Receiving and perceiving datives (cipients)

A view from German*

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The paper gives an analysis of productively occurring dative constructions in German, attempting to unify what are known traditionally as Double Object and Experiencer Datives. The datives in question — cipients as we call them — are argued to be licensed under two conditions: One, predicates licensing cipients project a theme and a location argument internally; two, interpretation of the predication as a whole involves reference to two dissociated temporal intervals, or more generally, indexical truth intervals. It is argued that the location argument is needed because it provides the variable that is bound by the cipient argument — the variable in question ranges over superlocations of the location argument referent. Reference to two truth intervals is forced because interpreting the cipient structure involves evaluation of two propositional meanings that would contradict each other in a single context. The first propositional meaning is embedded in the predicate; it encodes that something is at a certain location (in quality space). The second propositional meaning is projected as a presupposition that corresponds just to the negation of the first one. The cipient, functioning as the logical subject of the construction, accommodates this second presuppositional meaning; this makes the construction as a whole interpretable. The analysis applies uniformly to what appear to be the two major contexts licensing cipients: 'eventive' and 'too-comparative' predications, thereby accounting for some striking parallels between them.

1. Introduction

It is important in linguistic theorizing which phenomena are grouped and analyzed together, if the theory is to be evaluated against (hence indirectly to be built on) the phenomena.¹ This paper seeks to show that grouping together a range of constructions featuring dative case-marked arguments in German (and many other languages as well) allows for interesting conjectures about the interface between syntactic and semantic/pragmatic representations (taking for granted that constructions with parallel syntax are interpreted in a parallel fashion). Specifically, productive dative-case mark-
ing correlates with reference to two (vs. one) truth intervals in semantic/pragmatic interpretation, as well as with the presence of indexical elements in the syntactic structure which are mapped onto locations and degrees. The constructions that I argue to have parallel syntactic/semantic structures are exemplified in (1).\(^2\)

(1) a. *Die Anna stahl/ gab/ backte dem Otto einen Kuchen.*  
   ([the Anna]\textsubscript{NOM} stole/ gave/ baked [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} [a cake]\textsubscript{ACC}  
   'Anna stole/gave/baked Otto a cake.'
   
   ([the cat]\textsubscript{NOM} was [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} to-run/ struck/ too greedy  
   'The cat installed itself at Otto's'/'The cat struck Otto'/'Otto found the cat too greedy.'

The sentences in (1a) are examples of the familiar Double Object Construction (DOC). The sentences in (1b) exemplify what may be called Dative Experiencer Construction (DEC). I will first argue that the structure responsible for the licensing of dative arguments in a DOC corresponds to the structure of a DEC. Crucially, this structure includes (projects) an indexical location or degree argument that is related to the theme argument ('location') as well as to the dative argument ('inclusion'). The licensing predication relation between the dative subject and its predicate (a thing@loc\(^3\) propositional meaning with an abstractable superlocation variable) I propose to be established by a category pertaining to the tense/indexing system of natural language different from traditional T(ense) but reminiscent of Giorgi and Pianesi's T2 (Giorgi & Pianesi 1991). The DEC variant given last in (1b) does not feature a verbal but an adjectival predicate; more precisely, it involves a too- comparative predicate (cf. Meier 2003). In the absence of a degree element (too or (not ...) enough), no dative is licensed generally with adjectival predicates. We see that a too-comparative licenses a DOC structure as well with verbal predicates that usually do not license dative arguments (Individual Level Predicates (Carlson 1978) in particular):

(2) *Der Otto liebte dem Ede die Anna *(zu sehr).*  
   ([the Otto]\textsubscript{NOM} loved [the Ede]\textsubscript{DAT} [the Anna]\textsubscript{ACC} (too much)  
   'Ede found that Otto loved Anna too much.'

We argue that the degree element in the too- comparative case plays a role parallel to that of the location argument; 'location' must then be understood in a wide sense, covering at least 'degree location' (fixing the degree to which something (the theme referent) instantiates a certain property). The gist of the proposal can be stated in terms of licensing conditions for dative arguments (in German): the syntactic condition in I and the semantic/pragmatic condition in II have to be met in order for a dative argument to be licensed (see the previous note for (groups of) cases not explicitly discussed here).\(^4\)

1. The lexical predicate of a dative licensing construction comprises an indexical (degree) location argument that is related to the theme (location) as well as to the dative (inclusion in).
II. Interpretation of a dative licensing construction involves the checking of two disjoint truth intervals.\(^5\)

If I and II are on the right track, then the notions employed in formulating these conditions must capture something that matters in important ways at the interface between syntax and semantics/pragmatics.

The article is structured as follows: In Sections 2.1 to 2.3 I discuss more prominent approaches to dative licensing, including the Larsonian, the possessor raising and the applicative approaches and their problems. In Section 2.4, evidence is presented suggesting that cipient structures always comprise a predicate internal location argument, even if this is not visible on the surface (as is often the case). Section 2.5 presents parallels between DOCs and DECs that suggest that the part of structure relevant for licensing cipients is the same in both cases: the dative is the 'subject' of the construction, connected to its predicate by material that pertains to the tense/indexing system of natural language that implements the condition in II. Section 3 develops a unified analysis for (the cipient licensing part of) DOCs and DECs, starting with the verbal domain and the relation between the cipient and the (PP) location argument. According to the proposal, cipients 'double' PP locations in a whole-part agreement configuration, akin to a clitic doubling structure. Section 3.2 explores the properties of the location argument important for condition II. Cipient structure interpretation involves reference to two truth intervals. I argue that the cipient predicate projects a presupposition that crucially involves the location argument referent; the presupposition as a whole is the negation of a propositional meaning embedded in the predicate. In the (eventive) verbal case, the propositional meaning – thing@loc for short – encodes that something is at a certain location; in the too-comparative case, it encodes that something instantiates a property to a certain degree. Modulo choice of variables, the representational format is the same for both cases. We suggest that reference to two truth intervals must be made because contradictory propositional meanings do not fit single truth intervals. The last section illustrates the proposed analysis with a basic account of blocking effects associated with the cipient structure and an account of 'repetitive' vs. 'restitutive' ambiguities found in the construction.

2. Shifting, raising, doubling

2.1 Dative shift

Ditransitive predicates (of the give/send-type) regularly show alternating argument realization frames. This 'dative alternation' (cf. Larson 1988; den Dikken 1995) is illustrated in (3) for English and German:

\[(3) \quad \text{a.} \quad \text{Otto sent Anna flowers.} \]
\[\text{Otto schickte Anna Blumen.}\]
b. Otto sent flowers to Anna.
   Otto schickte Blumen zu/nach/an Anna (hin).

The example in (3a) illustrates the Double Object Construction (DOC), that in (3b) the PP-Location construction. In the DOC, the traditional goal/recipient (ципиент) can bind the theme syntactically, but not the other way around. In the PP location construction, binding data indicate that the theme c-commands the PP location, but the relation is more symmetric in that binding from the PP into the theme is marginally possible (cf. Barss & Lasnik 1986; Larson 1988):

(4) a. Otto gave [each worker], his, paycheck (/*...his, owner [every paycheck]),.
   b. Otto gave [each paycheck], to his, owner (/*...his, paycheck to [every owner]).

In our terminology, the cipient c-commands the theme and the theme c-commands the PP location argument. It seems to have largely escaped notice that unaccusative ‘experiencing’ predicates exhibit an analogous alternation between a ‘bare’ dative D/NP ‘experiencer’ (ципиент) realization and a PP location realization:

(5) a. A gangster escaped Otto.
   b. A gangster escaped from Otto.

(6) a. Einem Propheten erschien ein Heiliger.
   [a prophet]DAT appeared [a saint]NOM
   ‘A saint appeared to a prophet.’
   b. Ein Heiliger erschien bei einem Propheten.
   [a saint]NOM appeared at a prophet
   ‘A saint appeared at a prophet’s.’

Pronoun binding data show that c-command relations are as in the ditransitive case: at LF at the latest, the cipient c-commands the nominative theme, and the theme c-commands the PP location argument:

(7) a. His, (own) mistakes escaped [every reader],.
   b. [Every prisoner], escaped from his, cell.

According to the influential Larsonian analysis of DOCs, what we call cipient and PP location argument are alternative instantiations of one and the same thematic role. It is with the idea that the DOC is transformationally derived from the PP structure (or vice versa), however, that the Larsonian analysis meets serious problems. Consider the following examples of English DECs and DOCs respectively (ципиентs are subscripted ‘cip’, PP locations ‘loc’):

(8) a. The enemy escaped uscip [into the thick of the battle]loc.
   b. Otto sent Anna,cip flowers [TO HER OFFICE]loc.

Structures as (8) appear to license both a cipient and a PP location, which should be forbidden if one were derived from the other as under the Larsonian analysis.
Larsonian tradition according to which the 'dative alternation' is a syntactic transformation involving preposition incorporation/absorption and movement (for case) cannot account for the fact that cipients and PP location arguments may cooccur.

2.2 Possessor raising

Given that DOCs typically denote 'transfer of possession' and that there often appears to be a kind of possessive relation between the dative and the theme argument in DECs as well, it seems attractive to subsume the cipient construction under a 'possessor raising' analysis (cf. among many others Szabolcsi 1994; Landau 1999): According to a possessor raising analysis, the cipient would start out as an 'internal possessor' of the theme and would then raise to its surface position in a process involving absorption of genitive case or a preposition. Among the largely theory-independent arguments against a possessor raising analysis, two are particularly strong. First, there need by no means be a possessive relation between the dative cipient and the theme, cf. e.g.:

(9) a. Mir ist ein Fehler aufgefallen.
   me\textsubscript{DAT} is [a mistake]\textsubscript{NOM} up.fallen
   'I noticed a mistake.'

b. Mir ist ein Fehler ins Auge gefallen.
   me\textsubscript{DAT} is [a mistake]\textsubscript{NOM} into.the eye fallen
   'A mistake caught my eye.'

