

POSTPRINT

How Do Speakers Define the Meaning of Expressions? The Case of German *x heißt y* (“x means y”)

Henrike Helmer

Pragmatics Department, Institute for the German Language, Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: To secure mutual understanding in interaction, speakers sometimes explain or negotiate expressions. Adopting a conversation analytic and interaction linguistic approach, I examine how participants explain which kinds of expressions in different sequential environments, using the format *x heißt y* (“x means y”). When speakers use it to clarify technical terms or foreign words that are unfamiliar to co-participants, they often provide a situationally anchored definition that however is rather context-free and therefore transferable to future situations. When they explain common (but indexical, ambiguous, polysemous, or problematic) expressions instead, speakers always design their explanation strongly connected to the local context, building on situational circumstances. I argue that *x heißt y* definitions in interaction do not meet the requirements of scientific or philosophical definitions but that this is irrelevant for the situational exigencies speakers face.

Speakers in interaction usually assume that recipients understand them correctly and take the intersubjective understanding of the meaning of expressions for granted. If this is not the case, they secure mutual understanding through grounding (see Clark & Brennan, 1991, “next turn proof procedure”; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, p. 728). This can mean that speakers demonstrate understanding (see Sacks, 1992) of a prior turn (in the first sequential position), for example, by formulating candidate understandings (Antaki, 2012) in a second position. In a third position, the prior speakers react to it to secure mutual understanding (or correct the other, see Deppermann, 2015a). If we cannot observe such an overt grounding process (e.g., when speakers just produce a fitted next turn), we cannot decide from an analyst perspective whether speakers and their recipients actually achieve intersubjectivity. For many occasions in human interaction, however, an overt grounding process is not relevant; not facing non- or misunderstanding is often sufficient for the interactional task at hand. As Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs put it, interaction is based on “the mutual belief that the listeners have understood what the speaker meant in the last utterance to a criterion sufficient for current purposes” (Clark & Wilkes-Gibb, 1986, p. 33). This principle is not only relevant for actions that participants need to understand to react in a relevant way (Levinson, 2013) but it applies to meanings of lexical units too.

The interactive constitution of the meaning of expressions has recently come into sharper focus in linguistic research. Interactional approaches like Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics show that the meaning of expressions in interaction is not categorical or fixed but situated and negotiable (Interactional Semantics). Sometimes participants treat expressions as unknown or problematic and display that a clarification of their meaning is relevant. An explicit way to negotiate meanings of expressions metacommunicatively is to define or explain them self-initiatedly or to

Contact: Henrike Helmer, helmer@ids-mannheim.de
Institute for the German Language, R5, 6-13, 68161 Mannheim, Germany

invalidated in specific contexts (cf. Barsalou, 1987). Moreover, in his frame-semantic approach, Fillmore (1985) outlines the strong relation between linguistic meaning and encyclopedic knowledge.

After the pragmatic turn, researchers paid more attention to the use of language instead of the internal linguistic system and questioned the idea of context-free meaning of expressions, both in written texts and spoken discourse. Corpus linguistic approaches deal with the syntagmatic environment of linguistic expressions and focus on usage patterns in the form of collocations and show that the combination of expressions is not arbitrary but depends on systematic rules and constraints (e.g. Hoey, 2005; Sinclair, 1991). Other textlinguistic approaches like Discourse Analysis analyze the variability and change of meaning of expressions over time when users try to shape them differently in dissent, like in political or professional discourse (so-called semantic fights; see Liedtke, Wengeler, & Böle, 1991; see also Deppermann, 2015b; Felder, 2006).

In prior studies conversation analysts and interactional linguists touch on the topic of meaning in interaction in studies of definitions (Harren, 2009; Koole, 2010; Spreckels & Trojahn, 2009; Temmerman, 2009), securing understanding (Deppermann, 2015a), repair-initiations and repairs (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977; Selting, 1987), candidate understandings (Antaki, 2012), formulations (Deppermann, 2011; Heritage & Watson, 1979), generalization and specification (Bilmes, 2011), categorization (Bilmes, 2015), interpretations (Helmer & Zinken, 2019), and constructions such as *x and x* (Linell & Lindström, 2016, on *x-ā-x*).

Studies of the interactive constitution of meaning show that sometimes expressions are treated as unknown, and clarification about their denotations or situational uses are made relevant (Deppermann, 2006, 2019; Deppermann & Spranz-Fogasy, 2006). Speakers may explain, correct, or negotiate the meaning of the expressions. Sometimes they take the initiative in doing this to secure (mutual) understanding or avoid misunderstanding.

Deppermann (2019) analyzes occasions and practices of negotiating the meaning of expressions. He points out that meaning is bound to local situations and contexts and constituted interactively to guarantee understanding (and prevent misunderstanding), convey knowledge (didactically), or support a certain position in a conflict. He identifies several practices of the interactive constitution of meaning, such as definitions and contrasting expressions with antonyms (see also Deppermann & De Stefani, 2019), naming synonyms or naming properties of a category. The explicated meaning that becomes publicly available sometimes may approximate to what is called the “conceptual meaning” (e.g., Leech, 1981), the core sense of an expression we might find in dictionaries, but often speakers display that they use an expression with a different, local meaning that is situation- and context-adapted (see Deppermann, 2019, p. 173).

Definitions and the specific definitional practices described above are one way to meta-communicatively deal with the meaning of expressions. Next, I present studies that deal with the notion of definition.

Definitions

The vernacular notion of “definition,” seen through how people “define” concepts or expressions in practice, differs from the philosophical concept of “definition,” which often relates to epistemological questions and problems. Philosophers from antiquity to modern eras have thought about the nature of definitions. According to Aristotle, thinking is bound to concepts, which in turn are bound to definitions (Aristotle, 1938): A formal definition of a concept contains necessary properties or conditions, which combined are sufficient for the categorization as that concept and for the differentiation from others. Related to that are the notions of *genus proximum* and *differencia(e) specifica(e)*: The first defines a concept by subordinating it to a superordinate category, whereas the latter make(s) it clearly distinguishable from other representatives of that category (Aquinas, 1947 [1265], based on Aristotle, 1938). This idea is still reflected in the modern concept of lexical decomposition and word field theory and often in dictionary entries as well. One aspect that definitions in dictionaries all have in common is that they provide for nominal definitions, not what has been called “real definitions” in

philosophy. In Locke's terms: They deal with the meaning of expressions or concepts, not with the constitution of objects in the real world (Locke, 1975 [1689]).

Definitions in interaction often turn out to be less overarching or general in outlining the meaning of expressions or concepts. In addition, speakers do not clearly provide for either a nominal or a real definition of expressions or concepts. A decision from an analyst perspective between both types of definitions would rest on an improper differentiation between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge. As Langacker (1987, p. 154) put it: "the distinction [...] between linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge is largely artefactual, and the only viable conception of linguistic semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies and is consequently encyclopaedic in nature." Participants in interaction usually do not make such differences themselves (explicit). Instead, empirical data of spoken interaction make us see definitions from a different perspective and let us focus on the exigencies as well as affordances of verbal communication, depending on interaction type, participation framework, interactional tasks, and sequential environment.

