

## POSTPRINT

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### **Verbal practices of perspective grounding**

This chapter deals with perspectivation in verbal interaction, that is verbal practices in which participants manifest perspectives and set their relevance for the interpretation of their own and others' activities. Some of these practices will be studied here in the framework of a rhetorical conversation analysis. The main empirical objects are instances of remarkably elaborated perspective presentations which function as explanations of the speaker's position and actions and thus allow "rich" interpretations of them, displaying their plausibility and their inner logic to the interlocutors.

The basic practice in perspective explanations relates conditions and consequences and often forms chains of such relations – contextualizing single actions in the framework of an action perspective and grounding this perspective in a background perspective which is rooted itself in specific conditions. This type of chaining constitutes perspective grounding. Explicit perspective grounding generally serves to define the speaker's position as deeply rooted, essential for the speaker's actions, and stable (Kallmeyer & Keim 1996). The most important strategies of grounding perspectives are grounding in personal experience, in social categorization, and in principles of acting (such as persistence in goal orientation, flexibility in reaction to situational changes, or rationality in problem solving).

The specific interest which motivates my analysis of these practices of perspective grounding is in the role which perspectivation plays in the participants' way of constructing themselves as actors in social contexts. In their perspectivizing activities participants structure the field of potential or established contextual or intertextual relations with respect to themselves as perspective sources. Perspective grounding is a particularly good analytical object to show the way how participants define themselves and project spaces of possible actions and expectable activities.

The corpus which is used here is a collection of interactions of different types which all center on activities of dealing with problems and conflicts, such as counseling, mediation, or clarifying discussions. They are all guided by an ideology of

problem solving which implies the principal equality of the participants and is marked by a preference for explicit argumentation and the search of consensus.

## 1. Theoretical framework

The present study – as well as the study of Inken Keim in this volume – is part of a project on “conversational rhetoric” which incorporates the analysis of various aspects of verbal interaction such as explanation and argumentation, forms of cooperation and conflict, and the definition of social identities and relations (Kallmeyer 1996). The analysis of perspectivation in this context demonstrates forms of rhetorical strategies participants use to handle divergence and convergence of perspectives in social interaction in order to realize their practical purposes: defending their own perspective, proposing it to others, using perspective differences as a resource for problem solving, constructing common perspectives, or realizing perspective changes in order to adapt to changing situations.

Important elements of the theoretical framework of this type of rhetorical conversation analysis are a general model of perspectivity, tasks of perspectivation which are incorporated in the communication structure of discourse and interaction, and verbal resources speakers rely on to cope with these tasks. Verbal resources are verbal practices of referring to elements of perspectivity as basic elements of perspectivation, and higher-level strategies which, e.g., can be build around the core element of perspective grounding.

The model of perspectivity developed in psychology is deeply influenced by the analysis of visual perception but has been widened to cognitive operations in general (Graumann 1960, 1993). Following Graumann, perspectivity is a quality of the “representation of something by someone for someone from a given position” (Graumann 1993: 159). This “something” which is represented can be any type of object, and representing may be done by any type of semiotics.

Perspectivation means the incorporation of the constitutive elements of perspectivity in the verbal activities – elements such as the source (the active “someone” in Graumann’s formula), the standpoint, the orientation of attention, the object and its perceived aspects, the horizon or the context of relevance, and the addressee, incorporating a form of recipient design into the produced verbal activity.

All communication implies demands of perspectivation. The process of communication forces the participants to establish – aspects of – their perspectives as valid interpretive ground for the understanding of their utterances. Perspectivation is a form of contextualizing actual events in the framework of relevant backgrounds and conditions (Gumperz 1982 and 1992; Auer 1995). This contextualization has at least two effects: it allows a “rich” interpretation of the speakers’

activities, e.g. by discovering the consistency of the speakers' line of action; and perspectivation allows the partner's projecting further activities which can be expected from the speaker.