Examples such as (9) suggest that to the extent that there is something like a possessive relation in the cipient construction, it is between the dative cipient and the PP location. This points to a privileged semantic relation between the two. Furthermore, an 'internal possessor' can occur in the presence of and in addition to a dative cipient, and this for practically all arguments:

(10) a. Otto schob Anna sein Auto in ihre Garage.
   Otto pushed Anna his car into her garage
   'Otto pushed his car into her (=Anna's) garage for Anna.'

b. Otto schob Anna ihr Auto in seine Garage.
   Otto pushed Anna her car into his garage
   'Otto pushed her (=Anna's) car into his garage.'

(11) Otto entkam Edes Huhn.
   Otto\textsubscript{DAT} escaped [Ede's chicken]\textsubscript{NOM}
   'Ede's chicken escaped from Otto.'

If the 'external possessor' (shifted dative (cipient)) were the result of absorption on the part of the base position/extraction site, one would expect that the relevant position cannot be occupied in the presence of an external possessor. 'Multiple possessor constructions' like in (12) are excluded.

(12) *This is Otto's Anna's house.
2.3 Applicative head analyses

Analyzing cipients in terms of applicative heads has recently gained prominence. According to this line of thought, there are special heads that encode possession and that license cipients in their specifier position; this treatment of cipients is reminiscent of the Kratzerian (1996) analysis according to which the agent role is syntactically licensed by a head 'little v' or 'voice'. Arguably, little v in turn descends from the CAUSE predicate of Generative Semantics (Dowty 1979). The applicative analysis is prominently advanced by Marantz (1993) and developed by Pylkkänen (2002) and McGinnis (2001). The latter two authors argue that there are 'high' and 'low' applicative heads encoding possessive relations, on the one hand between the cipient and an event encoded lower in the structure (high applicatives) and on the other hand between the cipient and the theme (low applicatives). Languages differ as regards whether they furnish 'high' or 'low' applicatives or both.

While there is good reason to believe that cipients are licensed by a designated head, the applicative head analysis is not convincing for a variety of reasons. We have already seen that the idea that cipients stand in a possessive relation to other material in the structure is problematic (Section 2.2). The claim that English has only low applicatives runs into problems because there are clear cases in English where there is a semantic relation between the cipient and an event (however understood), something that should be excluded under the Pylkkänen/McGinnis approach. A punch, for example, should count as an event – in (13), the theme appears to denote an event then.

(13) Anna gave Otto a punch.
Otto had a punch.

Furthermore, cipients do not pattern with agents as they would be expected to if they were licensed by a head functioning like little v; cipients, much more robustly than agents, are excluded from processes traditionally assumed to apply in the lexicon, such as word or idiom formation (see e.g. Larson 1988; Marantz 1993). Cf. e.g. the following contrasts in German:

(14) *Altenrentenversprechen, *Kindernerzähler
Old_{DAT}-pensions-promise, kids_{DAT}-narrator
'promise of pensions to the old', 'story-teller for children'

(15) Kanzlergabe, Ritterschwur, Vogelgezwitscher
chancellor_{NOM}-gift, knight_{NOM}-oath, bird_{NOM}-chirping
'gift by the chancellor, oath by a knight, chirping by birds'

At least certain agents seem to be more lexical than cipients. Under an analysis assuming applicative heads with a rather specific meaning, cipients would be expected to behave more like agents. The fact that cipients are excluded from processes standardly assumed to apply in the lexicon suggests that cipients are licensed exclusively in the
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Under the analysis spelled out below, cipients are clearly functionally licensed, namely by material pertaining to the tense-/indexing system of natural language.

Conceptually, the idea that languages differ with respect to their applicative head equipment goes against the basic assumption that languages are uniform as far as the material substantive to interpretation is concerned (cf. Chomsky 1999). For different languages to have different applicative heads would mean for them to differ substantially with respect to the means they have for expressing certain meanings; this seems to be particularly unlikely for closely related languages like English (claimed to have only high applicatives) and German (which would need to have both high and low applicatives, see Brandt 2003:107ff.). Further, it appears questionable that there is a primitive meaning 'have', let alone several ones (cf. already Benveniste 1966; see more recently Belvin & den Dikken 1997).

2.4 The location argument

This section presents evidence that a location argument is always projected in the constructions we are discussing, even if this is not visible on the surface. We propose that the reason why location arguments are needed in the cipient construction is this: Cipients 'double' location arguments. Syntactically, cipients are licensed in an agreement relation with a category pertaining to the tense system that depends on a location argument lower in the structure. Semantically, cipients are superlocations of predicate-internal location arguments, and the variable they bind stems from the latter.

2.4.1 LOCs licensing force

A range of patterns suggest that the projection of a location argument is a necessary condition for cipient licensing. Often, and certainly with verbal predicates that can be informally characterized as 'process'-denoting, cipients are only licensed in the presence of an overtly expressed PP location argument or a locative prefix on the verb; the following pattern is perfectly productive in German (and similarly in e.g. Dutch):

\[
\begin{align*}
(16) \ a. \ & \text{Otto fiel die Vase *(auf den Boden).} \\
\ & \text{Otto$_{DAT}$ fell [the vase]$_{NOM}$ to the ground,} \\
\ & \text{The vase fell to the ground to Otto's misfortune.}' \\
\ b. \ & \text{Das Erbe war Otto *(zu-) gesprochen.} \\
\ & \text{[the heritage]$_{NOM}$ was Otto$_{DAT}$ to spoken} \\
\ & \text{'Otto was granted the heritage.'}
\end{align*}
\]

The lists in (17) and (18) illustrate the type of predicate that typically occurs in the DEC and DOC in German. It is striking that as a general rule, these predicates are prefixal – for the majority of cases, it is arguably the case that the prefix is related to a locative element that has incorporated into the verbal form (cf. for arguments in favor of the locative origin of the pertaining prefixes a.o. Seebold 2002; Maylor 1998).
(17) 'unaccusative' predicates occurring in the DEC in German:
er-scheinen ‘appear’, auf-fallen ‘strike’, wider-fahren ‘occur to’ gelingen,
glüchen ‘be crowned by success’, ein-leuchten ‘be enlightening’, ent-kommen,
entgehen, entwischen ‘flee, get away, escape’, entgegen-kommen ‘come toward’,
gegenüber-treten ‘oppose’

(18) predicates projecting the DOC in German:

With few exceptions, the prefixes occurring with the verbal predicates licensing DECs and DOCs that are transparently locative are in complementary distribution with overt PP location arguments – this follows if they perform the same function, namely that of a predicate-internal location argument. The prefixes er-, ver-, zer- are not in complementary distribution with locative PP arguments; arguably, they reflect an independent way of encoding ‘comparison of states of affairs’ (inchoative meaning). There may be interesting (historical) connections with the comparative suffix -er, reflecting reference to different states of affairs in comparative structures (see Jensen 1934:124). Note that with unaccusative DEC projecting predicates such as those in (17), locative prefixes seem more needed than with fully blown DOC projecting predicates such as those in (18). Adjectival passive DOCs pattern with DECs:

(19) a. Der Stein war ihm *(auf-) gefallen.
   [the stone]_NOM was him_DAT up-fallen
   ‘The stone had caught his attention.’  [DEC]

b. Der Brief war ihm über-bracht?* gebracht.
   [the letter]_NOM was him_DAT over-brought/brought
   ‘The letter was in a state of having been brought to him.’  [DOC]

The verbal passive DOC, projecting an (optionally expressed) agent under standard assumptions, can live without a locative prefix, but the adjectival passive DOC that does not project an agent cannot. We will offer a partial explanation for this pattern in Section 2.5 below, where we argue that the structure of adjectival passive DOCs is completely parallel to that of DECs.

2.4.2 Quantificational binding
A difference concerning reconstruction of WH quantifiers provides evidence for the presence of an unarticulated location argument in the cipient construction (see Reinhart 1983; Bresnan 1994 for syntactic, Maienborn 2001 for semantic/pragmatic criteria distinguishing location arguments from adjuncts). Consider the following contrasts between cipient-licensing predicates (in (a)) vs. non-cipient-licensing predicates (in (b)):
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(20) a. *Zu welchem von Ottos Kollegen hat man ihn geschickt?
to which of Otto’s colleagues has one sent him
‘Which of Otto’s colleagues has he been sent to?’
b. Bei welchem von Ottos Kollegen hat man ihn gesehen?
at which of Otto’s colleagues has one him seen
‘At which of Otto’s colleagues’ places has he been seen?’

(21) a. *Zu welchem Nachbarn von Otto ist er entwischt?
to which neighbor of Otto is he escaped
‘To which of Otto’s neighbors did he escape?’
b. Bei welchem Nachbarn von Otto hat man ihn gesehen?
at which neighbor of Otto has one him seen
‘At which of Otto’s neighbors has he been seen?’

We can explain that the (a) sentences are worse than the (b) sentences if in the former, the WH quantifier reconstructs into a location argument position below the theme argument, giving rise to a crossover (Principle C) effect. In the (b) examples, the quantifier reconstructs into an adjunct position that is higher than the position of the theme.11

We see an analogous effect in the domain of degree predication, where too-comparative structures with fronted WH constituents providing information about the actual degree of instantiation pattern with the location argument structures. Structures that lack the too-comparative but that allow ‘degree adjuncts’ pattern with the location adjunct structures ((Marcel Reich-)Ranicki is a famous literary critic in Germany):

(22) a. *Mit welchem Wert auf Ranickis Skala war er, zu hoch bewertet?
with which value on Ranicki’s scale was he too highly judged
‘With which value on Ranicki’s scale was he judged too highly?’
b. Mit welchem Wert auf Ranickis Skala hat man ihn, provoziert?
with which value on Ranicki’s scale has one provoked him
‘With which value on Ranicki’s scale did they provoke him?’