Prior research on definitions and explanations of expressions in interaction has mostly focused on didactical settings. Defining in expert–novice interaction is closely connected to explaining, naming, showing, and demonstrating—all of them share features in terms of a family resemblance (see Stukenbrock, 2009). Quasthoff and Hartmann (1982) have outlined four practices of providing for an explanation of the meaning of an expression: giving examples, naming synonyms, naming *genus proximum* and *differencia specifica*, and naming essential properties and features (see also Deppermann, 2019). Not all of them meet the requirements of a definition in Aristotle's sense, but some of them hint at the importance of situational exigencies and practical purposes. Later research even more strongly points to the fact that practical purposes are the main motivation for defining expressions or concepts (see Birkner, 2006). Researchers hint at the shortcomings of lessons, in which teachers work with abstract definitions of or synonyms for expressions, instead of explaining the expressions in a proper way to qualify children to understand and learn the functions of the underlying concepts (see Koole, 2009; Spreckels & Trojahn, 2009). Adapting explanations of expressions closely to the specific situation and orienting to recipients, for example, by using multimodal means like gestures, helps students memorizing the meaning of an expression and connect it to the learning matter (Belhiah, 2013; Harren, 2009). Deppermann (2016) illustrates that specific interactional settings (like practical driving school lessons) require a close connection between definitions, instructions, and embodiment. Recently, context-sensitive linguistic formats of defining have come into the center of attention. For example, integrating a negative definitional component (e.g. "expression" is not x but is y) orients to expectations connected to an expression and allows speakers to regulate participants' understanding of a stretch of talk (Deppermann & De Stefani, 2019).

In summary, in some situations definitions that describe the "conceptual meaning," that is, the core sense of an expression may be required (i.e., in case of non-understanding of unfamiliar expressions or in case of school lessons or exams in which experts test the knowledge of novices). Yet, prior research illustrates that participants in interaction mostly do not deal with the meaning of expressions by giving semantic features and clear-cut definitions. Instead, they orient to practical purposes and provide for relevant situational meaning instead of all-encompassing definitions. Depending on interaction type and specific interactional tasks, dealing with the meaning of expressions is accomplished by different practices, serves different purposes, and has different functions.

German heißen in interaction

German *heißen* has several meanings like "to have the name," "to have the meaning" (E-Valbu: <https://grammis.ids-mannheim.de/verbs/view/400556>), and "to correspond to an expression, a word in another language, to mean/express the same" (Duden: <https://www>).

duden.de/rechtschreibung/heißen_einen_Namen_tragen_geben#Bedeutung4). “To have the meaning” and “to correspond to an expression/express the same” deal with the meaning of expressions.

Research on German *heißen* in interactional data has dealt with mainly two constructions, *das heißt* (“that is”) and *was heißt x* (“what does x mean”). *Das heißt* has been described as a marker for self-repairs and self-reformulations (Bührig, 1996; Gülich & Kotschi, 1987; Kaiser, 2017) and for other-reformulations or other-interpretations (Bührig, 1996; Deppermann & Schmidt, 2014; Helmer & Zinken, 2019). Researchers have described *das heißt* as an initial marker prefacing complex conclusions that elaborate or elucidate further talk (Bührig, 1996; Deppermann & Schmidt, 2014; Helmer & Zinken, 2019; Rost-Roth, 2006; Vargas, 2002). *Das heißt* is used as a connector that indicates that the subsequent formulation is an alternative to the previous one (see Breindl, Volodina, & Waßner, 2014, p. 1144). Günthner (2015) analyzes how *was heißt x* (“what does x mean?”) is deployed for other-initiated repairs and self-oriented talk. Speakers use the format to problematize stretches of talk that are not situationally appropriate or to clarify expressions when their situational meaning remains unclear. There is no research yet on German *x heißt y*. This article contributes to current research on definitional practices with specific formats (as shown above) and to research on formats and functions of constructions with German *heißen*.

Methods

All audio and video data come from the corpus FOLK (Forschungs- und Lehrkorpus Gesprochenes Deutsch, “Research and Teaching Corpus of Spoken German”), a corpus that contains talk-in-interaction from diverse informal, institutional, and public settings, like interaction between friends and family, school and driving school lessons, and public mediations. At the time I gathered my collection (in the course of 2018), it comprised about 230 hours of audio and video recordings. All data are available to the scientific public via dgd.ids-mannheim.de, a database that allows for a systematic form-based search through the corpus.

I searched for all instances of the format *x heißt y* (“x means y”), *x* being the *definiendum*, *y* being the *definiens* that defines or explains *x*. Both *x* and *y* are instantiated by either (nominal/verbal/adjective/prepositional) phrases, subordinate clauses, main clauses, or adverbs. My final collection consists of 80 cases.

I excluded cases of *x heißt y* if they did not deal with the meaning of an expression, if (1) speakers state a person’s name (*ein dichter heißt jakob von hoddis* (“one of the poets is called jakob von hoddis,” FOLK_E_00127_SE_01_T_01)) or (2) *heißen* means “to have as a consequence” or “to imply” (*dass sie des kognitiv wissen heißt noch lange nicht dass sie_s auch wirklich nit machen* (“that you know that cognitively does not imply at all that you don’t do it for sure,” FOLK_E_00007_SE_01_T_01)).

To contribute to the further differentiation of interactional functions and semantic facets of the German metacommunicative verb *heißen*, I adopt a conversation analytic and interactional linguistic approach, examining the relation of linguistic form and interactional function (see Couper-Kuhlen & Selting, 2018). To explore systematic relations between sequential, formal, and functional aspects of my data, I categorized several aspects of each single case in a coding scheme, including interactional setting (informal, institutional, public, experimental), sequential position of *x heißt y* (first position, second position, third position), grammatical features of *x* and *y* (*clausal, phrasal*), type of expression of *x* (*technical term, common expression, foreign word, abbreviation*), and type of definition (*general definition, situational explanation*).

All presented data are transcribed using FOLKER¹ according to the conventions developed by Jefferson (2004). Where necessary, I provide multimodal transcriptions in addition, according to the conventions in Mondada (2018).

Table 1. Practices of Defining Expressions with *x heißt y*

	Practices	Overall No.
Self-initiated explanations		35
Other-initiated repairs		35
	Requests for definition	21
	Providing definition	14
Other-repairs		10
	Correcting wrong definition/candidate	7
	Correcting performance	3
		80

Results: defining expressions in interaction

Concerning the format *x heißt y*, I am especially interested in the practices, sequential environment, and interactional tasks in which speakers make use of this format, that is, for which purposes speakers use the format in, for instance, other-initiated repairs and other-repairs. Table 1 illustrates the sequential environments and already anticipates the structure of my analyses.

In my analyses I take into account which sorts of expressions (technical terms, foreign words, and abbreviations vs. common expressions) speakers negotiate or clarify. I examine in what ways they clarify or negotiate them (by general, context-free definitions that are applicable to other situations vs. situational explanations that display a specific partial meaning that is valid for that situation). I am especially interested in how the (phrasal or clausal) definition or explanation *y* “transforms” the expression *x* in question and at the same time builds on already existing and shared knowledge.

Self-initiated explanations

By explaining and negotiating the meaning of expressions, speakers avoid mis- or non-understanding. This is typically the case in expert–novice interaction like in didactical settings, but it applies to informal talk or public interaction, too. Intersubjectivity is typically established through a grounding process (Clark, 1996; Clark & Brennan, 1991). Sequentially, speakers achieve and secure mutual understanding in a sequence with three positions (Schegloff, 1992). In interactions with asymmetrical epistemic status (at school, in interviews with specific topics, and so on), speakers sometimes anticipate possible problems due to lack of intersubjectivity and explain expressions self-initiatedly ($n = 35$). In 75% of these cases, they explain either technical terms or foreign words, or resolve abbreviations, assuming them to be unknown or unclear to other participants (see Extract 1 above).

