known character of the skills needed for a competent fulfilment of requests is indexed by the 'reminder'-design of the teacher's corrective instructions (see sect. 3) and the student's immediate, unproblematic responses to them in extract #1. Pedagogic counterfactual recipient design is used in order to elicit students' responses as information about who s/he "really is", i.e. which skills s/he already may reliably enact and which skills are still unstable and in need of practice. Pedagogic counterfactual recipient design therefore is an interactional practice of counterfactual other-positioning which is used to find out who the recipient relevantly is with respect to the precise exigencies of the task to be learnt.

The combination of a counterfactual request with subsequent corrections situates the driving lesson in a "zone of proximal development" (cf. Vygotsky 1978): The instructor's initial request sets a goal which the student is to orient to in her own actions, i.e. it projects the model driver which the student is to become, but which she is not yet. The instructor supports her by monitoring her actions, by providing corrective instructions for initiating and rectifying local actions and by active interventions from his part (like braking, later also: speeding up, grasping the steering wheel). The instructor's actions resemble scaffolding activities (Ninio/Bruner 1978): The skills to be finally acquired by the student as her individual competencies are first realized in coordinated interpersonal practice led by the more experienced participant. The cooperative performance of the actions which the instructor expects replaces individual actions of the student whenever her actions do not match the standards which the instructor holds to be in place.

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6 By clicking his pen twice after his sequence-opening request (#1, S05), the instructor assumes an examiner's stance, displaying that he is ready to note any occurring problem.

7 The student is not yet close to the driving school exam, i.e. neither the instructor nor the student regard her as a possibly fully competent driver at this point. The lesson from which the extract is taken was not framed as a simulation of the final driving school exam.
4.2 Counterfactuality of recipient design resulting from egocentric presuppositions

Pedagogic counterfactuality of recipient design is deliberately used to test the student's skills and to identify student's needs for improvement and learning validly under real-world conditions. The instructor, however, also can be seen to make another kind of presuppositions which may be more adequately termed "egocentric". These presuppositions do not seem to be strategically counterfactual, but inadvertently so: The instructor presupposes bits of his private knowledge to be part of the common ground shared with the student which, as turns out in the interactional sequence, the student effectively does not share. These egocentric, non-shared presuppositions create problems of intersubjective cooperation, because they imply tacit expectations of how the student should comply with the instructor's requests, which, however, are opaque and inaccessible to the student. The kinds of knowledge and perspectives which are egocentrically presupposed by the instructor are

- knowledge about expectable problematic traffic conditions which are likely to be encountered at certain future points of the planned trajectory (see extract #3),
- the instructor's driving preferences (see extract #3 and 7), and
- topographic knowledge about the (not-yet-visible) course of the road (see extracts #7 and #9).

5. Interactional consequences of egocentric turn-design: Breakdown of intersubjective cooperation

If egocentric turn-design involves expectations concerning the recipient's actions which the recipient cannot recover, intersubjective cooperation and reciprocal coordination with respect to the shared joint project break down. In extract #2, we see how the student is no longer able to contribute to the joint project of turning left at the third intersection, because she does not understand the rationale of the instructor's corrective instructions and even considers them to be illegitimate.

#2 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 32:00-32:27

21 (0.4)% (2.2)
   st-h: %starts engine, grasps steering wheel
   st-g: %looks ahead, then turns to left side mirror---->

22 IN: %BREMsen;
   CAR: %starts to move

23 (0.4)

24 ST: <<h>weiSO: denn.>
      but why?

25 IN: weil dU WECHseln +möch[test]
      because you like to change
   in-f: +brakes
After the instructor braked and stopped the car, the student starts the engine again and sets the car in motion (S21). The instructor, however, again asks her to brake (S22) and makes the car stop again (S25). The student, with an irritated voice, displays non-understanding of this move, requesting an account from the instructor for why she should brake again (S24). The instructor answers: **weil dU WECHseln möchtest** ('because you would like to change', S25). However, this account obviously does not help the student to understand the reasons for the instructor's action and what he expects her to do. Her open class repair initiator

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8 The instructor here refers to the plan to change to the left lane. Why this is an account for the command to keep the car stopped, becomes clear only in S40-42 (see below).
was? (S26; cf. Drew 1997) and her facial expression (slightly frowning, mouth opened, see fig.2) display unresolved non-understanding.

While the car stays in place, the instructor declares that they wait because of the overtaking cars (S30-35). The student, however, does not understand why she should stay in place (instead of moving on down the right lane); moreover, she doubts that she is allowed to just stop the car at this place (S36f.). Her pointing gesture to the street ahead (see fig.2) seems to index that she assumes that it is not allowed to stop the car leaving more than 10 meters space to the next car in front of her which is waiting for the traffic lights to turn green, and risking to cause a traffic jam behind her, which, indeed, is about to develop.