Along the location argument vs. adjunct line, we can explain the contrast if the WH constituent in cases like (22a) reconstructs into a degree argument position below the theme whereas the WH constituent in cases like (22b) reconstructs into an adjunct position above the theme.

The analysis predicts, of course, that Reinhart’s c-command condition on bound variable readings is met at LF in the location/degree argument cases, but not in the location/degree adjunct cases. As is often the case with reconstruction phenomena, judgments are again subtle but appear to be clear enough for some speakers. (23) and
(24) illustrate the DOC and DEC case with location, (25) illustrates the DEC case with ‘degree location’:

(23) a. Zu welchem seiner Kollegen hat man [jeden Linguisten], to which of his colleagues has one every linguist geschickt?
sent ‘To which of his colleagues was every linguist sent?’
b. Bei welchem seiner Kollegen hat man [jeden Linguisten], at which of his colleagues has one every linguist vorgestellt?
introduced ‘At which of his colleagues’ places has every linguist been introduced?’

(24) a. Bei welchem seiner Kollegen ist [jeder Linguist], at which of his colleagues is every linguist unpleasantly aufgefallen?
up.fallen ‘At which of his colleagues’ places has every linguist made a bad impression?’
b. Bei welchem seiner Kollegen hat man [jeden Linguisten], geküsst?
at which of his colleagues has one every linguist kissed ‘At which of his colleagues’ places has every linguist been kissed?’

(25) a. Mit welchem Wert auf seiner Skala war [jeder Kritiker], with which value on his scale was every critic too hoch bewertet?
highly judged ‘With which value on his scale was every critic judged too highly?’
b. Mit welchem Wert auf seiner Skala hat man [jeden Kritiker], with which value on his scale has one every critic provoziert?
provoked ‘With which value on his scale did they provoke every critic?’

2.4.3 Coordination of identical constituents
Another argument for a silent location argument in the cipient construction comes from patterns of coordination in conjunction with verb raising. It is generally assumed that only constituents with identical structure can be coordinated. One can say:

(26) Otto sent [[Anna a letter] and [a parcel to Ede]].

If what can be coordinated are constituents with identical makeup, the structure of (26) must be as indicated in (27):

12
(27) *Otto sent Anna [[a letter \(pp\) e] and [a parcel \(pp \text{ to Ede}\)].]

Similarly, the following examples are acceptable, suggesting that the cipient construction has a location argument in its structure:

(28) a. (2) *The gangsters escaped Otto [[t\_theme \(pp\) e] \(tv\)] and [t\_theme into the woods \(tv\)].
   b. *The boss promised ME [[a vacation \(pp\) e] \(tv\)] and [fewer HOURS to the WORKERS \(tv\)].

There is a problem here, however (pointed out to me by Magdalena Schwager): we would expect the second conjunct to be interpreted with respect to the cipient (like the first one), if conjunction takes place below the cipient; this is not the case, though. A possible solution to the problem builds on the fact that contrastive focus marking is needed for the construction to be felicitous. Contrast on the PP in particular indicates that it is interpreted with respect to a contextually given set of alternatives (Rooth 1985) rather than with respect to the cipient. Some support for this idea comes from data such as (29), where contrastively focus-marked PP locations seem to marginally be able to take scope over cipients, an option that is usually excluded:

(29) *Otto hat einem Abgeordneten einen Beschwerdebrief Otto has [a member.of.parliament]DAT [a letter.of.complaint]ACC in jede Stadt geschickt. in every city sent ‘To every city, Otto sent a (different) member of parliament a letter of complaint.’

2.4.4 Hin und her (hither and thither)
A third argument for a silent location argument in cipient predication is provided by the separable prefixes *hin* 'hither' and *her* 'thither' in German – these elements strictly depend on the presence of a location argument in the structure in which they occur. Intuitively, *hin* and *her* signal the ‘directedness’ of an event away from some implicit source to some location (*hin*) or toward the source from some location (*her*):

   Otto drove thither ‘Otto drove there.’
   b. *Otto fuhr her.*
   Otto drove hither ‘Otto drove here.’

Predicates that do not contain location arguments are incompatible with *hin* und *her*, respectively:
Ein Hase war/hatte... *hin/her-gegessen, *hin/her-geschlafen, a hare was/had... hither/thither-eaten, hither/thither-slept,
*hin/her-gestunken hither/thither-stunk

The predicates that do not allow hin and her do not license cipients either, as is predicted:

Dem Otto war/hatte ein Hase {gegessen, geschlafen, gestunken}, [the Otto]DAT was/had [a hare]NOM eaten, slept, stunk
'A rabbit was eaten/had slept/stunk for Otto.'

In the cipient construction, hin und her are possible, indicating the presence of a location argument in the construction:

Dem Otto war die Blume... [the Otto]DAT was [the flower]NOM...

a. hin-gefallen, hin-gestorben, hin-gewelkt.
   hither-fallen, hither-died, hither-withered

b. hin/her-geschickt worden, hin/her-gebracht worden,
   hither/thither-sent been, hither/thither-brought been,
   hin/her-gemailt worden.
   hither/thither-mailed been

2.5 DOCs minus agentive structure are DECs

In the respects discussed so far, DOCs and DECs behave similarly to each other – we have seen evidence indicating that location argument projection is crucial in both cases and that c-command relations between projected arguments are the same. Both cases share core aspects of meaning, expectedly if they take part in the same type of alternation (Levin 1993, cf. Section 2.1). To repeat, overt expression of a location argument is needed more in adjectival passive than in verbal passive DOCs, bringing adjectival passive DOCs close to (unaccusative) DECs in this respect already. The obvious difference between fully blown DOCs and DECs is that unlike DECs, DOCs project an agent argument. It is theoretically desirable to assume that if an agent is missing, then so is the structure licensing it: under a minimalist perspective, there should be no structure that is not interpreted. Assuming with Kratzer (1996) that agents are licensed by a category little v or voice phrase that links agents to the eventuality they pertain to, little v should be absent in adjectival passive DOCs as in DECs, making them parallel structurally. In the following, I argue that adjectival passive DOCs and DECs are indeed structurally equivalent.

Starting with the obvious, German DECs and adjectival passive DOCs are completely analogous on the surface:
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(34) a. Dem Otto ist ein Huhn (aus dem Stall) entkommen.  
[the Otto]_DAT is [a hen]_NOM (from the shed) escaped  
'A hen escaped from the shed to Otto's misfortune.'

b. Dem Otto ist ein Huhn (in die Hand) versprochen.  
[the Otto]_DAT is a hen (into the hand) promised  
'Otto is in the state of a hen having been promised to him.'

Looking at deeper structural properties, coordination facts support the hypothesis that adjectival passive DOCs and DECs share a single structure: DECs and adjectival passive DOCs can be coordinated, and they may share the cipient argument (cf. 'equi NP deletion'). It is a standard assumption that only categorially identical constituents can be coordinated under 'Equi Deletion':

(35) Dem Otto [gefiel zwar die Firma sehr gut], [war aber  
[the Otto]_DAT appealed PRT [the company]_NOM very much, was but  
kein Job versprochen].  
no job promised  
'Otto liked the company very much, but he wasn't promised a job.'

The coordination patterns speak in favor of the subject status of cipients, and other facts do as well. In Icelandic, what appear to be cipients can bind certain subject-oriented anaphors (cf. Maling 1990); in German, partial extraction from cipients is just as bad as from subjects of Individual Level Predicates, which may be the clearest instances of subjects in a more general sense (being licensed externally at base and being presuppositional). Subjects are traditionally defined as D/NPs that are licensed in the specifier position of the Tense projection. Quite clearly in fully blown DOCs, the dative cannot be in the usual T(ense) projection – this is where the agent argument is (case-) licensed. An argument that cipients (in both adjectival passive DOCs and DECs) are licensed in a designated position that is different from T(ense) can be made on the basis of somewhat more intricate coordination patterns involving Equi Deletion (Hohle 1983; Heycock & Kroch 1993). Let us adopt the assumptions Heycock and Kroch make concerning coordination under Equi Deletion:

(36) a. The coordinated constituents have to be of like category.  
b. The deleted element has to be 'outside' (≈ higher structurally than) the first conjunct.

Let us assume further that the verb in German verb-second sentences is in the C(complementizer) position (den Besten 1989). Observe that both preverbal nominative subjects and cipients can undergo equi-deletion, as is predicted given (36):

(37) a. Der Otto hat einen Film gesehen und EC hat dann eine  
[the Otto]_NOM has a movie seen and EC has then a  
Bratwurst gekauft.  
sausage bought  
'Otto saw a movie and bought a sausage afterwards.'
b. *Dem Otto gefiel der Film, aber EC missfiel der [the Otto]_{DAT} appealed the movie but EC disappeared the Hauptdarsteller.

main.actor

‘Otto liked the movie, but he didn’t like the main actor.’

c. *Den Kindern war das Spielen auf dem Rasen verboten, aber [the children]_{DAT} was the playing on the lawn forbidden but EC schien das Schwimmen im See erlaubt.

EC seemed the swimming in the lake admitted

‘Playing on the lawn was forbidden for the kids, but they seemed to be allowed to swim in the lake.’

The constructions in (37) are fine; here, the part of structure that is coordinated under equi-deletion corresponds to everything below the SpecTP position. A well defined exception to the rule that the shared element has to be ‘outside’ the coordinated constituent is constituted by regular (nominative) subjects: These may be deleted under conjunction, although the verb is in a higher position in verb-second sentences with topicalization of a non-subject:

(38) Das Gepäck schmiss er in die Ecke und EC rannte zum [the baggage]_{ACC} threw he_{NOM} into the corner and EC ran to-the

A usgang.

exit

‘He threw the baggage into the corner and ran to the exit.’