Lack of verbal response is another reason for defining an expression in question. Extract 2 shows an example of a teacher (SM) using the format *x heißt y* to explain the technical term *sprachstil* (“style of speech”):

Extract 2: FOLK_E_00121_SE_01_T_01_c754

01	SM:	wie is der <u>sprachstil</u> in der (.) <u>kurzgeschichte</u> . <i>what is the style of speech like in the short story</i> (3.2)
02		
03	SM:	egal welche ma nimmt? <i>no matter which one you consider</i> (0.5)
04		
05	SM:	ob <u>hemingway</u> - (.) <i>whether hemingway</i>
06		ob <u>borchert</u> - (.) <i>whether borchert</i>

07 **böll**
 böll
 08 (1.9)
 09 => **SM:** **also sprachstil heißt jetzt eben lange sätze kurze sätze.**
 well style of speech means long sentences short sentences
 now
 10 (1.0)
 11 **SM:** **beispielsweise.**
 for example
 12 (0.6)
 13 **SM:** **ayla hm,**
 14 (0.4)
 15 **AK:** **also das ist unkompliziert?**
 well it is uncomplicated
 16 **das sind einfache sätze und (.) ähm-**
 it is simple sentences and ehm
 17 **.h meistens so in alltagssprache.**
 usually like in everyday speech
 18 (0.4)
 19 **SM:** **gut?**
 good

During a lesson about short stories, the teacher asks his students to describe the typical style of speech (i.e., the writing style) in short stories. After his first question (line 1), there is a considerable pause of over 3 seconds, in which none of the students reacts verbally. The teacher generalizes and subsequently exemplifies his question by implying that all short stories have that writing style in common (line 3) and then naming some of the authors the class had examined during the lessons (lines 05–07). After another pause of almost 2 seconds, he defines the technical term: *also sprachstil heißt jetzt eben lange sätze kurze sätze* (“well style of speech means long sentences short sentences now,” line 09). This is clearly not a definition that meets the requirements of a “conceptual meaning.” The teacher explains the possibly unknown term *x* by exemplifying it with the two nominal phrases “long sentences short sentences,” the type of sentence structure being one characteristic realization (among others) that constitutes only parts of an all-encompassing notion of style of speech. He makes clear that his definition is not an exhaustive dictionary-like definition but that he only gives an example (*beispielsweise*, line 11). The exemplification, however, is valid and applicable in future situations too. The elliptical, phrasal turn design (“long sentences, short sentences”) hints at the fact that an examination of the length of sentences in prose (and the functions of varying the style of sentences) has already been a topic in previous lessons: The teacher thus establishes intersubjectivity about “style of speech” based on already existing and shared knowledge. In this concrete situation, the definition or exemplification gives the students the opportunity to orient to the teacher’s expectations of an answer but does not provide for a proper answer yet itself (see Ehlich & Rehbein, 1986, pp. 92–93). He merely refers to two extreme, contrasting “values” on a scale (see Deppermann & De Stefani, 2019), between which the students still have to choose to give a correct answer.² The student who answers orients indirectly to this presetting, characterizing the writing style as “uncomplicated” (line 15) and with “simple sentences” (line 16), and in addition mentioning *alltagssprache* (“everyday speech,” line 17). By establishing a mutual understanding both of the meaning of the technical term and his expectations of an answer with the format *x heißt y*, the teacher enables and maybe also entices the student to provide a sufficient answer.

Sometimes speakers self-initiatedly “explain” abbreviations by substituting them with the underlying term: Building on common ground, usually they just resolve them by naming the original expression, given the fact that recipients are able to understand the longer expression without further explanation (e.g., *er E heißt regioNAlExpress* [“RE means regional express”]; FOLK_E_00068_SE_01_T_04_DF_01_c879). In this way they neither provide the denotation of an expression nor do they give an appropriate definition in Aristotle’s understanding. Instead, they assume that the original words are self-explanatory and suffice for establishing the intersubjectivity needed in the specific situation.

Sequences of other-initiated repair

Speakers use the format *x heißt y* in sequences of other-initiated repairs (see Levinson, 1983, pp. 340–341). Either *x heißt y* serves as a repair-initiation or -pursuit in the function of a candidate understanding or confirmation check (see section 'Request for clarification with candidate understandings') or the format is used in responses to repair-initiations—speakers provide a sufficient definition of *x* then (see section 'Providing a correct definition'). In more than two-thirds of the cases, the expressions in question are technical terms and foreign words.

Request for clarification with candidate understandings

One example of a negotiation about the meaning of a foreign word illustrates that speakers may orient both to the denotation of an expression and to its practical relevancies in a specific situation. In Extract 3 a daughter (CA) and her mother (RA) are about to bake together.

- 01 CA: **das rezept (.) is in cups.**
the recipe is in cups
- 02 AP: (1.2)
- 03 RA: **in cu[ps.]**
in cups
- 04 CA: **[mit cups kann ich nichts anfangen. (.)**
cups are not useful to me
- 05 **ich brauche gramm.**
I need gram
- 06 (0.2)
- 07 => RA: **cup heißt eine tasse oder,**
cup means one cup doesn't it
- 08 (0.3)
- 09 CA: **schon klar.=**
(that's) obvious
- 10 **=aber jede tasse is unterschiedlich groß bei uns.**
but every cup has a different size at our house
- 11 (3.8)

Extract 3: FOLK_E_00331_SE_01_T_01_DF_01_c767

The daughter (CA) complains that the recipe operates with cups instead of grams (lines 01 and 04–05), not reacting to her mother's first repair initiation (line 03). The mother (RA) obviously does not know that "cup" is a measuring unit (thus used as a technical term in the recipe), so she does not understand her daughter's problem with the expression. Yet she does know the German equivalent of the foreign word and formulates the candidate understanding *cup heißt eine tasse oder* ("cup means one cup doesn't it," line 07). She substitutes the English term *x* with the possibly correct German expression *y*. With her turn-final question tag *oder* ("doesn't it," line 07), she makes relevant that she wants to establish intersubjectivity about the meaning and situational relevance of the English term and treats her daughter as an expert (see Drake, 2016). When responding, however, CA orients to her mother's turn as a (superfluous) translation of the foreign word instead of a repair pursuit. She displays that she is well aware of the German equivalent of the English word (line 09) and points out her actual problem: She does not know which size of cup is requested: *aber jede tasse is unterschiedlich groß bei uns* ("but every cup has a different size at our house," line 10). The underlying problem of course is that the daughter does not know the weight equivalent of one cup as a measuring unit and that the recipe does not provide a more specific *micro sense* (Croft & Cruse, 2004) either (like "tea cup" or "mug"). She makes very clear that an "explanation" of the expression in the form of a substituting translation does not suffice to solve this problem.

Providing a correct definition

To follow an ongoing interaction, participants sometimes feel the need to ask for the meaning of expressions, typically technical terms or foreign words. As they may use the format *x heißt y* only if

they are able to provide a candidate understanding, the usual format for asking for completely unknown expressions is *was heißt x* (“what does y mean?”; see Günthner, 2015). The format *x heißt y* provides the subsequent speaker with an opportunity to present a definition that builds on existing knowledge. Extract 4 stems from a lesson in a professional school in which the students, who will be supervisors, learn about how to deal with their own apprentices in the future and discuss the goals of an apprenticeship. At the end of the lesson, the teacher hands out a worksheet for homework on which the students ought to assign several notions to three key skills: personal, social, and cognitive. The expression in question (*kognitiv*) is a loan word that stems from Latin “cōgnitio.”