It is only now that the instructor accounts for his actions, referring to the solid line as a normative reason for the place chosen to stop (S40-42, fig.4).
fig. 4: IN: "das problem ist nur DA die durchgezogene Linie.", the problem is only the solid line', points to the solid line separating left and right lane.

The instructor does not clearly state, but only lets infer that he wants the student to change lanes before the solid line, because they will not have a chance to change lanes later. Why this should be so, remains unexplained. There is no indication from the student, either, that she has understood how and why the solid line is normatively relevant for how the instructor expects her to perform the task of changing to the left lane. Like in extract #1, the student fails to produce expected actions self-initiatedly. However, in contrast to extract #1, where corrective instructions were followed unproblematically without delay, in extract #2, even upon corrective instructions, the student does not understand why she should produce expected actions and she even deems them to be illegitimate. The instructor's counterfactual expectations obviously did not concern situated expectations about performing already-been-learnt and could-have-known skills, but they proved to be egocentric and unrecoverable for the student. Still, that the student does not act the way the instructor expects does not mean that the student does not have the relevant skills or is not able to practice them in situ. The student's failure to brake and clutch becomes only a failure against the background of the teacher's tacit, rigid expectation that they have to change lanes before the solid line, whereas driving straight further down the right lane would be perfectly well if one wants to change lanes only after the second traffic light, as the student seems to intend. It is thus only if one compares the student's actions to a rigid driving plan which is different from hers that her actions seem incompetent. The egocentric turn-design of the instructor has created an opaque action environment, selecting the relevance to change lanes before the solid line as an arbitrarily chosen absolute criterion which is unnegotiable. This implies a high probability for the student to fail and which discourages the student to deploy the skills she possesses, because all actions which do not conform to the instructor's plan are rejected.

In the further course of the joint project of turning left at the third intersection following extract #2, the student acts increasingly insecure and reacts only with much delay, if at all. This causes additional trouble: she misses the first chance to change lanes quickly enough, and at the second occasion, her manoeuvre is so slow that the instructor intervenes by grasping the steering wheel and speeding the car up. The student's increasing incapability to act according to the teacher's expectations arises from the failure to infer how he expects her to perform the task of turning left at the third intersection. This failure directly plays out as puzzle-
ment about what to do next. The student's (in-)action is finally responded to by a series of harsh criticisms by the instructor.

It is only some two minutes later when they have arrived at the third traffic light and the task is about to be completed that in the concluding assessment and discussion of the task-performance, the instructor explains why he wanted the student to change lanes at the earliest moment possible (and not only after the second traffic light) and why he wanted her to stop the car. The instructor argues that he thought it would have become more difficult to change lanes at a later point because of the heavy traffic to be expected after the second traffic light.

#3 FOLK-Fahrschule 148a, 33:46-33:59

104 IN: wenn man sich hier AUSkennt,=
    if you know the site
105   =WEISS man dass das hier SEHR sEhr eng ist,
    you know that it is very very tight here
106   °h und wir haben STOßverkehr zur zeit-
    and there is heavy traffic right now
107   du siehst dass_s hier überall DICHT,
    you see that it's all packed here
108   °h un wEnn ich schon einmal steh dann bleibe ich stehen
and
109   <<len>!WA:R!te,
    and if I have already stopped once then I stay and wait
110   (0.4) und WARTen,
    and to wait
111   <<all>hab ich ja immer gesagt->
    I have always said it
112   °h ist GEnial-
    is perfect
113   "h und da kann mir !NICHTS! passieren;
    then nothing can happen to you

The instructor now explicitly refers to prior experience (wenn man sich hier aus-
kennt, 'if you know the site') as grounds for his driving preferences. This, however, is the instructor's private knowledge, which he uses for anticipatory planning of actions, but it obviously has not been available to the student. Thus, tacitly presupposing that the student takes this knowledge into account for the design of expected actions inevitably leads to cooperation problems and breakdowns of intersubjectivity. Breakdowns concern both the unrecoverability of the partner's expectations and action plan and the unintelligibility of the partner's actions (their reasons and functionalities). The instructor additionally states a rule of thumb (warten (...) ist genial, 'waiting (...) is perfect'), which is to account for his preference to keep the car stopped, although this causes other cars to wait. The student also did not seem to be able to relate this rule, which the instructor treats as common ground (hab ich ja immer gesagt, 'I have always said it'), to the relevancies of the current task-performance.

The instructor concludes his discussion of the task-performance with a moral assessment of the student's failures.
The instructor ascribes the failure to comply as expected to the student as a morally implicative, personal fault. He claims that she had "kollabiert" ('collapsed', S113f.) and did not stay "cool" (S119-121). The instructor warrants his negative moral evaluation of the student reference to the student's deviation from norms of proper driving which he states.