Cipients cannot be the shared constituent under coordination unless they are fronted (i.e., in SpecCP):

(39) a. *?Gestern gefiel dem Otto der Film, aber missfielen

yesterday pleased [the Otto]_{DAT} [the movie]_{NOM} and displeased

EC die Darsteller.

EC [the actors]_{NOM}

‘Yesterday, Otto liked the movie, but he disliked the actors.’

b. *?Gestern war den Kindern das Spielen auf dem Rasen

yesterday was [the children]_{DAT} [the playing on the lawn]_{NOM}

verboten, aber schien EC das Schwimmen im See

forbidden but seemed EC [the swimming in the lake]_{NOM}
erlaubt.

admitted

‘Yesterday, playing on the lawn was forbidden for the kids, but they seemed to be allowed to swim in the lake.’

As an anonymous reviewer points out in support of these observations, constructions where the dative controls a nominative gap in one of the conjuncts are ungrammatical:
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If cipients were licensed in a way analogous to ‘standard nominative subjects’, we would expect them to behave like the latter in the deletion under coordination paradigm, which they do not. The coordination under deletion pattern indicates that cipients are not associated with (licensed by) the standard T projection. The fact that cipient presence gives rise to ‘extra tensing’ options suggests that cipients are licensed in a designated lower position that is just as tense related. Thus ‘small infinitives’ generally forbid independent temporal location of the embedded propositional meaning, but they allow it as soon as a cipient argument is projected:

\begin{enumerate}
\item We tried to escape Otto’s party next Sunday.
\item *We tried to escape next Sunday.
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item The boss tried to give Otto Europe next year.
\item *The boss tried to give Europe to Otto next year.
\end{enumerate}

The conjecture is that while cipients are lower than the standard T(ense) projection, they are still above material that achieves temporal location – specifically, what is temporally located in examples such as (41) or (42) is the expected post states of the attempts that are depicted – for (41) that one be away on the occasion of Otto’s party and for (42) that Europe be with Otto.

It was noted in Section 2.4 that an overt locative prefix is more strictly required in adjectival than in verbal passive DOCs. If what we propose here is on the right track, we have the beginnings of a story why this should be so: We argue that the location argument projected in the cipient construction has a crucial part in furnishing a second index that must be checked when it comes to interpretation; suppose that the locative morphology signals this. If there is agentive structure and associated morphosyntax present, it may be clear from this already that there is reference to two truth intervals involved in the interpretation of the construction. Agents are causers, and causation relates states of affairs at different times. It seems plausible that if agentivity helps signalling presence of two intervals, then locative morphology will be less needed.

3. Location doubling and whole-part agreement

We saw that cipients have certain properties associated with subjecthood, including that they appear to mark a ‘tensed domain’. In the light of the crucial role PP locations appear to play for the construction, we may consider (43) as the structure licensing cipients:
In (43), cipients are licensed in the specifier position of a functional projection that pertains to the tense system of natural language, called here ‘little t’. Depending on the presence of a predicate-internal location argument, \( t \) can license a cipient in its specifier position.

The structure in (43) is essentially that of a clitic-doubling configuration.\(^{21}\) So we find the features of clitic doubling structures associated with the cipient structure. In clitic doubling structures, there appear to be two argument expressions that relate to one and the same role; second, in the the presence of a doubling clitic, the source for the doubling may remain unexpressed (like PP locations in the presence of a cipient). Third, clitic doubled arguments show evidence of being external arguments and involve a form of agreement with the doubled element.

From a semantic/pragmatic perspective, clitic doubled arguments behave like ‘subjects’ roughly in Strawson’s sense, that is, as expressions carrying presuppositions of some definite empirical fact (a presupposition of existence in the weakest case). It is argued by Gutiérrez-Rexach (2000) that clitic doubled arguments in Spanish carry existence presuppositions, which squares well with the fact that they regularly appear to take unusually wide scope (e.g., Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 1997). Indeed in languages like Greek or Spanish, the cipient structure is realized in a clitic-doubling configuration:\(^{22}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(44)} & \quad To \ vivlio \ *(tu) \ aresi \ tu \ Petru. \\
& \quad \text{the book cl}_{\text{DAT}} \text{ appeals [the Peter]}_{\text{DAT}} \\
& \quad \text{‘The book appeals to Peter.’ [Greek, Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 1997:152]} \\
\text{(45) a.} & \quad La \ musica \ *(le) \ gusta \ a \ Juan. \\
& \quad \text{the music him}_{\text{DAT}} \text{ pleases to Juan}
\end{align*}
\]
b. A Juan *(le) gusta la musica.

to Juan him\textsubscript{DAT} pleases the music

'The music pleases Juan.'

[Spanish, Montrul 1995:183]

The main difference between standard clitic doubling structures (or how they are thought of) and the cipient structure is that while in the former there appears to
be perfect identity of reference between the doubled and the doubling element, the
semantic relation between cipients and PP locations is of the whole-part kind. Ready-
to-use terms are largely lacking in this domain (but cf. Moltmann 1997; Husserl 1913),
but we see the relevance of the kind of inclusion relation in shading contrasts like the
following:


[the Anna]\textsubscript{NOM} sat [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} on the lap

'Anna sat on Otto's lap.'

b. ?Die Anna saß dem Otto auf der Kühlerhaube.

[the Anna]\textsubscript{NOM} sat [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} on the hood

'Anna sat on Otto's hood.'

c. ?*Die Anna saß dem Otto auf dem Tisch.

[the Anna]\textsubscript{NOM} sat [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} on the table

'Anna sat on Otto's table.'

In an obvious but to be clarified sense, for the average German Otto includes Otto's
lap more than his car, while his car more than his table belongs to Otto the person as a
part.

3.1 More on the cipient-PP location relation

We propose that cipients and PP locations have to relate as superlocations to subloca-
tions: PP locations come with additional free variables ranging over superlocations of
the PP location referent, and it is such a superlocation variable that the cipient expres-
sion binds. The relevant partial LF contributed by PP locations can be represented as
follows, where p and w are variables ranging over locations and R is a relation of (at
least) inclusion:

(47) \[ \text{PP} \rightarrow \lambda p \lambda x \left[ \text{AT}(x_{\text{theme}}, p_{\text{location}}, i) \land R(p, w) \right] \]

where R(p, w) \rightarrow p \text{ included-in } w

Deferring discussion of its contribution to temporal/indexical structure, we can think
of the t head as rendering the cipient slot 'active' by abstracting over the superloca-
tion variable w. Unlike for PP locations, holding that cipients denote locations seems
strange at first.\textsuperscript{23} There appears to be a crosslinguistically valid correlation, however,
between the ease with which cipients are licensed and the 'strength' or 'prominence'
of the inclusion relation between the cipient and the PP location (cf. the hierarchy
for 'possessor constructions' proposed by Payne & Barshi 1999). The more prominent
the part of the cipient is that the PP location denotes, the more easily the cipient is licensed. German appears to constitute a worst case as far as the cipient-PP relation is concerned; loose spatiotemporal inclusion as well as metaphorically extended senses make the construction available; thus (48a) is felicitous if we know that Anna has an office in London to which she has some access (which needn't be physical) and (48b) is felicitous if we know that Anna profits in some way from the translation of the article in question into English:

(48) a. Der Otto hat der Anna den Brief nach London geschickt.

'The Otto sent the letter to London for Anna.'

b. Der Otto hat der Anna den Aufsatz ins Englische übersetzt.

'The Otto translated the article into English for Anna.'

There is some evidence from acquisition studies that 'possession' might really be derivative of 'inclusion at a sublocation' in the relevant sense (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976). Further, the interpretation of cipients as locations accounts for some properties of cipients that are rather unexpected if they are indeed subjects (external arguments agreeing with tense), such as the general absence of agreement or the unexpectedly ill anaphor-binding properties of cipients. Both may follow from cipients not bearing the 'right' features, the 'right' features being those defining things and persons, but not the ones defining locations.24

Something like an inclusion relation between cipients and PP locations not only holds at the object level, but also at the level of indexical structure. Consider the following pattern:

(49) Die Vase fiel (dem Otto) zu Boden.

'The vase fell to the ground to Otto's misfortune.'

Every speaker of German interprets the location denoting PP 'to ground' as a location prominent in the utterance context in the absence of a cipient. If there is a cipient expressed, the location is interpreted as a location relative (close, usually) to the cipient referent. The point is clearer, in fact, in the comparative case:

(50) Die Suppe war (dem Otto) zu heiß.

'The soup was too hot (for Otto).'

In the absence of a cipient, the standard needed to know what it means for the soup to be too hot is set in the utterance situation. In the presence of a cipient, this standard is
set by the cipient. The degree to which the soup is actually hot is included, of course, in the set of degrees at which the cipient potentially experiences heat of edibles (the cipient’s ‘quality space’ (Quine 1960) with respect to temperature of edibles).

Note that the cipient appears to set a parameter here that is usually set by the utterance situation. This strongly backs up the claim that cipients are interpreted as definite.

3.2 Two indices and cipient anchors

Let’s turn now to the role of location for the condition under II, viz. that there are two indices involved in interpreting the cipient structure.

It has been noted that there is a link between unaccusativity and aspectual structure (Borer 1994; Levin & Rappoport Hovav 1995 among many others). Unaccusative predicates projecting location arguments in particular regularly give rise to a state change interpretation. Most verbal predicates licensing cipients are state change predicates – DOCs typically encode (abstract) transfer (Oehrle 1976), and most verbal DECs express affectedness of the cipient by some ‘event’ (cf. e.g. Marantz 1993). It is argued here that we can analyze the eventive and the too-comparative cases along the same lines, if we interpret ‘eventhood’ as state-change. An example illustrating the too-comparative construction is repeated in (51).