Extract 4: FOLK_E_00004_SE_01_T_02_DF_01_c1386

01 GS: und sie sollen jetzt zuordnen, =
and now you ought to determine
02 =was davon sind personelle,
which of them are personal
03 (0.3)
04 GS: was sind soziale Fähigkeiten, =
which are social abilities
05 =was sind kognitive Fähigkeiten.
which are cognitive abilities
06 (0.4)
07 AB: was heißt_n kognitiv,
what does cognitive mean
08 (0.2)
09 GS: genau- (.)
exactly
10 danke? (.)
thank you
11 was heißt kognitiv?
what does cognitive mean
12 (2.1)
13 GS: weiß des jemand von ihnen,
does anyone of you know
14 ja bitte,
yes please
15 US: irgendwas mit_m kopf,
something with the head
16 (0.2)
17 US: oder so,
or the like
18 (0.4)
19 GS: JA:,
yes
20 (0.9)
21 => GS: hier ↑kognitive heißt (.) intelligenz da oben drin (.) ja,
(here) cognitive means intelligence up in there okay
22 (0.5)
23 GS: kognitive,
cognitive
24 (1.2)
25 GS: intelligenz.
intelligence
26 (4.8)

After the teacher (GS) uses the technical term *kognitive Fähigkeiten* (“cognitive abilities,” line 05), one of her students (AB) initiates repair, asking for the meaning of the adjective “cognitive” (line 07). His usage of *denn* (here only seen in the elision *_n*) indicates the teacher’s accountability (see Deppermann, 2009, p. 33). By *genau* (“exactly,” line 09) the teacher shows that she is aware of the fact that the expression requires an explanation or that she wanted to explain it anyway (see Oloff, 2017; Willkop, 1988) and thanks the student for reminding her (line 10). She first checks her

students' knowledge by repeating and then reformulating the question and inviting a student to answer (lines 11–14). US gives a vague and underspecified explanation (*irgendwas mit_m kopf* (0.24) *oder so*, “something with the head (0.24) or the like,” line 15–17) that however meets the teacher's requirements in that situation. She confirms (line 19) and then formulates her own explanation stating *kognitive heißt* (.) *intelligenz da oben drin* (“cognitive means intelligence up in there”³), prosodically emphasizing both expressions in focus, “cognitive” and “intelligence.” She repeats both expressions and gives her students the possibility to make a note (line 26) before proceeding with the general topic, however not elaborating further on “cognitive.”

The teacher's explanation is a context-free explanation in the sense that it is more or less applicable to other situations, even if not suited as an all-encompassing description of the conceptual meaning of the expression. The teacher does not actually substitute the adjective *kognitive*⁴ with the nominal phrase *intelligenz da oben drin* but replaces the loan word with another Latin (but clearly Germanized) loan word, *intelligenz*, which however is completely Germanized and can be assumed to be part of both passive and active vocabulary. The term “intelligence” thus is apt for giving the students a hint of the meaning of “cognitive,” even if they are not the same and not substitutable, because both terms are related to another in a world field. Both refer to (cognitive) abilities and competences. The teacher uses “intelligence” as an approximation to push the recipients' thoughts in a certain direction, which gives them a clue of what the term (and thus their homework) is about. With the adverbial phrase *da oben drin* (“up in there”) she refers to the localization in the real world, the head, where “cognitive” abilities are situated as well—she also aligns with her student's previous explanation, referring to the head as the location of “cognitive.” This obviously suffices as a “general explanation,” which is not a clear-cut definition but (1) with which students may be able to at least roughly understand future uses of “cognitive” and (2) with which the students can deal with the worksheet at home. A definition suited as a dictionary entry (e.g., by naming necessary and sufficient properties) could not achieve the same effect, an embodied link between the word and the world.

The following example shows that the same expression can be explained by several definitions, which (even for technical terms) may be aspectual and may build on already shared knowledge about the general denotation. Those situational explanations “promote one specific understanding which is relevant for the interaction at hand” (Deppermann & De Stefani, 2019, p. 153). Instead of clarifying a context-free (partial) intension of an expression in question, speakers aim at making its specific relevancies transparent. Extract 5 illustrates how the same teacher (GS) explains the same technical term, *kognitiv* (“cognitive”), but gives a very different explication in a subsequent lesson, 1 week after the lesson of Extract 4.

Extract 5: FOLK_E_00007_SE_01_T_01_DF_01_583

- 01 GS: **wiederum jetzt drei begriffe,**
again three terms now
- 02 (1.4)
- 03 GS: **das letzte mal kam schon die frage auf,**
the question came up already last time
- 04 (1.0)
- 05 GS: **was heißt eigentlich kognitiv.**
what does cognitive mean actually
- 06 (0.5)
- 07 GS: **°ne°,**
right
- 08 (0.6)
- 09 GS: **ich hatte dann gesagt=**
I said then
- 10 **=es hat hier irgendwas mit köpfchen zu tun.=**
it has something to do with the head/the wits
- 11 **=hier obbe.**
up here
- 12 **ne, =**

05 (0.9)
 06 AP: das betonen beide?
both stress that
 07 und [ähm]
and ehm
 08 JG: [.h] was meinen sie mit markiert.
what do you mean by marked
 09 (1.8)
 10 AP: >tschuldigung< die unmarkierte (.) [mein ich] natürlich.=
sorry the unmarked I mean of course
 11 [hm:..]
 12 AP: =o gott.
o god
 13 .h ich mein die unmarkierte.
I mean the unmarked
 14 [also die natürliche-]
so the natural
 15 JG: [äh und was heißt >was heißt das] äh wenn äh wann sie
eh and what does what does it mean when you when you
 16 wenn sie sagen< markiert unmarkiert.
when you say marked unmarked
 17 was wie verstehen sie markiert unmarkiert.
what how how do you mean marked unmarked
 18 weil-
cause
 19 (0.4)
 20 AP: äh:m.
ehm
 21 (1.0)
 22 => AP: die unmarkierte struktur heißt es ist der normalfall.
the unmarked structure means it is the normal case
 23 JG: mhm.
 24 AP: der rede.=
of speech
 25 =und die markierte struktur is das was auffällig is.=
and the marked structure is that which is striking
 26 [=das was-] was
that which which
 27 JG: [m okay.]
 28 mhm,
 29 AP: ja.
yes
 30 (0.5)

As in Extract 4, a repair-initiation precedes the explanation with *x heißt y* (line 08 and 15–17, using the *was heißt y* format). However, the motivation here is a different one: As an expert in linguistics, the professor of course knows the intension of *markiert* (“marked,” line 08) in a linguistic context. The reason for initiating a first repair is that the student uses the wrong technical term (*markierte struktur* [“marked structure,” line 03] instead of *unmarkiert*) when she refers to the German verbal bracket in relation to separable verbs. The professor prompts the student to correct herself when he checks her knowledge of the meaning of *markiert*, using the format *was meinen sie* (“what do you mean,” line 08). The student realizes her mistake and repairs the term (lines 10–14). The professor insists on an answer, however expanding his question to an explanation of both terms *markiert* and *unmarkiert*, now an even more explicit knowledge check with the format *was heißt x* (“what does y mean,” lines 15–17, in comparison with the prior prompt to rethink the word choice). The student offers the definitions *die unmarkierte struktur heißt es ist der normalfall | der rede | und die markierte struktur is das was auffällig is* (“the unmarked structure means it is the normal case of speech and the marked structure is that which is striking,” lines 22–25), prosodically stressing the opposing key expressions (*unmarkiert/normalfall* and *markierte/auffällig*). Propositionally, the student does not elaborate further on what “normal case” or “striking” means

(i.e., she does not give examples or expanded explanations), but her definition is sufficient enough for her professor to close the sequence (lines 27–28).

In the given context, the technical terms *unmarkiert/markiert* and the common expressions *normalfall/auffällig* are not synonyms but, like in Extract 4, the key expressions may be related to each other in a word field. Her definition of the technical terms is more or less applicable to several situations, in which (grammatical) structures are in focus. Concerning the specific situation yet, the student formulates what in philosophy is called a “context definition”: In this type of definition, it is possible to substitute the proposition that includes the *definiendum* by a proposition that does not include it but has the same meaning (Precht & Burkard, 2008, p. 99). In terms of Extract 6 and taking into account the current topic, the proposition “some grammatical structures (e.g., verbal brackets) are unmarked” in that specific context has the same meaning as “some grammatical structures (e.g., verbal brackets) are the normal case,” the substitute “normal case” explaining “unmarked.”