Cooperation problems resulting from failures to accomplish intersubjectivity with respect to expected actions are unilaterally ascribed as symptoms of incompetence to just one of the participants involved. Interactional effects resulting from egocentric turn-design and asymmetries in knowledge and preferences are finally interpreted in terms of other-positioning the student as being incompetent, i.e. a degradation of her status as a rational actor.

Over extracts #1 and #2 we could observe an increasing breakdown of intersubjective cooperation. It began with the absence of expected actions by the student, was followed by the student's non-understanding of why she should produce these actions and finally led to the student's doubt whether expected actions are actually legitimate. The increasing problems of the student to recover the instructor's expectations and the reasons for his corrective instructions finally led to a breakdown of her own action orientation as evidenced by delayed action and inaction. The breakdown of intersubjectivity seems to imply the student loses her trust in being able to contribute to cooperative action in an acceptable way, leading to reduced involvement, which itself increases the breakdown of intersubjective cooperation.

Only starting with S25 in extract #2 the instructor began to formulate bits of non-shared knowledge and driving preferences which accounted for his expectations. However, sufficient transparency was only achieved after the fact, i.e. after the student had repeatedly missed expected steps of the task performance and the relevant actions had finally been carried out by the instructor himself. We could see that the following egocentric assumptions informed the instructor's expectations about how and why to comply with requests and corrective instructions:
• topographic knowledge: knowledge about the not-yet-visible course of the road,
• prior experience concerning problematic traffic conditions (jams) which are likely to be encountered and which should be avoided by anticipatory driving choices,
• driving preferences which the student considers to be dis-preferred or even forbidden (here: leaving more than 10 meters space and waiting in front of green traffic lights in order to change lanes before the solid line and risking to cause a traffic jam is better than driving straight on and risking to get caught in a traffic jam).

The detrimental effects of egocentric turn-design on intersubjective cooperation become further aggravated, because other resources which could help to restore intersubjectivity are not used, either. Driving preferences, action plans and standards of correct task-performance are unilaterally enforced by the teacher, remaining opaque to the student. The instructor offers no opportunity for negotiating how the task is to be solved collaboratively and how to account for individual steps of action. Even in the face of the student's repeated failures to comply with the instructor's expectations, he does neither try to check the student's plan about how to manage the task, which obviously differs from the instructor's concept, nor does he account more explicitly and comprehensively for the choices he expects the student to make. The student's questions deemed to restore intersubjectivity are responded to rather fragmentarily, obviously not leading to sufficient understanding on her part (see extract #2, S24-26 and S36f.). The instructor does not check whether the student finally has understood his choices and the presuppositions they rest on. The student herself also does not produce any understanding displays during the lengthy concluding discussion of the prior task-performance. In sum, egocentric turn design and its effects are intimately tied to interactional asymmetries in deontic and epistemic rights and duties in this episode:

• The instructor claims asymmetric deontic rights (cf. Stevanovic/Peräkylä 2012) in defining standards of correct task-performance exclusively by himself.
• The instructor assigns the epistemic duty (Stivers et al. 2011) to the student to strive to understand the instructor's perspective, whereas he himself cooperates only in a very partial and delayed fashion in securing the student's understandings of his actions. In contrast, the instructor neither tries to understand the student's perspective - he only devalues it -, nor does the student try to account for her own perspective in order to make it transparent to the teacher.

6. Extending the analysis:
   Misunderstood and non-understood expectations as a source of breakdowns of cooperation

In order to give an idea of recurrent sources of egocentric turn design and how it systematically affects intersubjective cooperation, we will turn to two other cases of egocentric expectations about how to comply with a request. In these cases, the
student is not able to contribute expected actions because of misunderstandings and non-understandings of non-shared expectations.

6.1 Misunderstandings:
Egocentric turn design leading to a wrong expectation concerning task performance

Egocentric turn design may lead the respondent to comply with a request in a way which runs counter to the non-shared requester's expectations. In the next case, the instructor rejects the way the student responds to his request. From the point of view of the student, the rejection seems to contradict the initial request and the student is not able to contribute to a common joint project anymore.

The task-setting request

When crossing an intersection, the student did not mind that driving on straight made him enter a dead-end street. Students in driving school have to avoid this unless explicitly being requested to. After the instructor has made the student recognize his fault (S01-08), the instructor requests him to leave the dead-end street (S09-12).