   [the cat]NOM was [the Otto]DAT too greedy
   ‘Otto found the cat too greedy.’

   [the cat]NOM was [the Otto]DAT not greedy enough
   ‘Otto did(n’t) find the cat greedy enough.’

Structures as in (51) are productively available, hence constitute the strongest type of counterexample to an exclusively aspectual approach to cipient licensing. These cipient constructions are stative, ruining the idea that eventhood proper is the criterion for cipient licensing. In the following, it is shown how a uniform semantic/pragmatic analysis of the eventive and the too-comparative cipient structures can be given once we choose a particular format for event representation, namely the one proposed in Dowty (1979, building on von Wright 1965). Accordingly, the analysis offered here provides an argument in favor of the idea that event representations are really built from contradictory propositional meanings (that encode a change of state); it speaks against a view of events as primitives of the ontology (Davidson 1967).25

3.2.1 From change...

Consider a cipient structure like the elephant escaped Otto. What it asserts is that there is a time (in the past) where the elephant in question is not with Otto – but it has to have been with Otto before if the sentence is to be meaningful. In the following I argue that predicates involving verbs like escape trigger presuppositions that correspond to
the negation of what is actually asserted, and that the same holds for too-comparative predicates.\textsuperscript{26}

In the case at hand as well as with most verbal/eventive structures licensing cipients, this asserted meaning is what one might call the post state of the event encoded in the structure: \textsuperscript{27} For the cases discussed here the post state has thing@loc semantics — something is at a certain location at a certain time/index:

\begin{equation}
(52) \quad \begin{aligned}
\text{a. } & \text{The elephant escaped Otto.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{AT(}\text{Otto-subloc,elephant,}i\text{)} & \Rightarrow & \text{AT(}\text{Otto-subloc,elephant,}i'\text{)} & \& & i < i' \\
\text{Presupposition} & \text{Assertion}
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}

It seems clear that presupposition and assertion have to hold at different indices here — the same elephant cannot be at different locations at the same time. We argue that this is what forces reference to two dissociated indices: Interpreting the cipient structure involves checking contradictory propositional meanings, and contradictory propositional meanings do not fit single contexts. Problems arise, however, with indefinite themes:

\begin{equation}
(53) \quad \text{An elephant escaped Otto.}
\end{equation}

Under standard assumptions, the theme is existentially quantified at the VP level, so there seems to be no way to bind the theme referent in the presupposition (the negated assertion). None of the following formulae is contradictory: \textsuperscript{28}

\begin{equation}
(54) \quad \neg (\exists y, p' \ \text{AT}(y,p',i)) & \& 3x, p \ & \text{AT}(x,p,i)
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
(55) \quad 3y, p' \ \Rightarrow \ \text{AT}(y,p',i) & \& 3x, p \ & \text{AT}(x,p,i)
\end{equation}

There is nothing wrong with there not being some \( y \) at \( p' \) and there being at the same time some \( x \) at \( p \). Nor is there anything wrong with there being some \( y \) and \( p' \) not at each other’s places and there being at the same time some \( x \) and \( p \) at each other’s places. What is needed to arrive at contradictory propositional meanings is for information from downstairs to project up and determine further the propositional meaning given as a presupposition. We want to ensure that the referent of the location argument in particular is the same in presupposition and assertion, and we want to further ensure that the same type of thing is talked about in the presupposition and in the assertion.

\subsection{3.2.2 with kinds at highly specific locations...}

Looking at a single context (index), presupposed pre states and asserted post states as defining a certain change of state will contradict each other if it is made sure that the same location and kind of thing are talked about in the two propositional meanings, but not otherwise. There is evidence that cipient predication projects a presupposition with a location argument whose referent is identical with the one denoted by the PP location. Consider:
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(56)  
a. Fidel was reading a book about catholicism when suddenly the Pope appeared.

\[ \text{Fidel was reading a book about catholicism when suddenly the Pope appeared on Cuba/to him.} \]

b. Fidel was reading a book about catholicism when suddenly the Pope had a brilliant idea.

\[ \text{Fidel was reading a book about catholicism when suddenly the Pope had a brilliant idea about Cuba/him.} \]

The example in (56a) contains the cipient licensing predicate *appear*; it is most natural to interpret the unexpressed location argument as picking its referent from what is mentioned in the main clause (Fidel, of whom we know that he is in Cuba). There is no such locative anaphoricity in (56b) where the location of the state of affairs encoded in the embedded clause is free. Sæbø (1996) makes a proposal that offers a good way to understand this contrast. Sæbø argues that

(57) A zero Argument is anaphoric iff the predicate triggers a presupposition involving it.  

(\text{Sæbø 1996:195})

That a location prominent in the matrix clause also locates the embedded state of affairs in (56a) follows if the embedded clause contains a silent location that is anaphorically dependent for referential purposes; if Sæbø is right, then the antecedent location arises from a presupposition triggered by the predicate itself. No such effect is observed with (56b), which does not involve an anaphorically dependent location.\textsuperscript{29} It is important that the location is anaphoric and consequently does not interact with scope-bearing elements in its clause, since only if the location is specific does one arrive at contradiction between the presuppositional and the actually asserted thing@loc meaning (keeping the evaluation index constant). It is argued here that reference to two indices is forced in the cipient structure exactly because the two propositional meanings lead to contradiction if evaluated at a single index.

Something else is needed, though, to 'project up', namely information about what kind of thing the theme is.\textsuperscript{30} The case for kind information projecting up from the theme is quickly made; it is in exactly the enviroments we are discussing that we see kind information associated with the theme argument take wide scope with respect to the cipient expression, consider (58).

(58)  
a. She assigned a different student every exercise.

\[ \text{She assigned a student every type of exercise.} \]

\[ \approx \text{"For any type of exercise, she would assign it to a student."} \]

Examples such as (58a) illustrate that it is generally impossible for individual-denoting theme arguments to take (non-surface) scope and distribute over cipient referents (‘scope freezing’). (58b) shows that as soon as a kind denoting expression figures as
the theme argument, the theme does seem to be able to take wide scope with respect to the cipient (with a generic reading arising for the complete sentence). Kind information thus projects up to at least the cipient level.\textsuperscript{31} Provided that the location argument is anaphoric to a location in a presupposition and that kind information pertaining to the theme argument projects up, we do arrive at contradictory propositional meanings between what we have in the VP and as a presupposition if we prefix the presuppositional meaning with negation:

$$\neg(\exists x \text{ relevant.stuff}(x) \& \text{AT}(x,p,i)) \& \exists x \text{ relevant.stuff}(x) \& \text{AT}(x,p,i)$$

We now have situations in which there is both nothing and something of a relevant kind at a certain location, and this, we put forward, necessitates reference to different contexts. But why, after all, couldn’t contradictory meanings hold at a single time (interval)? Arguably, this is simply not how language works. Consider, for example, the following:

(60) "Yesterday I was and I wasn’t at the office.

Although (60) may likely be true under unspectacular circumstances, it is odd. It seems the quantification is over a relevant minimal interval included in the time denoted by the temporal adverb, and that at this interval only one of the propositions p or not p can be asserted.\textsuperscript{32} We submit that restriction of the quantification to a relevant minimal domain is at play in the locative as well as in the temporal domain. This also takes care of another problem: it seems that the location has to be very specific to arrive at contradiction.\textsuperscript{33} Physically there seems to be no problem with e.g. there being a stone on Otto’s head already when another one hits him there. What we have to assume is that the location in question is indeed a minimal one.

3.2.3 ... to too-comparative

Paralleling the need for a location argument in the verbal domain, comparative constructions license cipients to the extent that they feature a degree element like too in English, indicating that the property talked about is instantiated to a degree beyond what one may call a ‘standard of appropriateness’ associated with the cipient argument.\textsuperscript{34} The dual of too, not... enough, does a cipient licensing job as well:\textsuperscript{35}

(61) a. Der Otto ist mir *(zu) intelligent.
   [the Otto]_{NOM} is me_{DAT} *(too) intelligent
   ‘Otto is too intelligent for me.’

   b. Der Otto ist mir (nicht) intelligent *(genug).
   [the Otto]_{NOM} is me_{DAT} not intelligent enough
   ‘Otto is not intelligent enough for me.’

For the eventive case, the idea is that the cipient is interpreted as its spatiotemporal extension, overlapping with both the index at which the VP thing@loc meaning holds as well as with the index at which its negation holds – cipients thus restrict the possible index values of both propositional meanings and make the structure interpretable
In the *too*-comparative case, it is particularly obvious that the cipient provides information necessary to interpret the structure. To repeat, we need to know the cipient’s standard in order to know what it means for something to exceed that standard.

Transforming the essence of von Stechow’s (1984) or Meier’s (2003) counterfactual analysis of *too*-comparative structures, the following examples with paraphrases bring out the parallel between the eventive and the *too*-comparative case:

(62)  

a. *The vase fell to the ground.*
There is an index i where the vase is not on the ground and there is an index i′ where the vase is on the ground & i < i′.

b. *The soup was too hot.*
There is an index i at which the soup is not hot to degree d (such that it would be appropriate for eating) and there is an index i′ where the soup is hot to degree d (such that it is inappropriate for eating) (& i > i′).