As hinted at above, it is not determinable whether the student formulates a nominal definition (aiming at the meaning of the expression “unmarked”) or a real definition (aiming at the essence of “being unmarked”). The distinction is not only impossible (as the distinction between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge), but it is also irrelevant for the student. The clausal turn design of her explanation as an orientation to a higher style of speech (in comparison with the teacher in Extract 4) might indicate her main goal: to position herself as a competent student and demonstrate her knowledge. In addition, she builds her explanation on shared knowledge: She presumes that the professor as the expert knows when, how, and what kind of linguistic structures may be striking or the normal case and how this relates to the ongoing discussion about verbal brackets.

Other-repairs

In 10 cases other speakers perform repairs (see Levinson, 1983, pp. 340–341) with *x heißt y*. They correct either the first speakers’ definitions of expressions or a performance that demonstrates mis- or non-understanding. The first case contains only technical terms and foreign words that are used or explained in a wrong way (see section ‘Correcting a wrong definition/candidate understanding’) and three other unusual, but interesting, cases stem from driving school lessons (see section ‘Correcting performance’).

Correcting a wrong definition/candidate understanding

Sometimes speakers correct definitions or candidate understandings by other participants with *x heißt y*. In these cases *x* has been defined beforehand with *x heißt y* or similar formats like *x ist y* (“*x* is *y*”) by another participant. Extract 7 shows an example from a public mediation. The participants argue about the budgeting of a railway and urban development in a German city. The opponents of the project assume that the German Railways intentionally calculate with costs that are far too low. During the mediation session, three accountants (one of them HS) explain their mostly positive report on the financial planning.

Extract 7: FOLK_E_00070_SE_01_T_06_DF_01_c283

- 01 HS: er hat äh (0.4) für uns nachvollziehbar ausgeführt dass er
in our opinion he explicated reasonably that he
- 02 sagt, .h wir müssen (.) in unsern baumaßnahmen optimieren.
says we have to optimize in our construction measures
- 03 dafür werden wir bezahlt.
that’s what we get paid for
- 04 (1.0)
- 05 HS: das is richtig.
that is correct
- 06 (0.5)
- 07 HS: ((smacks)) keine frage.

		<i>no question</i>
08		(0.3)
09	HG:	optimieren heißt knapp kalkulieren. <i>to optimize means to calculate tightly</i>
10 =>	HS:	.hh optimieren heißt (.) in dem (.) <u>technischen sinne-</u> <i>to optimize means in the technical sense</i>
11 =>		.h dass sich der (.) <u>bauausführer oder der planer-</u> <i>that the constructor or the planner</i>
12 =>		gedanken macht- wie können wir <u>optimal?</u> .h (0.3) <i>thinks about how can we optimally</i>
13 =>		damit <u>kostenschonend</u>, (0.3) <i>thereby cost-effectively</i>
14 =>		das projekt <u>durchführen</u>. <i>complete the project</i>

HS claims that the project leader has explained reasonably that it is his job to “optimize” with regards to construction measures of the project (implying that he cannot assume an exceedingly high price, line 01–07). The mediator (HG) reacts with a repair initiation in the form of the candidate understanding *optimieren heißt knapp kalkulieren* (“to optimize means to calculate tightly,” line 09), which at the same time is a definition of *optimieren*. He substitutes *x* with a verbal phrase *y* that can be interpreted as a provocative near-synonym, demonstrating that he does not treat the expression as a technical term. The accountant HS repeats the expression in question (line 10) and repairs the mediator’s definition with the same format *x heißt y* (see Du Bois, 2014, on dialogic syntax) but with a clausal turn completion instead of a phrasal substitution. By claiming to define the term *in dem (.) technischen sinne-* (“in the technical sense,” line 10) he treats *optimieren* as a technical term and subsequently delivers a far more elaborate structure *y* (lines 11–14). In his complex clause he provides a technical definition of what constructors and planners mean by “optimize.” In contrast to just “translating” or substituting a technical term with a phrase that builds on prior knowledge, HS takes the advantage to demonstrate his epistemic authority, support his (neutral) position as an accountant, and refute the opponents’ negative understanding in an elaborate and factual manner. *En passant* he orients to the reproach implied by *knapp kalkulieren*, “calculate tightly,” reformulating it with the positively connotated *kostenschonend* (“cost-effectively,” line 13).

As in this extract, correcting a prior definition with *x heißt y* may give speakers the opportunity to position themselves in a specific way, orienting to and refuting meanings that other participants might have implied in the previous definitions. In my collection this is mostly the case in the public mediation, in which positioning and argumentation is relevant due to the conflictual interaction. Participants often negotiate (or “fight over,” cf. Felder, 2006) the meaning of technical terms that are polysemous. These terms have a common meaning in everyday life, sometimes conveying a negative connotation, but in the professional discourse and in connection with typical collocations they are used with a technical (e.g., economic) meaning (e.g., *optimistisch/konservativ berechnen/schätzen* (“to calculate/estimate optimistically/conservatively”).

Correcting performance

The three cases in which a driving instructor corrects the performance of his students after an instruction all contain common expressions: *lenken* (“to steer”), *schalten* (“to change gears”), *stehenbleiben* (“to stop”). On closer examination those “common expressions” build on very detailed and procedural background knowledge. Students have to know and adapt those instructions to the very specific situation, coordinating the monitoring of the traffic and other road users with knowledge about the car’s behavior and gaze/hand coordination.

Consider Extract 8, taken from a driving school lesson. The student (TD) is practicing the reverse parking of the car (parallel to the street), following his driving instructor’s (RK) instructions. The common expression in question is *lenken* (“to steer”), which RK explains with embodied *so* (“like this”).

Extract 8: FOLK_E_00168_SE_01_T_02_DF_01_c606

01 RK: so=un jetzt zurück.
so and now backward

[14s left out, student moves car backwards, instructor comments]

18 (2.0)
19 RK: >lenken lenken lenken lenken lenken lenken.=
steer steer steer steer steer steer
20 #lenken lenken lenken.<
steer steer steer
#Fig1



#Fig1. Driving instructor and student

21 und nach hinten gucken.=
and look backward.
22 ==hier hast du alles klar.
here everything is clear

td: +turns head, looks backward->

23 RK: #<L:ENken.>+
steer

————>+looks forward->

#Fig2



#Fig2. student steers to the right

24 (1.0)+(1.7)

td: —>+looks backward->

25 => RK: .hhh+ (.) *lenken heißt (.) *so#.
steer means (like) this

td: —>+

rk: *turns the steering wheel*holds wheel->

#Fig3. driving instructor steers to the left



#Fig3

26		hhh
	rk:	—>
27		(0.5)
	rk:	—>
28	TD:	mhm.*
	rk:	—>*
29	RK:	so.
		so
30		(1.0)
31	RK:	bleib <u>stehn</u>?
		stand <u>still</u>
32		(1.0)

During the parking process the student needs to turn the steering wheel harshly to the left to achieve the correct position of the car parallel to the street. The instructor continuously repeats *lenken* (“steer”, see Figure 1) with high volume and high speed (lines 19–20), indicating that the student needs to continue the action (see Mondada, 2017) and that the student does not perform well in the task. After the instructor asks the student to look backward to monitor the distance to other parking cars (lines 21–22), in line 23 he gives the last of many instructions to steer (lines 19–23). He pronounces it with even more increased volume and a stretched vowel that indicate his irritation about the student: Although it is already the eighth trial in that lesson, the student has not activated the correct steering and moving the car by hearing the key term *lenken*. Instead, he has turned the wheel in the wrong direction and with the wrong intensity (slightly to the right instead of turning it hard to the left, see Figure 2). After a long audible inbreath, with increased volume and a short smile the instructor states *lenken heißt so* (“steer means (like, see Figure 3) this,” line 25) turning the wheel into the correct direction. The modal deictic expression *so* requires an embodied enacting to make the recipient understand its situational meaning (see Stukenbrock, 2010). Simultaneously to *so*, the driving instructor performs the correct bodily behavior that the student should have performed himself. The student claims to understand (line 28) and the instruction sequence ends shortly afterward.