#5 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:04-7:16

01 IN: MEINST du dass das richtig war; do you think this was right?
02 ST: (0.2) hm_hm.
03 IN: (0.4) ((dental click)) (0.25)
04 IN: JA oder nein; yes or no?
05 ST: (0.2) NEIN weil da-
o no because there
06 (0.6) KOMM da nicht durch.
I won’t get through
07 (0.6)
08 IN: R:ICHtig; right
09 und JETZT, and now
10 sieh ZU:, see
11 (0.2) das is dann DEIne aufgabe,
this is your task then
12 wie DU da raus kommst.
how you manage to get out there

When instructors use the imperative in driving school lessons, this usually indexes that the requested action is immediately due (Deppermann forthc.; cf. Antaki/Kent 2012; Mondada 2011, 2013; Vine 2009 for other interaction types). The instruc-
tor's imperative-formatted request *JETZT, sieh ZU*: (0.2) *das is dann DEIne aufgabe, wie DU da raus kommst.* (*now see this is your task then how you manage to get out there*, S09-12) thus leads the student to assume that he is expected to turn around as soon as possible in order to exit the dead-end street as quick as he can. In addition to the imperative, the need for immediate action is further indexed by the stressed temporal deictic "*JETZT*" (*now*, S09). An immediate turn-around also seems fair because driving further down the dead-end street would mean to carry on with the faulty action.

*Interactional consequence: cooperation problems*

After his request, the instructor reminds the student that he has to enter dead-end streets only when being told to do so (omitted in the transcript). In the following, the student orients to using the next possible occasion to turn, while the instructor urges him to drive further down the dead-end street.

**#6 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:24-7:52**

18  $(3.3)$+  
   st-h: §starts to turn left§  
   in-f: +brakes

19 IN: +so pass AUF;+  
   now pay attention  
   in-h: +looks to the left, raises pen+

20  +(0.3)  
   in-h: +bends forward to the left, points with pen to the left->

21 IN: *§da sind sie VOLL an ar*beiten,$§$  
   there they are busy working  
   in-h: ----------------------$*,,,,,,,*$  
   st-g: §looks to the left§

22 IN: °h +und das ist +§STRESS pur.  
   and this is sheer stress  
   in-h: +horizontal move with right hand to the left and back+

23 IN: (0.3) fahr doch +erstmal WEIter;  
   drive on for now  
   in-h: ................+points ahead with pen--->

24  (0.5)+(2.0)  
   in-h: ----->+,,,

25  $(1.2)$  
   CAR: §starts to move---->>

26 IN: UND,  
   and

27 IN: (0.2) du +wach machst alles Ohne sich ohne sicherung,  
   you do it all without checking  
   in-h: ........+points at left exterior mirror,,,,,,,,,

28 IN: NÄMlich (. ) das falsche blinken.=  
   that is to say the wrong indicating

29  =so gib +!GAS!;  
   now speed up  
   in-h: ........+points ahead with pen,,,,
Immediately after the instructor's account, the student slows down and starts to turn left in order to enter a yard and to reverse the car (S18). The instructor, however, stops the car by operating the brake (S18). He tells the student not to enter the yard, because there are road-works going on, but to drive straight on instead (S19-23). The student drives on (S25), but very slowly, looking for the next opportunity to reverse the car. The instructor, however, recurrently insists that the student speeds up and drives straight on (S29, 30, 32, 33, 40, 41). The student starts to account for his driving intentions (ich wollte hier fahren, 'I wanted to drive here', S31). The instructor, however, does not cede the turn to the student, but claims to know the student's intentions and rejects their relevance insisting on his request to speed up (S32-35). Again, he accounts for his refusal of the student's initiatives by referring to unfavorable road conditions (das ist doch Alles viel zu eng, 'this is all much to narrow', S37).

In the extract, a profound failure of intersubjectivity becomes increasingly evident. The student's and the instructor's orientations have different orientations concerning how to deal with the task of having to leave the dead-end street and which visible and non-visible aspects of the road are relevant for a correct solution of the task. This creates an extended cooperation problem: While the student organizes his driving in order to use the next opportunity to turn, just as had been requested by the instructor in S09-12, the latter discards all available opportunities as unfavorable. The student, however, stays with his orientation to driving slowly in order to scan the road for places to turn, obviously, because he orients to the immediacy of the need to exit the street and because he sees no alternative to his searching procedure. The student's action initiatives are rejected by the instructor, but he is not able to infer the instructor's plan. Consequently, no shared intersub-
jective orientation to how the task is to be solved gets accomplished. The instructor neither states positively how the task should be solved nor does he let the student explain his own plan and enter into a negotiation about how to comply with the request satisfactorily.

_Egocentric presuppositions: Topographic knowledge and driving preferences_

The instructor makes his plan how to solve the task only explicit when the place gets into sight which the instructor deems suitable for turning the car.