The incorporation of perspectivation as a constitutive element of communication becomes visible in a – so to speak – dramatic way in the ongoing speech exchange in verbal interaction where the participants are involved in the joint production of what “is going on” and of shared meanings. In this sense the theory of symbolic interaction regards reciprocity in the sense of mutually taking the other's perspective as a basic requirement which participants have to deal with in order to establish a common definition of the situation, to produce interactional order, and to achieve mutual understanding.<sup>1</sup>

Symbolic interactionism as well as ethnomethodology and conversation analysis stress the fact that the formal structure of interaction, that is the organization of structures of order (e.g. sequential order and other types of interactional frames) and the production of meaningful activities, is bound to processes of retrospective and prospective interpretations. In conversation analysis, e.g., much analytical work has been spent on the role of projections of further activities in the actual activity and the retrospective contextualization of activities in foregoing ones. In perspectival terms, this means that participants are constantly changing their standpoint and their orientation of attention, e.g. looking back to the established context, in relation to which they place and shape their contributions, and then looking forward to following activities and projecting activity structures, that is setting them relevant for their own and/or the others' continuation. Such perspectival moves can be considered as an important element in “syntax for conversation” (Schegloff 1982, 1996).

In verbal interaction it becomes specifically salient that perspectives are bound to actors and actions. Participants are inevitably present as actors and thus as perspective sources; one consequence is that they have to control the other's interpretations of their perspectives. Furthermore, perspectives are related to frames of activities for which they are relevant and which define their expected life spans – short-term or long-term perspectives, related to single activities, complex interactions or series of social events. At the opening of an activity complex of any kind participants assume that certain perspectives will play a constitutive role and that they remain relevant until their life span is closed by a perspective change.

Verbal interaction is structured as a process of perspective-setting and -taking (Graumann 1989). The way in which this exchange is done, and how we have to understand perspective taking needs still more clarification. One aspect which is highly relevant for a rhetorical analysis is that perspective setting implies a claim of social relevance for the manifested perspective, that is the addressees are expected to identify it, to take it as a basis for interpretation, to respect it as a valid individual perspective and adequate orientation for the subject's acting, maybe to

adopt it at least partially, and to accept it as (part of) the common perspective and as common ground for coordinated activities. Perspective taking deals with these claims. Perspective taking is used here as a general notion for all types of taking into account other people's perspectives: how participants interpret the other's perspective, how they relate their own perspective to it, whether they accept it as the other's perspective, and to what extent they adopt this perspective or incorporate it in their own. Taking into account another's perspective (*Perspektivenberücksichtigung*) does not necessarily imply the complete adoption of this perspective (*Perspektivenübernahme*), but it displays participants' orientation to the fundamental process of maintaining reciprocity to a degree which is "sufficient for the actual purposes" (A. Schütz).

Perspectivity is deeply incorporated in linguistic structure. Probably all languages have many lexical elements which relate to the everyday theory of perspectivity (and which correspond to the culturally formed image of perspective and is influenced by the popularization of specialized scientific constructs). All pragmatic categories have perspectival properties. They may be incorporated (or "frozen") in syntax and semantics: deictic categories which are, e.g., hidden in the semantics of many expressions (Fillmore 1966); activity categories which are in many cases part of word semantics, and which are incorporated in the grammatical role schemata of actor, experiencer, receiver etc. (Fillmore 1966; Zifonun, this volume); evaluative and modal expressions which presuppose a subject as the source of judgements and attitudes.<sup>2</sup> Following von Stutterheim and Klein (in this volume) we have to separate the L-perspective, that is the incorporation of perspective in linguistic utterances as an effect of linguistic constraints, and the speaker's/actor's perspective which becomes visible through topical and linguistic choices. One relevant aspect in this context is that the structure of the verbal exchange anchors the deictic center in the repartition of activity roles and demands a constant switching of it. Furthermore, the manifestation of the actor's perspective in discourse follows rules and constraints on an interpretive level (such as the requirements of consistency) which apply to the speaker's subsequent choices.

Participants' work of perspectivation in verbal interaction shows how they handle tasks and constraints which follow from linguistic and interactional structures in order to produce understandable utterances and ordered interaction, and in doing so, to pursue their respective goals.<sup>3</sup> Important perspectival practices in this context are:

- Defining standpoints in relation to situations, contexts or circumstances, backgrounds or conditions (*in my actual situation I cannot be interested in ...*);<sup>4</sup> or presenting perceptions, cognitions, and actions as consequences of orientations, that is of the individual's attitudes, dispositions, emotions (*I simply just*



*fear that if I leave for three months our personal relations will change*), intentions, and relevances (*it is very important for me to stay with him*).