In more perspicuous terms, the meanings encoded in the eventive and *too*-comparative constructions licensing cipients can be represented as follows, where the upper line represents a presupposed propositional meaning holding at a truth interval and where the lower line represents the asserted propositional meaning holding at another truth interval (that does not overlap with the first one). For the state change case, indices are ordered by the precedence relations holding between times; for the comparative case, we may assume that indices (‘worlds/situations’) are ordered by a preference relation (‘being closer to the situation where things accord to standards of appropriateness’):36

(63)  

a. ——(pre-state)———>times
.................↑post state↑

b. ——(edible)———>situations
.................↑actual↑

Given the existence of duals in the adjectival domain, the paraphrases and schemata cover state-change structures as well as the following types of comparative structures:

(64)  

a. *The soup is too hot.*
b. *The soup is not hot enough.*
c. *The soup is too cold.*
d. *The soup is not cold enough.*

The core meaning of the cipient structure can then be written as two simple propositional meanings, one of which is presupposed and the other one asserted; p ranges over locations or over degrees of property instantiation:

(65)  

\[ \neg AT(x_{\text{theme}},p_{\text{loc/deg}},i) \& AT(x_{\text{theme}},p_{\text{loc/deg}},i′) \& i < i′ \]
We have seen that the location argument depends on the cipient for the fixing of its reference; in the absence of a cipient, it is interpreted with respect to a parameter usually thought to be set in the immediate utterance situation (like location, standards, dimensions). In a more formal setting, we want to say that cipients can be interpreted as their 'spatiotemporal history' (cf. Carnap 1928; Musan 1995 on the temporal interpretation of individuals) or as their 'quality space' (Quine 1960) with respect to a particular property and thing in question; under this view, dative marking signals the application of a function that maps individuals and indices onto locations (in quality space) at particular indices:

\[(66) \quad f: <x,i> \rightarrow \{p \mid AT(x,p,i)\}\]

The spatiotemporal history of an individual is the locations at which that individual is at particular indices; an individual’s quality space is constituted by the degrees to which that individual potentially perceives the instantiation of a certain property.

3.2.4 Remarks on body-part predicates and sense predicates

Some problematic cases remain; for one thing, it appears to be the case that cipients can be licensed in the absence of state change meaning or explicit comparison if the location argument denotes a body part of the cipient. To account for this, one may say that body part predicates come with something like a ‘too close/too much’ relation built in. This idea gets some support from the fact that body-part cipient constructions typically have a meaning involving physical closeness that is at least exciting, often maleficient or harmful. This possibility and supportive observation was pointed out to me by Magdalena Schwager (p.c.).

Another large class of predicates licensing cipients are sense predicates, cf. the pi-acere class of Belletti and Rizzi (1988) (see the Greek and Spanish examples in (44) and (45), Section 3). It seems likely that with sense predicates, there will be many quality-space locations simply stored in memory, so that finding and anchoring a presupposition that defines a pre-state/standard poses no problem (see Husserl 1913:1, 41), who develops the idea that value judgments generally involve contradictory propositional meanings.

3.3 Blocking, repetition and outlook

According to Chomsky (1999), material that can be interpreted must not be kept in syntax; if cipients render the VP/AP interpretable by accommodating the presupposition projected from the material contained in it, then that material will not be able to enter syntactic relations beyond the cipient under normal circumstances. Under the analysis I have developed, cipients achieve the anchoring of the propositional meaning embedded in the cipient predicate, hence blocking effects as occurring cross-linguistically with cipients are predicted (cf. Torrego 1996; McGinnis 1998). Thus, in the following example, the theme cannot be interpreted as an argument of repair and
at the same time be case licensed (which would require establishing an A relation with Tense, hence across the cipient):

(67)  

\[ \begin{align*}  
&\text{a. } \text{Das Auto wurde (*?mir) t zu reparieren versucht.} \quad \text{[The car]_{NOM} was } m_{\text{DAT}} \text{ t to repair tried} \\
&\text{b. } \text{Es wurde (?*mir) das Auto zu reparieren versucht.} \quad \text{It was } m_{\text{DAT}} \text{ [the car]_{NOM} to repair tried} \\
&\text{\textit{They tried to repair the car (for me).'}} \\
&\text{(built on Wurmbrand 1999)} \\
\end{align*} \]

Analogous blocking effects hold in the too-comparative construction:

(68) \[ \begin{align*}  
&\text{Die Bahnpreise waren mir zu hoch angesetzt.} \quad \text{[the railway.fares]_{NOM} were } m_{\text{DAT}} \text{ too high made} \\
&\text{OK: \textit{In my opinion, the railway-fares were made too high (for everybody).'}} \\
&\text{*\textit{The r.-fares were made such that they were too high for me.'}} \\
\end{align*} \]

It is exactly the most natural and expected reading that is unavailable for (68), namely that the policy of the railway company makes their tickets unaffordable for me (the actual price exceeds the cipient referent’s standard). This follows if the theme argument cannot reconstruct into a (caseless) theta position that is associated with the relevant predicate, due to cipient intervention – again, what is blocked is an A-relation across the cipient argument.\(^{40}\)

According to my proposal, the cipient makes the VP/AP complement interpretable because it accommodates the presupposition projected from it; therefore, cipient merger yields a fully saturated VP/AP structure. Assuming that interpretation of cipients in terms of indices is allowed, the indices associated with the referent of the cipient restrict the \text{thing@loc} meaning, as well as its negation; the indices at which \text{thing@loc} holds are included in the indices for which the function \(f_{\text{loc}}\) yields a nonempty set when applied to the cipient, and the indices at which the negation of \text{thing@loc} holds overlap with the cipient indices. What the structure ‘proves’ (= is mapped onto in extralinguistic terms) at the relevant stages is shown in (69). We write paraphrases below the symbolic representations for perspicuity.\(^{41}\)

(69) \[ \begin{align*}  
&\text{a. } \text{V-PP/DegP } \models \lambda x \text{ AT}(x,p,i) \land R(p,w) \\
&\text{\textit{the (relevant) stuff/things that is/are at a certain location (in quality space) at a certain index, the location being a sublocation of the cipient}} \\
&\text{b. } \text{VP } \models \exists x \text{ AT}(x,p,i) \land R(p,w) \\
&\text{\textit{There is/are relevant stuff/things at a certain location at a certain index, the location being a sublocation of the cipient}} \\
&\text{c. } \text{t } \models \lambda i \exists i',i'',x \text{ relevant-stuff}(x) \land \text{AT}(x,p,i'') \land \lnot \text{AT}(x,p,i') \land i' \cap i'' = \emptyset \land i' \subseteq i \land i'' \cap i \neq \emptyset \\
&\text{\textit{The index intervals such that they comprise subintervals i’ and i” such that there is/are relevant stuff/things at a certain location at i” (assertion) but not at i’ (presupposition)}, where i’ and i” are disjoint'}} \\
\end{align*} \]
d. \( tP \models \exists i,i',x \text{ relevant-stuff}(x) \& AT(x,p,i') \& \neg AT(x,p,i') \& i' \in \{i \mid f_{loc}(x,i') \neq \emptyset \} \& i'' \in \{i \mid f_{loc}(x,i'') \neq \emptyset \} \neq \emptyset \)

'There are subintervals \( i' \) and \( i'' \) of the cipient (interpreted as its index extension) such that there is/are relevant stuff/things at a certain location at \( i'' \) (assertion) but not at \( i' \) (presupposition)'

The V-PP/DegP constituent (cf. (69a)) corresponds to a lambda abstract over the theme argument slot; we assume that this slot is saturated via control by the theme argument in the specifier of VP (cf. (69b)). The crucial work is done by the category \( t \): It existentially quantifies over two intervals that do not overlap; the first of these intervals hosts the pre-state and standard of comparison; the second one hosts the post-state and actual instantiation. \( t \) further abstracts over an interval \( i \) containing the post-state/actual instantiation interval and overlapping with the pre-state/standard interval; conversion is with the the cipient argument, interpreted (among other) as its index extension. Cipient merger saturates this slot; under the assumption that the relations in which the intervals \( i' \) and \( i'' \) stand to the cipient interval \( i \) sufficiently define \( i' \) and \( i'' \), cipient merger yields a fully interpretable structure (cf. (69d)).

Building on work by von Stechow (1996), interpretive effects with presupposition-triggering adverbs like \textit{wieder} 'again' in the cipient construction can be accounted for now. 42 \textit{Wieder} triggers different kinds of presuppositions depending on its c-command domain, on the basis of which the presupposition that \textit{wieder} triggers is computed; in German, the c-command domain of \textit{wieder} is reflected in its surface position. Looking at the cipient structure, only repetitive readings are available as long as \textit{wieder} occurs to the left of \((/c\text{-commands})\) the cipient; restitutive readings arise only if \textit{wieder} occurs to the right of \((is \text{ c\text{-commanded by})\) the cipient:43

\begin{align*}
(70) \ a. \ & \ldots \textit{wieder dem Otto Türen geöffnet wurden.} \\
& \ldots \text{again [the Otto]_{DAT} doors_{NOM} opened were} \\
& \ldots \text{doors were opened for Otto again.}' \\

(70) \ b. \ & \ldots \textit{dem Otto Türen wieder geöffnet wurden.} \\
& \ldots \text{[the Otto]_{DAT} doors_{NOM} again opened were} \\
& \ldots \text{doors were opened for Otto again.}'
\end{align*}

Assuming (69), \textit{wieder} has in its scope both the pre- and the post-state of the event in (70a); hence, the repetitive reading is triggered according to which a relevant event has occurred before. In (70b), \textit{wieder} has in its scope the PP complement furnishing post state meaning; hence, the sentence is felicitous as long as a state corresponding to the post state of the event has held before (cf. (69a)).