#6 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 7:54-8:00

43 IN: so und jetzt siehst du #+DA eine schöne einmündende strAße; so and now there you see a nice connecting street

in-h: ..............................+points ahead with pen,,,,,,,,,

#fig.5

44 ST: n JA-
yes

45 IN: da fährst du L:INKS rein; there you turn left

It turns out that the dead-end street they are driving down intersects with another minor street, which was not visible when the teacher produced his request to exit from the dead-end street and when the student attempted to reverse the car.

![fig.5: IN: "so, und jetzt siehst du DA eine schöne einmündende strAße;",
'so and now there you see a nice connecting street'.
IN points forward; the connecting street to the left is not visible yet.](image)

Obviously, the instructor had in mind from the beginning that the student should use the connecting street to turn the car. However, the student neither seemed to know of this street nor did the instructor assume the student to do so. He uses an indefinite description _eine schöne einmündende strAße_ ('a nice connecting street', S042) to refer to the place to turn. The indefinite article _eine_ ('a') indexes that the instructor supposes this to be new, previously unknown information (cf. Gundel et al. 1993) to the student. The indefinite reference and the fact that it is produced, when the street is still barely visible to the participants, give evidence that his rejections of the student's initiatives to turn have rested on his private topological knowledge about more favorable opportunities for turning. This knowledge about the course of the road was obviously not shared by the student. Therefore, the student was not able to recover the instructor's plan how to solve the task and thus could not cooperate in task-solving as expected by the instructor. Being short of shared prior knowledge, the student could only understand the instructor's dis-
crepant orientation to task-solving when he could see the opportunity to turn which the instructor had known in advance.

As the car has turned and they are on their way out of the dead-end street, in the concluding discussion of the task-performance the instructor discloses his driving preferences.

**#7 FOLK-Fahrschule 13.09.2012, 142a: 8:48-9:07**

104 IN: SU(chen sie) sich mal ne geeignete stelle. *just look for an appropriate place*

105 aber DAS waren alles, *but these were all*

106 (0.5)

107 IN: !STRESS! (. ) stellen; *stress places*

108 naTÜRlich geht das, *of course this is possible*

109 Aber, ( .) *but*

110 ich mach das doch nicht wenn da die leute ARbeiten. *I don’t do it if people are working there*

111 °hh und WENN, *and if*

112 (0.4)

113 IN: mach ich das IMmer, (0.2)rückwärts RECHTS; *I always do it like reverse right*

114 sodass ich !DANN!, *so that I then*

115 (0.5)

116 IN: °h ((clears throat))

117 der BLINker fehlt. *the indicator is missing*

118 (1.0)

119 IN: sodass ich !DANN!? *so that I then*

120 (0.5)

121 IN: wenn ich da (0.4) RUMfahre, *if I turn*

122 nur !EI!nen fahrstreifen kreuze; *cross only one lane*

123 und NICHT ( .) zwei. *and not two*

The instructor concedes that the student's initiatives and i.e. his plan how to solve the task were not incorrect (*naTÜRlich geht das, 'of course this is possible', S108). He now makes his driving preferences explicit which he had tacitly presupposed when rejecting the student's initiatives: He would avoid stressful places to turn,
where people are working, and when turning around (using a yard), he would do it by reversing to the right, but not by first crossing the street.

The student finally learns that his initiatives which the instructor had blocked were not wrong in principle, but not preferred from the instructor's point of view for reasons of safety and ease of driving. It is thus only after the fact that the precise nature of the rupture of intersubjectivity between the participants' expectations becomes clearer: It is not that the student had simply tried to comply with the request in an unacceptable way – as the recurrent outright rejections of his actions by the instructor would have suggested –, but the instructor expected him to use a more convenient and safer opportunity to turn. Because of his restricted knowledge of the course of the road, the student could not guess that such an opportunity existed.

When producing his requests, the instructor presupposes non-shared knowledge about topographic particulars and driving preferences for how he expects the student to complete the task. Intersubjectivity breaks down because the student is unable to recover the instructor's tacit expectations. While the instructor bases his expectations on what he knows in advance, the student can only account for the instructor's expectations after the fact, i.e., when he sees that the dead-end street finally intersects with another street. From the student's point of view, the instructor's recurrent instructions urge him to continue a line of action which is obviously in contrast to what is requested. The apparent contradiction between the instructor's initial task-setting request and his later instructions is increased by the instructor using the imperative in his initial request, thus erroneously contextualizing the urgent need to comply immediately. These contradicting demands on the student's action lead to a breakdown of cooperation, because the student's own action plan and his attempts at accounting are rejected, but no intelligible alternative is provided by the instructor. Instead, the instructor's later imperatives ('gib gas', 'speed up') ask for "blind" compliance, solely by virtue of the instructor's entitlement to command, without providing an account which makes the instructions intelligible for the student.