- Differentiating perspectives – own and others, actual and past, factual and hypothetical views – and relating them by operations of text structuring using junctions such as IF–THEN, BECAUSE or AND THEN, sequential ordering, foregrounding and backgrounding. Relating perspectives may be done also in the form of layering, the use of reported speech in order to incorporate a double perspective, i.e. the reported speaker’s and the actual speaker’s (Günthner, this volume).
- Displaying perspectival movements, such as looking around from one standpoint, changing standpoints (locomotion), widening or narrowing the perspectival span and changing the granulation of perception (*this is a global impression but at a closer look we discover . . . ; let us go into the details*).
- Indicating the modality of “having a perspective” – it may be actively taken in the sense that a subject adopts it deliberately from somebody else or that it results from the speaker’s choosing a standpoint, e.g. in order to be able to do things such as problem solving, but it may be the case as well that at a certain moment the subject becomes aware of having a perspective which has grown by itself and which the subject cannot remember having chosen.
- Defining the claim of relevance for one’s own perspective and the degree to which one will take into account the perspectives of others.
- Handling the relation between “talking about a perspective” and “talking from a perspective”. The explicit representation of one’s own standpoint is done from a certain perspective, too, and is a form of “talking about”. But when speaking about themselves, speakers normally pretend to talk from the perspective they talk about, as far as they do not mark it as “other’s perspective” or “not my actual one”. Sometimes they have to take special effort in order to display that and how their declared perspective defines their actions.

The practices of perspective grounding which will be analyzed in the remaining part of this chapter are elaborated forms of relating situations, standpoints, orientations and actions, in a static or dynamic way. They often show suggestive forms of “having a perspective”. Specific attention will be paid to the speakers’ strategic choices – choices of the type of grounding schema and of substantial elements in the course of their realization – and what follows from them for the rhetoric elaboration of perspectivation. Activities of grounding often have aspects of accounts,<sup>5</sup> but in this chapter, my interest focuses less on the sequential structure of account episodes and functional account categories such as excuses, justifications, concessions or refusals (see Schönbach 1990: 76ff.), but more the rhetorical form of elaborating explanations. The demonstration will start with examples of the produc-

tion of complex utterances and proceed to sequences of verbal exchanges showing perspective negotiation.

## 2. Perspective grounding in personal experience

The strategy of grounding in personal experience focuses the subject's perception, his/her being or becoming aware of situations and inner states and of their changes. The grounding experience is presented as unquestionable and "given" in a strong sense.

This strong modality of experiencing can be marked by different means. So, referring to knowledge and perception, formulating their restricted character (e.g., *I only know that or all I know is*) points to the kernel of what the subject "really knows" and what presents the result of the individual's active reflection, the field of his/her sure judgement, excluding other elements of belief which are uncertain and not validated.<sup>6</sup> The expression of experiencing feelings, attitudes, and dispositions is often reinforced by presenting them as natural states of the subject which are given in an immediate and unreflected manner and which have the status of simple facts. In German, speakers frequently use the particle *einfach* (*simply, just*) for presenting their orientations as natural attitudes. The consequences of the grounding experiences are generally formulated with modal expressions of necessity and impossibility.

The first example is a telephone call to a center for AIDS care.<sup>7</sup> A young man who learned only three weeks before that he is HIV positive and calls for the first time, resists the counselor's therapeutic initiatives and proposals of already far reaching strategies, defending his own orientation of concentrating on the very next step. He grounds his action perspective in experiencing his actual mental state. One of the salient formulaic expressions he uses in this context is *ich merk einfach / I just notice*.<sup>8</sup>

142 B: ja ich merk einfach auch dass ich angst krieg un \* überhaupt nich weiß  
*well I just notice too that I get scared and \* don't know at all*

143 B: was sache is↑ \* was bedeutet det jetzt für mich so \*\*  
*what's going on \* what it means for me now \*\**

144 B: ich merk einfach nur \* manchmal schnürt=s mir einfach die luft ab  
*I just notice \* sometimes I feel like I just can't breathe*

The speaker stresses his disorientation and his being exposed to uncontrollable mental processes. His perception of these processes is the only thing to rely on (*nur/just*, l. 144). In the following context the consequences for the speaker's actions are expressed in a modality of "to have to" (e.g. *ich muss überhaupt erst mal=*n

weg für mich finden wie ich damit umgeh / first I have to find a way for me how to cope with it).