The clarification of the common expression *lenken* does not aim at a clarification of its intension. Instead, it is about the practical realization of an instruction in a very specific situation. This implies that the student had already learned how to perform correctly: *So* would probably not work in the first instruction sequence, which in general tends to be more explicit (see Deppermann, 2018). In the first instruction (not shown here), the instructor indeed explains the steering process in a more elaborate way. Thus, in Extract 8 the instructor builds his explanation on shared knowledge: He reminds the student of the formerly learned process that they established during previous trials. Yet, the instructor also relies on shared knowledge regarding another important aspect: *Lenken heißt so* is valid only for that exact situation and for the specific goal of reverse parking parallel to the street. As

a counter-example, to achieve the previous 45-degree angle in relation to the street, the student would need to steer to the right, not to the left. To correctly understand an aspectual meaning of a common expression and apply it to future situations, recipients need to infer several parameters. In this case, these parameters, primed by the instructor's *so*+bodily performance, are as follows:

- (1) The task of reverse parking at the side of the road (not, e.g., to pull into a parking space)
- (2) The position of the car (already in an angle + its position in relation to the curbstone)
- (3) The timing (ideally moving the car while steering, not steering while standing still)
- (4) The intensity (turning the wheel hard and continuously until the right angle is reached)

In theoretical didactical settings, like in Extracts 2, 4, 5, and 6, participants negotiate the meaning of expressions to accomplish more or less theoretical tasks (answering a question, filling out a worksheet with questions, following the topic of a lesson). The affordances and requirements of establishing intersubjectivity and demonstrating knowledge in practical settings like driving school lessons or dancing lessons (Keevallik, 2013) are very different. Students need to be able to bodily perform, coordinate theoretical knowledge and practical skills, and do all this in a very short time slot.

Discussion

Speakers use specific definitional practices to orient to their recipients and deal with specific interactional tasks and situational circumstances. Adopting a conversation analytic and interactional linguistic approach, this article examined how speakers use the format *x heißt y* for different goals when they constitute and negotiate the meaning of expressions. Results indicate that with the format, speakers connect an unknown or problematic expression with already existing or previously established knowledge. In case of foreign words and abbreviations, they often adopt a phrasal format and typically just substitute the expression *x* in question with the (presumably) known expression *y* (see Extract 3).⁵ In the case of technical terms, *x heißt y* is used for both phrasal substitutions with known terms and clausal explanations (see Extracts 1, 2, and 4–7). In both cases speakers build on assumed or established background knowledge like familiar expressions and preliminary established concepts, adapting the explanation to the specific situation. Although anchored in the situation, parts of the definition of technical terms often are formulated in a rather general, context-free manner (see Extracts 4 and 6 in particular): As they are not part of participants' active or passive semantic lexicon, speakers provide the expressions' denotations in a way that is transferable to other situations. In some situations speakers display that adopting a clausal turn design with a more elaborate and general explanation is also a practice that aims at displaying an expert status (see Extracts 6 and 8).

Speakers negotiate the meaning of common expressions in other contexts. Since participants are familiar with the denotation of common expressions, the reasons for "explaining" them is connected closely to the situation and its local or practical relevance. Expressions in question may be indexical (e.g., *hier*, "hier," FOLK_E_00178_SE_01_T_01_DF_01_c39), polysemous (e.g., *offen*, "open" in common understanding vs. as a technical term in the context of short stories, i.e., the collocationally restricted meaning of "open beginning"), and subjective or evaluative (e.g., *ordentlich sprechen*, "speak properly," FOLK_E_00177_SE_01_T_01_DF_01_c76, *eigentlich schon gut*, "actually quite good," FOLK_E_00074_SE_01_T_01_DF_01_c164). Consequently, speakers focus on the practical relevance that is connected to the affordances and exigencies of the specific situation, when they explain or negotiate common expressions (see Extract 8). Table 2 that is based on codes of the coding scheme presented above supports the difference between the quality of definitions and explanations of common expressions versus potentially unknown expressions like technical terms:

Especially driving school lessons illustrate that "common expressions" often are more than that: They (should) activate distinct theoretical, procedural, and bodily knowledge that needs to be

Table 2. Type of Expressions and How They Are Defined/Explained

	Foreign Word, Technical Terms, Abbreviations	Common Expressions	Overall No.
General, context-free definitions	43 (71.7%)	0*	43
Situational explanations	17 (28.3%)*	20 (100%)*	37
	60	20	80

$\chi^2 = 28.175$, $df = 1$, $p = 1.108e-07$; Phi/V-coefficient = 0.6224045 (strong effect).

*Residuals in the cells are >2 or less than -2, i.e. that the specific effect account for the statistically significant result.

adapted to a very specific situation. This points to the fact that speakers do not only establish intersubjectivity with definitions but always presuppose detailed lexical and pragmatic knowledge about situational parameters and the adaptability to new situations too. Speakers who learn a new or reactivate an already learned expression must be able to evaluate in which situations they may apply the given definition or explanation. This illustrates that interactional histories influence and shape (the type of) definitions.

Practically, there is not a single case in my data in which speakers provide an abstract, all-encompassing definition suited as a dictionary entry, describing the conceptual meaning of an expression, for instance, by stating necessary and sufficient properties, not even in school lessons in which such definitions might be relevant for exams. This is in line with prior research, which points out that definitions in interaction do not need to meet the requirement of an abstract scientific or philosophical definition or, when they are required, are introduced in other types of sequences and with other types of formats.

In contrast, depending on interactional settings and goals, sequential environment, and situation, defining expressions needs to be tightly situated and context-sensitively adapted according to specific exigencies and relevancies. Considering this, definitions in interaction reveal which kinds of (partial) meanings and connotations speakers and recipients have in mind, when they use or hear an expression in an interaction: not an all-encompassing dictionary-like definition but typically locally situated aspects that are evoked by or connected to the ongoing interaction. Sometimes definitions even reveal personal stances toward (using) potentially problematic expressions.

Examining a format that has not yet been in focus of prior research, this article contributes to research on pragmatic and semantic features of constructions with German *heißen* and is in line with current research on Interactional Semantics that shows how the constitution of meaning is bound to local situations and contexts. Next to *heißen*, also other metacommunicative verbs (that can be translated as “to mean”) might be used with a similar format, for example, *x meint y* or *x bedeutet y*. While focusing on systematically searchable practices is an eligible way of examining how speakers negotiate the meaning of expressions, other approaches like focusing on actions of defining and explaining (e.g., introducing concepts that are not bound to specific linguistic formats but need to be learned in driving school lessons like “driving carefully,” Helmer) are still to be pursued. The findings of this and previous studies (e.g. Deppermann, 2019; Deppermann & De Stefani, 2019) may advance the prospective research on the interactive constitution of meaning.

Notes

1. FOLKER is an annotation tool developed for the transcription of natural, multipart interaction (see Schmidt & Schütte, 2010).
2. By exemplifying *sprachstil* with this simple dichotomy, he also characterizes the task as a simple one, thus maybe enticing somebody to volunteer.
3. There are no video recordings of that lesson, but we can assume the teacher disambiguates the deictic expression *da* (“there”) by some sort of pointing gesture to the head.
4. *Kognitive* is not the basic form (which would be *kognitiv*) but a conjugated one, either apt for a feminine singular noun (e.g., *intelligenz*, lines 21 and 25) or apt for a plural noun (e.g., *fähigkeiten*, “abilities,” line 05).

5. In only one single case in my collection a foreign word is explained in a clausal formulation; in all other cases the x and the y correlate grammatically (i.e., a noun is substituted with a noun, e.g., in the native language), an adjective with an adjective, and so on.