6.2 Non-understandings: Egocentric turn design leading to puzzlement concerning expected task performance

An intransparent instruction and its interactional consequences

Immediately after turning into a new street, the instructor asks the student three times to look at the ground. While it is clear that this request implies the need for some driving action, the student does not understand which action is expected from her.

#8 FOLK-Fahrschule "guck auf_n boden", 18.09.2012, 148a: 20:00-20:15

01 IN: +§guck auf_n BOden;+
     look at the ground
     in-h: +points to right lane ahead+
     st-g: §looks at street ahead---->

02 IN: #guck auf_n BOden,
     look at the ground
     #fig.6
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By saying *guck auf den boden* ('look at the ground', S01-04), the instructor expects the student to infer that she should inspect the road markings on the street and to infer from them which lane she has to take. Fig.6 shows the street view as the car just is entering the new street on the right lane. Its road marking obliges cars driving on this lane to turn right at the next intersection.
In driving school there is a rule which is well-known to students requiring them to head on straight beyond an intersection if the instructor does not require them to do differently. This holds except for cases where driving straight would lead into a dead-end street or into private property. Then the student has to turn right. The instructor's request to look at the ground thus invites the student to remember, by discovering the road markings, this rule and to decide whether she may drive straight on, which would make it necessary to change to the left lane, or whether she may not, thus having to stay on the right lane in order to turn right. The student first does not overtly react to the instructor's request (S03), after its second repetition (S04), she produces a repair-initiator (S06) and moves her fingers to the indicator (S07), showing that she infers that the instructor means her change lanes, and asks for confirmation of this action (S12). The series of her reactions suggests that she first saw no need to consider changing lanes and did not figure out for which reasons she should do so. Fig.6 shows that when the instructor produced his request for the first time, there was no need for an immediate change of lanes, because there was still enough time and no competing traffic. Only since the instructor repeatedly insisted on his request, she concluded that she was expected to change lanes, because this was the most plausible account for the lingering relevance of the request. The instructor, however, does not confirm her move. Instead, he brakes and stops the car (S13) in order to initiate a knowledge checking sequence starting in S16. He does not treat the student's initiative as a display of competent knowledge how to deal with the task of selecting the right lane, probably seeing it only as an reaction occasioned by his repeated problem-implicative request, which let her infer that her own choice must have been wrong, however, without understanding why. The student reacts puzzled, displaying by a frowning face, repair-initiations and head shake (S20-21) that she does not understand what the instructor expects from her.

_Egocentric presupposition_

Over the course of the knowledge check, it turns out that the instructor knew that the street continues beyond the next intersection. The student, however, did neither know this, nor was she able to see it when the instructor's requests were produced (cf. fig.4 above).
As the instructor asks the student if she is allowed to drive straight on (S23), she denies (S25) and accounts for this by her question *is das ne straße* (*'is this a street', S29), indexing that she did not recognize the continuation of the road as a public street. The instructor confirms this in S33 by instructing the student that they have to take this street. As an inference from this, the student now formulates explicitly the expected solution to the initial task-setting request: *also FAHR-
streifenwechsel ('so (it's) change of lane', S36). The instructor confirms (S37), reproaching the student that she should have seen this before and reacted accordingly (S38-45). Both the student's question in S29 and the street view of the camera recordings (see fig.6), however, suggest that the student could not identify whether the road would continue as a public street beyond the intersection. In addition, the instructor's request to look at the ground (see #8, S01-04) contradicts his later criticism "DEN hättest du vorher schon sehen könn_n,=wenn du da WEIT genug reinguckst," ('you could have seen this already before if you look far enough into it', #9, S38f), because looking both directly in front of the car and far ahead beyond the intersection does not seem to be feasible at the same time. The instructor equates his prior knowledge about the local topography of the course of the street with what the student could have seen, treating it as common ground to be taken into account when complying with his initial request. However, for the student, the course of the road beyond the intersection is not immediately visible, and even less so as she is asked to look at the ground. The student could have acted the way the instructor expected her to only, if she had the same knowledge about the local topography of the street as he. As in the two other cases discussed above, the instructor's request (in #8, S01-04) was egocentrically designed, tacitly expecting the student to take non-shared topographic knowledge into account for correct task-performance. The student's failure to comply with the request as expected resulted from a lack of shared topographic knowledge, which she could not compensate for by visual access. The student's failure to comply with the task as expected thus did not reflect a lack of driving competencies (here: lack of knowledge about rules for lane selection or lack of anticipatory driving). Still, the instructor treats it as a morally accountable failure due to insufficient monitoring of the course of the road.