An analogous effect occurs with \textit{too}-comparative constructions, which we have argued share with the eventive construction the semantic/pragmatic feature that they involve reference to contradictory propositional meanings (contradictory at a single index, that is; cf. above). To repeat, we propose that the propositional meaning embedded in the predicate (AP/DegP) encodes actual instantiation to a certain degree, while the propositional meaning projected as a presupposition and accommodated by the cipient encodes hypothetical instantiation to a certain standard degree. A little
context is needed though to see the parallel. Assume that Otto has thrown two parties where each time he served a particularly dry wine. In the first scenario, none of his guests complained about the dry wine at the first party, nor did anybody at the second party. In the second scenario, at least one of his guests complained at the first party, but none did at the second. (71a) is only appropriate in the first scenario while (71b) is felicitous in the second scenario as well:

(71) a. *Es war wieder keinem der Wein zu trocken.*
   it was again nobody\(_\text{DAT}\) [the wine]\(_\text{NOM}\) too dry
   `Nobody found the wine too dry again.'

   b. *Es war keinem der Wein wieder zu trocken.*
   it was nobody\(_\text{DAT}\) [the wine]\(_\text{NOM}\) again too dry

Disambiguating paraphrases of (71a) and (71b) are given in (72a) and (72b) respectively:

(72) a. It was again the case that nobody's standard was such that the wine was too dry.

   b. Nobody's standard was such that the wine was too dry again.

The difference between (71a) and (71b) can be analyzed as follows: In (71a), *wieder* takes wide scope, triggering a presupposition according to which what is asserted (that nobody found the wine too dry) was true on a previous occasion – the relation between standards and actual degrees is the same on both the earlier and later occasion. The presupposition triggered in (71b), in contrast, differs from what is asserted (that nobody found the wine too dry); it is just its negation (somebody did find the wine too dry before). Since the wine's dryness is the same at both parties, what must be different is the relation between the actual dryness and the standards involved; we expect this to be allowed only if the structure encoding the relation is not as a whole c-commanded by *wieder* – under the analysis offered here, *wieder* has only the actual instantiation (encoded in AP/DegP) in its scope in (71b), not the standard that is associated with the cipient argument. Put more succinctly, scope relations are as in (73a) for (71a) but as in (73b) for (71b), with W standing for *wieder* and x the cipient that fixes the standard:

(73) a. *W ⇓ ∃x [x finds wine too dry]*

   b. *¬∃x W [x finds wine too dry]*

Negation is needed for the scope difference to be visible because it presumably traps the existential quantifier below *wieder*. Without negation, intuitions are as expected but both readings can be gotten for both structures with some context.
Notes

* Many people helped with this paper, which is based on my PhD Dissertation (Brandt 2003) and seeks to improve on some questions that I’ve been chewing on since. For important remarks on and critical help with this particular article, I would like to thank Alexis Dimitriadis, Daniel Hole, Cécile Meier and Magdalena Schwager; special thanks to Alexis for general discussion (early) and detailed comments (late). Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer, Leston Buell, Eric Fuß, Günther Grewendorf, Monika Rathert, Jochen Zeller, Ede Zimmermann and Hong Zhou. Thanks for the important input and intuitions of audiences at UC London, the GGS meeting in Cologne, the ‘Datives and similar cases’ workshop of the DGfS meeting in Mainz and various seminars. Errors, problems and remarks that could be important for the understanding of an improved future version that will also do more justice to the literature remain.

1. Cf. Husserl’s (1913 [1993:1]) discussion in the introduction to his Logische Untersuchungen (‘Logical Investigations’).

2. ‘Low datives’ (Steinbach & Vogel 1998; Meinunger 2002) as occurring in constructions that look like DOCs but where the order as well as hierarchical relation between the theme and dative argument appear reversed will be left out of consideration here. The set of predicates projecting this construction is small, virtually exhausted by aussetzen ‘expose’, ent- or unterziehen ‘secure/take away from’ and ‘let undergo’. Similarly, dative/nominative constructions featuring predicates like helfen ‘help’, gleichen ‘be similar to’ and formations like nachfolgen ‘follow after’ that appear to be unergative will not be discussed.

3. thing@loc is short for: ‘there is something at a certain location’. The spelling with the ‘@’-symbol, denoting a primitive overlap relation, is adopted from Heidi Harley’s (2003) review of my dissertation in GLOT.

4. Ideas relating to the licensing of certain dative arguments in Dutch reminiscent of the condition under I can be found in Hoekstra (1988). Landau (1999) makes a connection between certain constructions in Hebrew being ‘object locating’ and licensing datives. Fong (1997) proposes a condition reminiscent of the one in II to account for the occurrence of transitive case in Finnish. According to Fong, constructions where transitive case occurs have to be ‘biphasic’.

5. A truth interval can be understood to be an ordered set of elements furnishing (tuples with) indexical information (a prototypical case being times. See McGilvray (1991) for a development of Reichenbach’s theory in terms of temporal intervals so decomposed).

6. For the backward binding effects (cf. (7a)), Belletti and Rizzi (1988) assigned the following structure to their ‘piacere type predicates’:

   (i) \[
   [s [\text{NP ec} ] [\text{VP} [\text{vi} \ [\text{v piace} ] [\text{NP questo} ] ] [\text{NP Giannila Gianni} ]]
   \]

   Under Belletti and Rizzi’s analysis, the ‘experiencer’ argument c-commands the theme from a canonical adjunct position in (i).

7. The examples in (8) appear to need marked focus intonation on the PP location or ‘bridge accent’ (Büring 1997) to be felicitous, a fact that is going to become important later in Section 2.4.3. Analogous ‘ципиент and PP location’ constructions appear to be available in diverse languages, including e.g. Hungarian and Norwegian. See Brandt (2003:66) for examples.

8. It can be shown that the PPs in the examples behave just like PP location arguments in structures not featuring a cipient argument; both cannot be stranded under do so substitution (but...
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location adjuncts can), cf. Note 11, both cannot be fronted in combination with WH question formation (but location adjuncts can), and both behave alike with respect to certain word order regularities in Dutch; for reasons of space, we refer the reader to Brandt (2003:65ff.) for full demonstration.

9. Cf. also cases in English like

(i)  *She shot him a bullet right between the eyes.

10. Judgments are subtle here. Interestingly and supporting our line, the adjectival passive constructions get better with the particle schon 'already' that triggers a presupposition of expecting a state of affairs opposite to the one asserted. Cf. Löbner (1989). Tom Roeper (p.c.) points out a fact about English that supports a strong connection between 'verbal' particle projection and dative licensing; in the DOC, particles must be 'stranded', unlike in the prepositional construction where they may be pied-piped as well.

(i) a. He sent me the letter up /*up the letter.
   b. He sent the letter up to me /up the letter to me.

Interestingly in verbal passives, the particle may be pied-piped, but may not be stranded:

(ii) a. I was sent up the letter.
   b. *I was sent the letter up.

The facts point to a PF interface solution of the problem (particle pied-piping being a preferred option but destroying the phonetic case licensing domain for both dative and accusative. See Neeleman & Reinhart 1998 for proposals).

11. That location adjuncts are 'outside' the constituent containing the theme argument can be witnessed e.g. in VP fronting structures and in do so substitution structures where location adjuncts but not location arguments may be stranded:

   b. *Throw The Capital he wouldn't into the bin.

(ii) a. Otto read The Capital in Paris and Ede did so in London.
   b. *Otto threw The Capital into the bin and Ede did so into the oven.

12. One cannot coordinate VPs one of which contains just a theme and the other one a theme and a location argument, cf. e.g.

(i) *Otto schlug die Vase in Stücke und seine Kinder.
   Otto hit the vase into pieces and his kids
   'Otto smashed the vase and hit his kids.'

13. In German, hin-/her-prefixation seems no longer productive, and some of the examples given sound archaic. In English, hither-/thither-prefixation does not seem to occur at all anymore. It should be said as well that few examples can be found where hin- or her- occur with DEC projecting predicates; a plausible reason for this is that these predicates typically already feature a prefix and that this blocks further prefixation for semantic reasons, presumably, cf. the grammatical sentence

(i)Sie ist ihm (aufs Dach) hinaufgestiegen.
   She is himDAT (onto.the roof) hither.up.climbed
   'She climbed up to him onto the roof.'
14. While there is considerable agreement in the literature at least since Wasow (1977) that adjectival passives do not project agents, the reviewers point out to me that the evidence from German is less clear in this regard.

15. Kratzer (2000) reminds us that adjectival passive constructions can be identified easily in German, since they utilize a form of sein ‘be’ instead of the verbal passive form werden ‘become’.

16. The sentences are grammatical under an ‘arbitrary’ reading of the second conjunct, but not under the equi reading which is the one that matters for the argument.

17. That small infinitives lack Tense is argued by Wurmbrand (1999); her main argument is exactly that small infinitives cannot be temporally located independently.

18. It may be noted as well that unlike themes and PP locations, cipients can bind into temporal adverbs and temporally modifying clauses:

\[
\begin{align*}
(i) & \quad \text{a. } The \text{ boss promised everybody, a day off on his birthday.} \\
& \quad \text{b. } *\text{The judge guaranteed him [every child], on her birthday.} \\
& \quad \text{c. } *\text{The boss promised a day off to everybody, on his birthday.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(ii) & \quad \text{a. } A \text{ lot of cows escape [every cowboy], on his first day.} \\
& \quad \text{b. } *\text{A lot of cows escaped from [every cowboy], on his first day.} \\
& \quad \text{c. } *\text{A lot of cows escaped from [every cowboy], on his birthday.}
\end{align*}
\]

Assuming a Cinquean approach to Adverb licensing according to which adverbs are licensed in designated positions depending on what semantic portion of the tree they modify, the binding data suggest that cipients are licensed in or above a projection that encodes temporal information.


20. See Brandt (2003) for more evidence of a correlation between cipient licensing and tense encoding.

21. It has been argued by authors like Schneider-Zioga (1993), Iatridou (1995) and Aoun (1999) that clitic-doubling structures encode predication.

22. Note that across languages, cipients are such that the lighter they are phonetically, the more easily licensed they are. In French for example, only pronouns may occur as ‘bare D/NP’ cipients, while with full D/NPs a prepositional realization is forced. In English, DOCs degrade with increasing heaviness of the cipient.