Acknowledgments

I thank Arnulf Deppermann, Nadine Proske, Jörg Zinken, and Silke Reineke as well as all anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier version of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

References

- Antaki, C. (2012). Affiliative and disaffiliative candidate understandings. *Discourse Studies*, 14(5), 531–547. doi:10.1177/1461445612454074
- Aquinas, T. (1947 [1265]). *The summa theologica*. New York, NY: Benziger.
- Aristotle. (1938). *Categories. On interpretation. Prior analytics*. Translated by P. Cooke, & H. Tredennick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Barsalou, L. W. (1987). The instability of graded structure: Implications for the nature of concepts. In U. Neisser (Ed.), *Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization* (pp. 101–140). Cambridge, US: Cambridge University Press.
- Belhiah, H. (2013). Using the hand to choreograph instruction: On the functional role of gesture in definition talk. *The Modern Language Journal*, 97(2), 417–434. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4781.2013.12012.x
- Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). *Basic color terms: Their universality and evolution*. Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.
- Bilmes, J. (2011). Occasioned semantics. A systematic approach to meaning in talk. *Human Studies*, 34(2), 129–153. doi:10.1007/s10746-011-9183-z
- Bilmes, J. (2015). *The structure of meaning in talk. Explorations in category analysis. Volume 1: Co-categorization, contrast, and hierarchy*. Manoa: University of Hawaii.
- Birkner, K. (2006). “was mEinen sie jetzt mit NUTzen”: Wortbedeutung als Gegenstand diskursiver Bedeutungskonstitution. In A. Deppermann & T. Spranz-Fogasy (Eds.), *Be-deuten: Wie Bedeutung im Gespräch entsteht* (2nd ed., pp. 185–202). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Breindl, E., Volodina, A., & Waßner, U. H. (2014). *Handbuch der deutschen Konnektoren 2. Semantik der deutschen Satzverknüpfen*. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.
- Bührig, K. (1996). *Reformulierende Handlungen. Zur Analyse sprachlicher Adaptierungsprozesse in institutioneller Kommunikation*. Tübingen, Germany: Narr.
- Clark, H. H. (1996). *Using language*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, H. H., & Brennan, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), *Perspectives on socially shared cognition* (pp. 127–149). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Clark, H. H., & Wilkes-Gibb, D. (1986). Referring as a collaborative process. *Cognition*, 22, 1–39. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(86)90010-7
- Couper-Kuhlen, E., & Selting, M. (2018). *Interactional linguistics. Studying language in social interaction*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Croft, W., & Cruse, D. A. (2004). *Cognitive linguistics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- de Saussure, F. (1966). *Course in general linguistics*. Edited by C. Bally, & A. Sechehay, in collaboration with A. Riedlinger. Translated by W. Baskin. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Deppermann, A. (2006). Von der Kognition zur verbalen Interaktion: Bedeutungskonstitution im Kontext aus Sicht der Kognitionswissenschaften und der Gesprächsforschung. In A. Deppermann & T. Spranz-Fogasy (Eds.), *Be-deuten. Wie Bedeutung im Gespräch entsteht* (2nd ed., pp. 11–33). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Deppermann, A. (2009). Verstehensdefizit als Antwortverpflichtung: Interaktionale Eigenschaften der Modalpartikel denn in Fragen. In S. Günthner & J. Bücker (Eds.), *Grammatik im Gespräch. Konstruktionen der Selbst- und Fremdpositionierung* (pp. 23–56). Berlin/New York, NY: de Gruyter.
- Deppermann, A. (2011). The study of formulations as a key to an interactional semantics. *Human Studies*, 34(2), 115–128. doi:10.1007/s10746-011-9187-8

- Deppermann, A. (2015a). Retrospection and understanding in interaction. In A. Deppermann & S. Günthner (Eds.), *Temporality in interaction* (pp. 57–94). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Benjamins.
- Deppermann, A. (2015b). Gleiche Wörter – Inkommensurable Bedeutungen: Zur interaktiven Entstehung von Undurchschaubarkeit in politischen Diskussionen am Beispiel von “Ökologie” in den Schlichtungsgesprächen zum Bahnprojekt “Stuttgart 21.” In U. Tuomarla, J. Härmä, L. Tiittula, A. Sairio, M. Paloheimo, & J. Isosävi (Eds.), *Miscommunication and verbal violence/Du malentendu à la violence verbale/Misskommunikation und verbale Gewalt* (pp. 25–41). Mémoires de la Société Néophilologique de Helsinki XCIII. Helsinki, Finland: Société Néophilologique.
- Deppermann, A. (2016). La définition comme action multimodale pour des enjeux pratiques: Définir pour instruire à l'auto-école. *Langages: revue trimestrielle*, 204(4), 83–101. doi:10.3917/lang.204.0083
- Deppermann, A. (2018). Changes in turn-design over interactional histories – The case of instructions in driving school lessons. In A. Deppermann & J. Streeck (Eds.), *Time in Embodied interaction. Synchronicity and sequentiality of multimodal resources* (pp. 293–324). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.
- Deppermann, A. (2019). Interaktionale Semantik. In J. Hagemann & S. Staffeldt (Eds.), *Semantiktheorien* (pp. 172–215). Band 2. Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Deppermann, A., & De Stefani, E. (2019). Defining in talk-in-interaction: Recipient-design through negative definitional components. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 140, 140–155. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2018.12.004
- Deppermann, A., & Schmid, T. (2014). Gesprächsdatenbanken als methodisches Instrument der Interaktionalen Linguistik - Eine exemplarische Untersuchung auf Basis des Korpus FOLK in der Datenbank für Gesprochenes Deutsch (DGD2). In C. Domke & C. Gansel (Eds.), *Korpora in der Linguistik - Perspektiven und Positionen zu Daten und Datenerhebung* (pp. 4–17). Göttingen, Germany: V&R unipress.
- Deppermann, A., & Spranz-Fogasy, T. (Eds.). (2006). *Be-deuten. Wie Bedeutung im Gespräch entsteht* (2nd ed.). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Drake, V. (2016). German questions and turn-final *oder*. *Gesprächsforschung – Online-Zeitschrift zur verbalen Interaktion*, 17, 168–195.
- Du Bois, J. W. (2014). Towards a dialogic syntax. *Cognitive Linguistics*, 25, 359–410. doi:10.1515/cog-2014-0024
- DUDEN. https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/heissen_einen_Namen_tragen_geben#Bedeutung4
- Ehlich, K., & Rehbein, J. (1986). *Muster und Institution. Untersuchungen zur schulischen Kommunikation*. Tübingen, Germany: Narr.
- Engelberg, S. (2011). Lexical decomposition: Foundational issues. In C. Maienborn, K. von Heusinger, & P. Portner (Eds.), *Semantics. An international handbook of natural language meaning* (pp. 122–142). Berlin/New York, NY: de Gruyter.
- E-VALBU. <https://grammis.ids-mannheim.de/verbs/view/400556>
- Felder, E. (2006). Semantische Kämpfe in Wissensdomänen. Eine Einführung in Benennungs-, Bedeutungs- und Sachverhaltsfixierungs-Konkurrenzen. In E. Felder (Ed.), *Semantische Kämpfe. Macht und Sprache in den Wissenschaften* (pp. 13–46). Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.
- Fillmore, C. J. (1985). Frames and the semantics of understanding. *Quaderni Di Semantica*, 6(2), 222–254.
- Gülich, E., & Kotschi, T. (1987). Reformulierungshandlungen als Mittel der Textkonstitution. Untersuchungen zu französischen Texten aus mündlicher Kommunikation. In W. Motsch (Ed.), *Satz, Text, sprachliche Handlung* (pp. 199–261). Berlin, Germany: Akademie.
- Günthner, S. (2015). Grammatische Konstruktionen im Kontext sequenzieller Praktiken - ‘was heißt x’-Konstruktionen im gesprochenen Deutsch. In J. Bücker, S. Günthner, & W. Imo (Eds.), *Konstruktionsgrammatik V: Konstruktionen im Spannungsfeld von sequenziellen Mustern, kommunikativen Gattungen und Textsorten* (pp. 187–218). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Harren, I. (2009). Schülererklärungen im Unterrichtsgespräch des Biologieunterrichts. In J. Spreckels (Ed.), *Erklären im Kontext. Neue Perspektiven aus der Gesprächs- und Unterrichtsforschung* (pp. 81–93). BaltmannsweilerGermany: Schneider Hohengehren.
- Helmer, H., & Zinken, J. (2019). *Das heißt* (‘that means’) for formulations and *du meinst* (‘you mean’) for repair? Interpretations of prior speakers’ turns in German. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 52(3), 159–176. doi:10.1080/08351813.2019.1608098
- Heritage, J., & Watson, D. R. (1979). Formulations as conversational objects. In G. Psathas (Ed.), *Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology* (pp. 123–162). New York, NY: Irvington.
- Hoey, M. (2005). *Lexical Priming. A new theory of words and language*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Jefferson, G. (2004). Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction. In G. H. Lerner (Ed.), *Conversation analysis: Studies from the first generation* (pp. 13–31). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.
- Kaiser, J. (2017). Reformulierungsindikatoren im gesprochenen Deutsch: Die Benutzung der Ressourcen DGD und FOLK für gesprächsanalytische Zwecke. *Gesprächsforschung – Online-Zeitschrift zur verbalen Interaktion*, 17(2016), 196–230.
- Keevallik, L. (2013). Decomposing movement: Spatial deixis in dance instruction. In P. Haddington, L. Mondada, & M. Neville (Eds.), *Interaction and mobility: Language and the body in motion* (pp. 345–370). Berlin/Boston, Germany: Walter De Gruyter.