The combination of the modality expressed bei *einfach/just* or *simply* for the representation of experiences and the modalities of necessity and impossibility for the action consequences appears as well in the next example, but it is part of a much more elaborated rhetorical strategy.

The extract (“Flat-sharing”) is taken from the interaction of a group of young adults who planned to share a flat, establish a common household (*Wohngemeinschaft*), and raise children from an orphanage. Two of them (H and T), who are younger than the others and still students, are interested in the pedagogical project primarily from a theoretical point of view, but decide to withdraw from it when they realize that their partners begin to count on their personal participation. The group meets for a clarifying conversation. The topic talk starts with an explication of the perspectives of T and H.

H structures his extended utterance by a series of changing standpoints. The elaboration of the explication has traits of a rhetorical *mise en scène* of taking standpoints and of becoming aware of their consequences:

a. After an utterance opening which announces his view of the actual situation, H continues with a YES–BUT construction which in its first part expresses his agreement with the general idea of the project:

120 H: von– \* von der– \* vom konzept der heimerziehung her gesehen \*  
*seen from \* from the \* from the concept of upbringing in a home*

121 H: ist natürlich der vorschlag oder die idee”↑ \*\* wahnsinnig gut↓  
*naturally the proposal or the idea” is \*\* terribly good*

122 H: wahrscheinlich die die \* optimalste form \* überhaupt \*  
*probably the the \* most optimal form \* possible \**

123 H: der heimerziehung ja↑ die man sich vorstellen kann \*\*  
*of upbringing in a home yes which one can imagine \*\**

124 H: also das projekt finde ich ausgezeichnet↓  
*so I think the project is excellent*

The first segment introduces a standpoint (*von ... her gesehen/seen from*). Then H presents a general evaluation which follows from the introduced viewpoint (ll. 121–123), and, in conclusion, H reformulates the evaluation, which before had been expressed in an impersonal or generalized form (*man/one* in line 123), in terms of his personal view (*ich/I*, l. 124). This personal formulation explicitly marks a standpoint taking.

Repair formulations often give hints to speakers’ criteria of verbal selections. The first two lines contain two repairs which are oriented to the same effect. In

the first case where *von der* would have grammatically fitted with *heimerziehung* H adds the expression *konzept*. In line 121 the correction of *proposal* by *idea* defines again the relevant aspect of the focused object, that is, the conceptual quality of the project and eliminates the aspect of the concrete participation. Both repairs introduce expressions which are more apt to build a contrast in the following BUT-part. By using the word *project* in the conclusion (l. 124), the speaker achieves a neutral reference to the object in question but which has a clear conceptual reading in the context of foregrounding this aspect (see the stress on *idee*", l. 121). The element of preparing a contrast is strengthened in the last segment (l. 124). Word order, with the object in first position, marks a narrow grammatical focus, that is, only the object is foregrounded. The narrow focus reproduces the aspectualization of the beginning (l. 120) and projects a contrast. On a micro-level the first four lines already show the formulation work which the speaker invests in order to maintain consistency in complex perspectivation.<sup>9</sup>

b. The contrasting aspect is the personal involvement which is presented in the following BUT-part. This part is filled with an IF–THEN construction and a very expanded formulation of the reason. The IF-part introduces into the narrative a new standpoint for the speaker (H). H constructs himself as realizing that the situation in which he has gotten himself involved actually requires an explicit choice regarding the nature or extent of his involvement:

125 H: aber \* <ja↑ wenn i"ch jetzt aber– \* ich persönlich  
but \* yes but if I now \* I personally

126 H: dran teilnehmen \*müsste↓ \* >(ja) sollte \* würde \* was auch immer < \*\*  
had to participate \* (yes) should \* would \* whatever \*\*

The speaker uses a specific verbal practice which consists in segmenting the utterance with partial reformulation and successively focusing on different parts of the utterance. In this way, H slows down the utterance progression in the first segment and foregrounds first the relation of opposition (*aber* \*...*aber*, where the first *aber* has no strong accent, but gains weight by the following pause and the re-opening interjection *ja*↑) and then his person as grammatical subject (*wenn i"ch jetzt aber– \* ich persönlich*, with a strong accent on the first *ich* and a verbalization of the stress by *persönlich/personally* in the second occurrence). This multiple focusing can be considered as the main part of a rhetorical *mise en scène*: properties of the utterance production, such as prosody, tempo, silences or repairs – together with the verbal selections – assumes an iconic value which contributes to the meaning.<sup>10</sup> Here the focusing practice highlights the step from the YES-part to the But-part. It can be interpreted as symbolizing the activity of “orienting the attention to”.