23. The idea that certain arguments are interpreted as locations can be found in the ‘localist’ tradition as reflected in the work of e.g. Gruber or Jackendoff. Landau (2003) develops the hypothesis that the experiencers in object-experiencer predications denote ‘mental locations’.

24. In more prominently studied agreement systems, the distinctions that matter most are person and number. Evidence is presented in Brandt (2003) that cipients are defective as far as number encoding is concerned, accounting for among other things why cipients cannot bind certain anaphors (like sich in German or Dutch). In Bantu languages that have locative agreement, the locative classes unlike most other classes lack number distinctions. Manzini (2001) shows that ‘dative clitics’ in Romance are systematically underspecified for person and number, a fact that is expected if the corresponding interpretive features are absent in cipients. Cf. Brandt (2003:222ff.) and references there.
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25. See Brandt (2005) for development of the argument that eventive and too-comparative structures share a common syntax and semantics.

26. Application of Geurts’ (1999) ‘Presupposition Test Battery’ supports the hypothesis of the presuppositional status of the pre-state and standard of comparison respectively. Thus the pre-state/standard is unaffected by negation (unlike the post state/actual degree of instantiation, cf. (i)), but it is no longer taken for granted if it is mentioned in the antecedent of a conditional (but is locally accommodated, cf. (ii)); the pre-state/standard is also no longer taken for granted if it is explicitly negated (cf. (iii)):

(i) a. *Die Suppe war dem Otto nicht heruntergefallen.*

   the soup was [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} not down.fallen

   ‘Otto didn’t let go of the soup.’

   b. *Die Suppe war dem Otto nicht zu heiß.*

   the soup was [the Otto]\textsubscript{DAT} not too hot

   ‘Otto didn’t find the soup too hot.’

(ii) a. *Falls Otto betrunken auf die Leiter gestiegen ist, dann ist ihm die Suppe heruntergefallen.*

   if Otto drunk onto the ladder climbed is, then is him\textsubscript{DAT} the soup down-fallen

   ‘If Otto climbed onto the ladder drunk, then he dropped the soup.’

   b. *Falls Otto Zahnschmerzen hatte, dann war ihm die Suppe zu heiß.*

   if Otto toothache had, then was him\textsubscript{DAT} the soup too hot

   ‘If Otto had a toothache, then the soup was too hot for him.’

(iii) a. *Otto ist nicht betrunken auf die Leiter gestiegen, und darum ist ihm die Suppe (auch) nicht heruntergefallen.*

   Otto is not drunk onto the ladder climbed, and therefore is him\textsubscript{DAT} the soup (also) not down-fallen

   ‘Otto didn’t climb the ladder drunk, and therefore didn’t drop the soup either’

   b. *Otto hatte keine Zahnschmerzen, und darum war ihm die Suppe nicht zu heiß.*

   Otto had no toothache, and therefore was him\textsubscript{DAT} the soup not too hot

   ‘Otto had no toothache, and therefore didn’t find the soup too hot.’

Cf. Geurts (1999: Chapter I) for discussion of tests for presuppositions.

27. Cf. Dowty (1979), Hoekstra (1988). Kratzer (2000) employs an ‘f-target’ function that takes an event to its ‘target state’; this means that Kratzer’s analysis still involves a primitive event-variable, unlike the approaches of von Wright and Dowty or the one developed here.

28. Thanks to Ede Zimmermann for pointing out this problem.

29. Alexis Dimitriadis points out to me that if the when-clause in examples such as (56a) is strongly destressed and thereby signals backgrounding (accommodation higher up in the discourse structure), the reference of the unexpressed location argument is free as is expected if under normal circumstances, presuppositions accommodate locally.

30. One may wonder whether it is indeed enough for just kind information pertaining to the theme argument to project up, rather than specific information about the particular referent of the theme argument. It seems though that in a situation where the same type of thing is or has
been located at (part of) the location in question, 'bare' cipient structures are infelicitous and one is forced to use adverbs like *again* or particles like *another*.

31. The example is built on Lumsden's (1988) observation that kind-denoting D/NPs can take scope in Existential *There* Sentences:

(i) *There was every *(kind of) linguist at the party.*

32. Under the stipulation that utterance time is a single truth interval, it can now be explained why 'perfective' (state change) verbs in present tense cannot have present reference.

33. Even if the location argument referent is the same in both cases, the presupposed meaning appears to be too strong. Take the following example:

(i) *Otto ist ein Stein auf den Kopf gefallen.*

   Otto is a stone on the head fallen.

   'A stone fell on Otto's head.'

It clearly need not be the case that for there to be a stone on Otto's head at a certain time, there must have been nothing (of the relevant kind) on his head at an earlier or even the same time.

34. The analogous pattern appears to hold in e.g. Hungarian or Greek:

(i) *Janos nekem *(tul) intelligens.*

   John meDAT *(too) intelligens

   'John is too intelligent for me.'

   [Hungarian]

(ii) a. *O Yargos mu ine eksipnos.*

   the John meGEN is intelligent.

   'John is too intelligent for me.'

   [Greek]

   b. O Yargos mu paraine eksipnos.

      the John meGEN too-is [sic!] smart

      'John is too intelligent for me.'

   [Greek]

   It is also telling that in a range of languages, the prototypical 'goal' preposition *to* and the degree element *too* are (near-) homonyms or have been such at earlier stages (as in English and Germanic more generally as well as in e.g. Hungarian or Greek).

Krivokapić (this volume) discusses Serbocroatian data that seem to undermine our analysis, given that no degree element appears to be needed for cipient licensing. A relevant example from Serbocroatian would be (i).

(i) *Ona je Mariji zabavna.*

   she is MarijaDAT fun

   'Marija finds that she is fun.'

   [Serbocroatian]

Krivokapić stresses, however, that it must be the case that the dative experiencer forms an exception to the generally held view; for (i) to be meaningful, everybody else (who is relevant in some sense) must find that Otto is not intelligent. We therefore find contradictory propositional meanings involved in the cipient structure in Serbocroatian as well, only that the presupposed meaning is not that standard of appropriateness for the cipient but for everyone.

35. In fact, *genug* 'enough' without negation appears to license cipients as well. It appears, however, that the construction needs marked focus intonation on *genug* in the absence of negation to be felicitous. See the remarks in Section 2.4.3 above.
36. To the extent that ‘standards of appropriateness’ are defined in terms of (positive) earlier experience, the ordering in the comparative case could be reduced just to temporal ordering as in the eventive case.

37. Cf. Kracht (2004) using a similar ‘locator’ function. The semantics developed by Kracht for locatives seems to me to be the right tool for properly formalizing what I develop in this paper; a more thorough development of the common semantics of (locative) state change and comparative constructions will have to await another occasion, however.

38. Cf. Quine (1960) for discussion. That the referents can be sets of degrees to which certain properties are instantiated as well as individuals is suggested by the fact that there are predicates that select just for this type of interpretation, cf. German:

(i) *Die Anna genügt dem Otto, was Schönheit angeht.*

[The Anna]_{NOM} suffices [the Otto]_{DAT} what beauty concerns

‘Anna is sufficient for Otto as far as beauty is concerned.’

What (i) says is that Anna is in the range of degrees defining what is sufficient beauty for Otto. That terms normally referring to individuals can refer to these individuals’ temporal extensions as well as the locations associated with them, which is needed for the eventive case, is shown in the following examples; these examples also make it clear that presuppositionality is a condition for the mapping:

(ii) a. *The dinosaur was before the cocker-spaniel.*

[presuppositional D/NP]

b. *A dinosaur was before a cocker-spaniel.*

[indefinite D/NP]

(iii) a. *I was at Otto’s yesterday.*

[presuppositional D/NP]

b. *I was at some idiot’s yesterday.*

[indefinite D/NP]

39. An anonymous reviewer points out that cases of the following form would appear problematic for the analysis given here:

(i) *Sie wusch ihm die Wäsche.*

[She washed his clothes.]

I would argue that such ‘resultative’ structures (cf. Hoekstra 1988) are really hidden comparative structures, containing a predicate ‘being clean to degree d’ and that it is the negation of this predication that is triggered as a presupposition.

40. There is no space to investigate in detail how the available reading comes about; obviously, it is not the cipient’s standard that matters for the interpretation of the actual degree but rather a contextually given (‘everybody’s’) standard. Therefore, cipient merger does not lead to the spellout of the material furnishing the thing@loc meaning, which will be kept until the material establishing a link to the actual utterance context is merged (C(omp)/T(ense) in traditional terms). There are obvious parallels here to recent work by Holmberg and Hröarsdóttir that similarly cannot be developed for reasons of space; as these authors point out, raising across an experiencer dative is usually blocked, but it is allowed if the experiencer is WH-moved. We expect that WH movement “deblocks” to the extent that it makes local accommodation of the presupposition impossible. WH movement of the experiencer would then have an effect similar to that caused by contrastive focus marking, leading to accommodation of the presupposition ‘higher up.’ Cf. Section 2.4.3.
41. We assume that the specifier of P and Deg each host a PRO element that is controlled by the theme argument; all variables entering the thing@loc meaning are therefore represented already at this level. The question mark in (69c) is intended to convey that it is undecided yet how and where the projected presupposition can be accommodated.

42. The meaning of wieder can be defined as follows (Egg 1994):

(i) Let \( p \) be a description of states of affairs and let \( i \) be an index (interval)

\[
[[\text{again}]](p(i)) \text{ is defined only if } \exists i' \ p(i') \land i > i'
\]

Where defined, \([\text{again}](p(i)) = 1 \text{ iff } p(i) = 1\)

43. To be precise, wieder has to occur to the right of the theme for the restitutive reading to be available. This follows if we assume with von Stechow that the case position of the theme (accusative) c-commands a head that encodes causal meaning and that, similar to the t head, makes reference to the pre- and post states of the event encoded.

References