- Koole, T. (2009). Erklären in der Mathematikklasse: Eine angewandte Konversationsanalyse. In R. Vogt (Ed.), *Erklären: Gesprächsanalytische und fachdidaktische Perspektiven* (pp. 109–121). Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
- Koole, T. (2010). Displays of epistemic access. Student responses to teacher explanations. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(2), 183–209. doi:10.1080/08351811003737846
- Langacker, R. W. (1987). *Foundations of cognitive grammar. Vol. 1: Theoretical prerequisites*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Leech, G. (1981). *Semantics: The study of meaning* (2nd ed.). Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University.
- Levinson, S. C. (2013). Action formation and ascription. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), *The handbook of conversation analysis* (pp. 103–130). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Liedtke, F., Wengeler, M., & Böle, K. (Eds.). (1991). *Begriffe besetzen. Strategien des Sprachgebrauchs in der Politik*. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Linell, P., & Lindström, J. (2016). Partial intersubjectivity and sufficient understandings for current practical purposes: On a specialized practice in Swedish conversation. *Nordic Journal of Linguistics*, 39(2), 113–133. doi:10.1017/S0332586516000081
- Locke, J. (1975 [1689]). *An essay concerning human understanding*. (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Mondada, L. (2017). Precision timing and timed embeddedness of imperatives in embodied courses of action. In L. Raevaara, M. L. Sorjonen, & E. Couper-Kuhlen (Eds.), *Imperative turns at talk: The design of directives in action* (pp. 65–101). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Benjamins.
- Mondada, L. (2018). Multiple temporalities of language and body in interaction: Challenges for transcribing multimodality. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 51(1), 85–106. doi:10.1080/08351813.2018.1413878
- Oloff, F. (2017). *Genau* als redebeitragsinterne, responsive, sequenzschließende oder sequenzstrukturierende Bestätigungspartikel im Gespräch. In H. Blühdorn, A. Deppermann, H. Helmer, & T. Spranz-Fogasy (Eds.), *Diskursmarker im Deutschen. Reflexionen und Analysen* (pp. 207–232). Göttingen, Germany: Verlag für Gesprächsforschung.
- Prechtel, P., & Burkard, F. P. (Eds.). (2008). *Metzler Philosophie-Lexikon. Begriffe und Definitionen* (3rd ed.). Stuttgart, Germany: Metzler.
- Quasthoff, U. M., & Hartmann, D. (1982). Bedeutungserklärungen als empirischer Zugang zu Wortbedeutungen. Zur Entscheidbarkeit zwischen holistischen und komponentiellen Bedeutungskonzeptionen. *Deutsche Sprache*, 10, 97–118.
- Rosch, E. (1973). Natural categories. *Cognitive Psychology*, 4, 328–350. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90017-0
- Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. *Cognitive Psychology*, 7, 573–605. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90024-9
- Rost-Roth, M. (2006). *Nachfragen. Formen und Funktionen äußerungsbezogener Interrogationen*. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.
- Sacks, H. (1992). *Lectures on Conversation [1964–72]* (Vol. 2). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
- Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. *Language*, 50(4), 696–735. doi:10.1353/lan.1974.0010
- Schegloff, E. A. (1992). Repair after next turn: The last structurally provided place for defense of intersubjectivity in conversation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95(5), 1295–1345. doi:10.1086/229903
- Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-correction in the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language*, 53, 361–382. doi:10.1353/lan.1977.0041
- Schmidt, T., & Schütte, W. (2010, May 19–21). *FOLKER: An annotation tool for efficient transcription of natural, multi-party interaction*. Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on International Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC) (pp. 2091–2096), Velletra, Malta.
- Selting, M. (1987). Reparaturen und lokale Verstehensprobleme. Oder: Zur Binnenstruktur von Reparatursequenzen. *Linguistische Berichte*, 109, 128–149.
- Sinclair, J. (1991). *Corpus, concordance, collocation*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Spreckels, J., & Trojahn, T. (2009). „n=objekt is also des is SCHWER zu erklären“ – Erklärungen im Grammatikunterricht. In R. Vogt (Ed.), *Erklären: Gesprächsanalytische und fachdidaktische Perspektiven* (pp. 133–149). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Staffeldt, S. (2017). Wortfeldtheorie. In S. Staffeldt & J. Hagemann (Eds.), *Semantiktheorien. Lexikalische Analysen im Vergleich* (pp. 97–149). Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg.
- Stukenbrock, A. (2009). Erklären – Zeigen – Demonstrieren. In J. Spreckels (Ed.), *Erklären im Kontext. Neue Perspektiven aus der Unterrichts-, Alltags- und Berufspraxis* (pp. 160–176). Baltmannsweiler, Germany: Schneider Hohengehren.
- Stukenbrock, A. (2010). Überlegungen zu einem multimodalen Verständnis der gesprochenen Sprache am Beispiel deiktischer Verwendungsweisen des Ausdrucks „so.“ In N. Dittmar & N. Bahlo (Eds.), *Beschreibungen für gesprochenes Deutsch auf dem Prüfstand. Analysen und Perspektiven* (pp. 165–193). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Lang.

- Temmerman, M. (2009). Communicative aspects of definitions in classroom interaction: Learning to define in class for first and second language learners. *Linguistics and Education*, 20(2), 126–144. doi:10.1016/j.linged.2009.04.003
- Vargas, E. (2002). Die paraphrastische Reformulierung mit explizierender Funktion: Versuch einer semantischen Typologie. In S. Bastian & F. Hammer (Eds.), *„Aber, wie sagt man doch so schön“ Beiträge zu Metakommunikation und Reformulierung in argumentativen Texten* (pp. 97–106). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang.
- Willkop, E. M. (1988). *Gliederungspartikeln im Dialog*. MünchenGermany: Iudicium.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Translated by Anscombe GEM. New York, NY: Macmillan.