7. Discussion

This study is a plea for more detailed studies of practices and properties of recipient design and their significance for the organization of social interaction. It aims to contribute to the study of recipient design by showing how turn design reflects presumptions of situated intersubjectivity-1 and how this matters to the interactional achievement of intersubjectivity-2. In particular, we have seen how counterfactual turn design figures in request sequences, taking extended interactional task-performances from driving school lessons as the empirical case. The main findings of the paper are:

(1) Request sequences in driving school lessons start with counterfactual, pedagogic requests which treat the student as if s/he was already able to comply with the request competently. Counterfactual pedagogic expectations concern bits of knowledge which have an already-been-learnt, should-have-known or could-be-known status for the student.

(2) Requests imply numerous taken-for-granted expectations concerning requested responses, e.g. regarding steps of actions to be taken, sequencing, timing and situated design of expected next actions and their adaption to changing situational contingencies of the moving car and the traffic conditions.
Counterfactual positioning the student as already being competent by the request is used to test and train the student's skills in situ, allowing to correct on his/her failures in real-time, authentic task-performance. There is a recurrent, routine sequential pattern of task-performances, which includes that the instructor continuously monitors the student's task-performance, reacting to failures to produce expected actions by corrective instructions until the task is completed.

Counterfactual turn design is a case of counterfactual other-positioning performed in order to make the recipient reveal him/herself who s/he really is (with respect to exigencies of the task at hand). It is thus rather a strategic, productive interactional practice and not so much a practice which reflects the speaker's partner model of the recipient.

At least in principle, counterfactual, pedagogic turn-design is to be distinguished from counterfactual, egocentric turn design. The latter involves non-shared private knowledge which the requester expects the student to take into account for correct task-performance, but which cannot be recovered by the student.

This non-shared knowledge accounts for tacit expectations about how the recipient should cooperate in the joint project initiated by the request. Since these expectations remain opaque to the student, s/he does not contribute in a way which the instructor deems to be adequate and a breakdown of intersubjective cooperation results. Such breakdowns are aggravated by additional restrictions on the accomplishment of intersubjectivity, such as refusals to negotiate on plans and understandings, insufficient accounts even upon request, lack of knowledge checks and understanding displays, etc.

Breakdowns of intersubjective cooperation are unilaterally attributed to the student as moral deficit by the instructor, resulting in negative other-positioning of the student.

These findings suggest some general structural properties of the relationship between egocentric turn-design and its consequences for intersubjective cooperation. Future research will have to determine which of these findings is generically relevant beyond the articual interaction type 'driving school lessons'. Still, the observations made in this context may also invite to consider how egocentrism might reflect a déformation professionelle, which may be typical of pedagogic settings.

We saw that most kinds of non-shared private knowledge which regularly create problems of intersubjective cooperation in driving school lessons are instructors' topographical knowledge, knowledge about expectable traffic conditions and driving preferences. These kinds of knowledge result from instructors' recurrent own professional experiences. Their biographical entrenchment and teaching routine may mislead the speaker to erroneously presuppose that this knowledge is shared by the current recipient. It may lead to instructional routines which are not closely adapted to individual recipients, but which rather address some typified and often idealized recipient, and which are not checked by attending to the recipient's situated responses.

At the same time, acting on the basis of possibly egocentric presuppositions may as well function as a socializing character test (cf. Goffman 1966): Setting
high standards and creating unfavorable conditions requires the student to try hard to be most attentive and to actively anticipate relevant options and act accordingly. In this way, egocentric recipient design can be used to create conditions for other-positioning: The respondent has the chance to gain respect by excelling in situated displays of flexibility, anticipation, caution, skilled inferencing, interactive checking, etc.; alternatively, s/he risks to be positioned as incompetent and even morally deficient (as we could see in the data) if failing to adapt to the instructor's tacit expectations. Since it is the teacher who largely unilaterally reduces opportunities for intersubjectivity-2 and who produces aggravated conditions for the partner's cooperation (cf. Kallmeyer/Schmitt 1996), egocentric action design can be a means to exert interactional power.

In methodological terms, a satisfactory account of the emergence of failures of intersubjective cooperation by virtue of failures of recipient design has to identify and account for

1. the turn-constructional and pragmatic properties of problematic turns,
2. recipients' cooperation problems and breakdowns of intersubjectivity because of non-shared and non-indexed expectations about recipients' actions,
3. the kinds of expectations which the requester took to be violated,
4. the sources and background assumptions which motivated the requester's expectations about adequate task-performance.