The expansion in line 126 presents a variant of successively focusing on utterance parts: The expansion contains a list of alternative candidates for the posi-

tion of the modal verb *müsste/had to*. The expansion is prosodically backgrounded as a possible correction or word search, but, within this frame, the modal element is successively focused. The sequential order of the listed elements shows a constant diminution of the semantic element of obligation, from *müßte/had to* via *sollte/should* to *würde/would*, and the final formula *was auch immer/whatever* blocks the relevance of a precise definition of the modality.

The defocusing of the character of obligation can be interpreted as part of the speaker's perspectivizing strategy. He presents the task of decision making as not being established by the partners, but as self-imposed and as a result of becoming aware that the situation demands a decision. If we reconsider the correction of *proposal* by *idea* in line 121 in this light we may discover an analogue implication: the correction defocuses too the partners' active role which is prominent in *proposal*. It seems that H consistently concentrates on the personal perception of his situation, leaving out or backgrounding the others' perspectives.

c. The following consequence-part presents the hypothetical negative decision:

127 H: das gi"ng \* das ging von mir aus de"r perspektive heraus nicht \*  
*that would be \* that would be impossible for me from this perspective \**

The formulation has no retroactive subordinating connector, for example the conjunction *then* or word order inversion, but presents the consequence in an independent main clause. This type of pragmatic junction introduces with the new activity step a new stance or positioning: H is talking now from the standpoint he introduced before and projects another perspective. The beginning illustrates again the rhetorical practice of successive focusing (*das gi"ng \* das ging... / that would be \* that would be...*). Thus, the step from the IF-part to the THEN-part is realized once more by taking or establishing a perspective.

The target point of the precedent multiple projection is an activity of grounding in experience. Its two major parts are the presentation of H's becoming aware of his inner state and the formulation of the consequences which follow from his situation. In accordance with this grounding schema, becoming aware has the modality of an unquestionable perception which is marked by the particle *einfach* (*simply* or *just*):

131 H: da seh ich einfach \* dass ich– dass ich einfach noch nicht \*  
*then I just realize \* that I that I'm simply not yet \**

132 H: so ne \* feste persönlichkeit bin \* und ha"be \* ja ↑  
*such a \* fixed personality \* and don't have one \* yes*

133 H: und \* will auch ganz \* bewu"ßt  
*and \* quite definitely don't want*

134 H: jetzt noch gar keine feste persönlichkeit \* sei"n \*  
*now to be a fixed personality yet*

The formulation of the consequences realizes the second part of the grounding schema establishing the modalities of necessity (*daßsich ... muß / that I need*, ll. 135/136) and impossibility, expressed by the connector *als dass/rather than* and the irrealis *wäre* (l. 137):

135 H: ja↑ daßsich mich daßsich mich vie"l meh"r \*  
*yes that I need rather to look \**

136 H: um mich persö"nlich \* auch kümmern muß  
*after myself personally*

137 H: →als daßsich zum beispiel je"tzt← \* fä"hgig und berei"t wäre \*  
*rather than being for instance now \* ready and willing \**

138 H: mich um ki"ndererziehung zu kümmern↓ \*\*  
*to take care of the upbringing of children \*\**

In the first part of the grounding schema, H realizes an interesting shift in the characterization of his state of personality development. In the course of the three-part formula H gives his self-characterization progressively an active turn which is expressed by the three verbs *ich bin ... habe ... will sein* (*I am ... have ... want to be*; ll. 132–134). Grounding in personal experience often shows the subject as an experiencer who discovers changes which he cannot control and which often have the character of force majeure. In the call to the AIDS center, the young man does it as well as, in another example, a young women who explains her friend that she gives up holiday plans with her because she found a new love. She uses the strategy of grounding in personal experience (e.g. *ich möchte einfach soviel zeit wie möglich mit ihm verbringen / well I simply want to spend as much time as possible with him*) and justifies her perspective change by *er ist einfach auf der bildfläche erschienen ... da kann man auch nichts machen* (*he just showed up ... one can't do anything against it*). In the present case, instead of relying on a self-categorization as passive experiencer which would exclude or reduce responsibility, H presents himself as actor who consciously (*ganz bewußt*) accepts the perceived situation as starting point for the formation of a new perspective (ll. 133–134). In this way H underlines the quality of his new perspective as valid ground of further activities. This is an elaborated instance of indicating the modality of "having a perspective".

The whole grounding passage, from line 131 on, is marked by extreme emphasis which is produced by pair formulas such as *bin und habe* (*I'm... and don't have*, ll. 131–132, with the additional expansion by *will..keine feste persönlichkeit sein / don't want to be a fixed personality*, ll. 132–133) and *fähig und bereit* (*ready and willing*, l. 137), and by the frequency of strong accents with the highest den-

sity near the end in the formulation of the consequence (l. 137). In this way, H presents his actual orientation, which excludes a participation in the project, as the culmination point of his rhetorical *mise en scène*.

d. This explicit positioning triggers a further explication. H depicts three biographical situations: first, the situation *bis vorm halben jahr* (*up until six months ago*) characterized by a stable pedagogical orientation which motivated his interest in the common project of upbringing children from a home (*I thought I'd do pedagogy*, ll. 158–161); second, another moment of becoming aware of an ongoing biographical change (*und da" hab ich au"ch wieder gemerkt \* daß ich mich noch vö"llig wa"ndle* ↓ / *and there I also noticed again \* that I'm still changing a lot*; ll. 164–165), and third, as an example of considerable change, his actual orientation which clearly contrasts with the pedagogical one (*und momentan mach ich wesentlich mehr \* richtung \* sprachliche \* musische sachen* / *and at the moment I do a lot more \* direction \* linguistic \* musical things*; ll. 165–166). The important point here is that H interprets his biography in the light of the concept of an ongoing biographical change which is the core element of his new perspective.

As a result of this case analysis we can say that the speaker's utterance incorporates all elements of manifest perspectivation listed at the end of Part 2. He integrates them in a thoroughly elaborated contour of formulation: The series of changing standpoints and becoming aware of their perspectival consequences introduces multiple projections which prepare the grounding in personal experience as the peak of the presentation. The rhetorical *mise en scène* of the process of becoming aware and of standpoint taking is a strong device of displaying that one is talking from the perspective one is talking about. Furthermore, we notice the speaker's strategic choices in perspectivation – concentrating on self-perception, defocusing the others' perspectives and their part in the situation, avoiding any perhaps problematic attribution to them – and his effort of maintaining consistency which becomes visible in repairs as well as in further expansions which introduce or reformulate elements of precision and backing. What could not be shown in the presented extract is that grounding in personal experience is H's dominant strategy throughout the whole interaction. Only rather late when the addressees had already accepted his position, he formulates the difference of both parties' biographic situations in the form of a category-near typification: *nicht mit solch unterschiedlichen leuten; ihr seid schon fertig und wir fangen erst an* (*not with so different people... you are already fixed and we only begin*). This may tentatively be interpreted in the way that the rhetoric strength relies on a clear choice and that the foregrounding of one schema implies constraints of consistency.

### 3. Perspective grounding in social categorization

Grounding perspectives in social categorization relies on the common knowledge of social types and of their properties which can be defined as ways of acting and as habitual orientations.<sup>11</sup> In perspective grounding, all elements of social categorization can be exploited, that is, the chosen category, its properties, the relation between properties and category, the attribution of categories and properties to individuals or groups, and the relation between category properties and the individual or group.

The connection between category and properties may be interpreted in different ways, for example, as habitual relation (what the “incumbents”<sup>12</sup> of a category normally do) or as obligation (what they should do or have to do). In perspective grounding, the linkage of category and property takes a strong, categorical modality of a necessary (or impossible) relation between condition and consequence. This modality of categorical consequence does not mean that there is a context-independent, fixed set of properties which are relevant in all cases. The choice of properties to be manifested and to be qualified as a categorical consequence corresponds to an actualization and sometimes to a definition or redefinition of social categories. The choices of categories and of their relevant properties as well can be strategically motivated.