In socio-cognitive experiments, it is possible to control and manipulate these four factors systematically, however, at the cost of the range and the naturalness of the phenomena of interest. In data from naturally occurring interaction, however, mostly only (1) the design of turns becoming problematic and (2) ensuing cooperation breakdowns become observable in the data, whereas (3) the violated tacit expectations and, above all, (4) their sources and background assumptions do neither become obvious to the participants nor to the analyst, given the observable interactional process. Egocentric presuppositions are mostly not recoverable both for participants and analysts in naturally occurring interactions. In contrast, the data used in this study are particularly apt for producing a comprehensive and systematic account, because they include observable interactional phenomena concerning each of these four constituents of the intersubjectivity problem. This "comprehensive" property of the data points to another important methodological demand on interactional studies of recipient design: A fuller grasp of the temporal properties of recipient design ranging beyond the narrow scope of the turn-design itself and extending into motivating (interactional, biographical) histories and interactional consequences requires the analysis of extended stretches of interactional episodes. This is needed both in order to understand how grounds for recipient design develop in interaction, which precise properties of a recipient actually are projected, and for which interactional concerns, and how choices of recipient design impinge on future interactional cooperation.

9 Still, since sources and background assumptions of egocentric turn design of the requests are only made explicit much later in the interaction and, of course, only fragmentarily, there rests some indeterminacy about their precise nature at the time the request was produced.
The study has revealed some more general aspects of recipient design which have not been studied in prior research.

Firstly, recipient design does not only concern referential choice, but also intelligible projections for next actions made available by action formation. Prior studies of recipient design have dealt with the ways in which partner's knowledge about referents and states of affairs is used for and presupposed in turn-design (see Sacks/Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1972, 1996; Betz 2015). The function of turn design which has been at issue in this study, however, is not that turns are designed so as to allow for (economic) recognition of intended referents talked about, but we have been concerned with the projection of trajectories of (collaborative) action. In the data studied this concerns the communication of background assumptions which the requester expects the respondent to take into account when constructing his/her response. It is not so much that the recipient design of the initial request turn as such proved to be problematic.10 Rather, it is the lack of formulating additional compliance-relevant assumptions which makes the design of the request egocentric. Therefore, issues of recipient design here do less concern lexical choices of referential expressions. Rather, the use of grammatical formats for requesting, the categorization of requested actions, the degree of explicitness of projections, and the provision of accounts which explain and justify requests and the bits of knowledge and expectations implied for expected compliant action matter here as recipient-designing practices of action-formation.

Secondly, the study has clearly shown how much the recipient design of individual turns is a case of the indexicality of action. Its meaning unfolds only in the context of an embodied contextual configuration (Goodwin 2000), which includes affordances and constraints of space (street), physical objects (cars), semiotic objects (car controls, road signs, traffic lights, mirrors) and their movements and embodied action (gaze, object handling). It builds on prior interactional histories and on both shared and private experiences. The recipient design of a turn and the definition of the recipient as embodied by situated turn-construction is not already sufficiently provided by choices of turn-construction in isolation.

Thirdly, recipient design is an emergent, temporal phenomenon. It develops over interactional histories, by which it is informed and which it reflexively advances and shapes itself. Recipient design is both retrospectively based and future-directed and it is adapted on the basis of the in situ, online-analysis of partner's actions. Recipient design adopts gestalt-like properties over the course of interactional episodes, positioning the recipient as a specific participant with a rich configuration of often very much personalized, locally task- and topic-relevant personal properties. These are much more detailed and specific than mere category membership and role incumbency. This interpretive depth of recipient design, however, is not constituted on the spot. It requires interactional time to unfold by systematic combination of practices of action and ways of respond to the partner's interactional moves.

Forth, we could show that recipient design does not simply rest on and reflect the recipient's knowledge. Recipient design is a feature of action formation which may rather be future-directed and strategic than retrospectively based. Recipient

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10 This only seemed to be the case in #5, S10, where the imperative was used, which in this context establishes a strong preference for immediate, urgent response.
design may be produced strategically, e.g., when counterfactual recipient design is used to test and diagnose the recipient's skills and knowledge. Rather than being adaptive to the actual recipient, recipient design then is destined to engender interactional phenomena which reveal who the actual recipient is. Current recipient design thus may reflexively be in service of future adaptations of recipient design to be performed on the basis of phenomena it helps to bring about itself.

Fifth, recipient design is perspectival in resting on the actor's perception and understanding of the partner, but not on the partner as such. Because of this ontological fact, but also more practically on behalf of simply ignoring to take the recipient's perspective into account, recipient design may be insufficient because of egocentricity, which means to presuppose knowledge which is not shared by the partner, but which is needed for successful interactional cooperation. Of course, egocentricity vs. partner-adequacy is not an "all-or-nothing"-feature, as some cognitive studies may be taken to suggest, but rather a continuum. Degrees and facets of egocentricity may be more or less obvious already upon speaker's construction of turns at talk, but their interactionally relevant properties only emerge over the course of subsequent interactional cooperation. This paper contributes to discover the interactional phenomenology of egocentricity in interaction and its interactional consequences. It is thus a step on the way to develop an interactionally based, essentially non-cognitive understanding of egocentricity.

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