The relation between individual/group and category may take different modalities too. The various types of social categories present quite different conditions of incumbency: ethnic or gender categories which are considered as fixed by birth and somewhat inescapably attributed; role categories which are rooted in forms of membership organizations, for example, mother, father, child which are defined in a schema of family organization; categories of social status and of moral quality, age, profession, and many others. The attribution of categories to individuals may take into account to what degree the categorization of the individual is justified, in which way the individual fulfils the category properties, and to what degree they are essential for the individual’s social identity. Besides rather neutral formula of attribution such as *I as X* or *I am an X*, there are others such as *sich betrachten als X* (*to consider oneself to be X*) which imply elements of choice in the case of variable categorization and of disputed incumbency (e.g., *I still consider myself to be your mother*).

In verbal interaction, participants are constantly involved in explicit or implicit social categorization. The definition of social identities and social relations is a basic element of verbal interaction and, thus, forms of social categorization are nearly omnipresent. Implicit social categorization is normally done by characterizing personal properties without marking them as category-bound and not using category names. The properties can be formulated as category-bound, still without connecting them with category names. Explicit social categorization may be done by using



the category name with or without formulating the relevant properties. Thus, we can imagine in an argument between a mother and her teenage daughter that the mother starts using the category “mother” without expliciting its properties thus taking them as self-evident (*ich bin deine mutter und ich möchte nicht dass du über nacht wegbleibst / I am your mother and I don't want you to stay out overnight*) and that only afterwards in a discussion about the definition of the family roles and the possible status change of the daughter there may be the need to define the properties of being a mother (e.g., responsibility, care). Perspective grounding in social categorization demands an explicit elaboration of the categorization schema, using category names, formulating the relevant properties, indicating the strength of the relation between category and properties, and specifying the individual's incumbency.

The following example (“Dramatist”) shows such a case of grounding in social categorization. In a talkshow, a rather wellknown performance artist<sup>13</sup> (HN) explains and defends his art which is often considered as scandalous and is criticized for its character of bloody and overtly sexual rituals. HN's global intention is to defend himself by correcting misunderstandings and informing the public about the principles of his art. The most relevant categorization he relies on and which is at the center of his dominant grounding strategy is that of an artist, and more precisely of a dramatist.

The host quotes a short passage from one of HN's literary texts as a demonstration of the provoking and shocking character of the imaginative action. HN explains that the text is a *fantastic drama* which is unlikely to be represented on stage and has more the character of a *reading drama* (*Lesedrama*). HN criticizes the practice of short citation and points out that Goethe's *Faust* too would not be understandable from small passages. In this way, HN already introduces the keyword *drama* before he starts grounding his perspective in the categorization as a *dramatist*:

- 314 HN: und äh ich betra”chte mich als dramatiker ↑  
*and euh I consider myself a dramatist*
- 315 HN: und äh dramatiker \* zeigen eben das tragische ↓  
*and euh dramatists \* just show the tragic*
- 316 HN: dramatiker \* zeigen äh grausamkeit äh gramti/  
*dramatists \* show euh cruelties euh gramti/*
- 317 HN: äh dramatiker \* zeigen äh äh tod äh \*\* mord und  
*euh dramatists \* show euh euh death euh murder and*
- 318 HN: totschiag >äh< \*\* äh äh die dramatiker ha”ben  
*manslaughter euh \*\* euh euh the dramatists really have*

319 HN: sich eben se/ mit dem to”d auseinanderzusetzen– \*\*  
*to deal with death \*\**

320 HN: und so sind meine arbeiten zu verstehen–  
*and this way one has to understand my creations*

HN realizes all parts of the . The self-categorization as dramatist (l. 314) uses the formula *to consider oneself X* and marks the modality of incumbency by a confirmation: the accentuation of the verb *betra”chte* (*consider*) constitutes a wide focus including the whole proposition which is confirmed as true.<sup>14</sup> With this construction, HN contextualizes the category “dramatist” as contextually given and presupposes a questioning of his incumbency. The representation of category-bound activities (ll. 315–319) first expresses their category-bound quality by generalization in the indicative (what they do/generally/normally; ll. 315–318) and then by the modality of obligation or necessity (*to have to do*), that is, as a categorical consequence (ll. 318–319). The particle *eben* defines the modality of this relation as absolutely sure and self-evident. The choice of the presented category properties is strategic – they correspond to those of HN’s own works of art which had been criticized in public as obsessive. The last segment presents the action consequences in the given context; it claims social relevance for the presented perspective which should be taken as a key for better understanding the speaker’s works of art.

HN’s self-categorization is foregrounded as a whole by the strong parallelism of the formulation. It has an anchoring function for his further verbal activities. He comes back to the key elements several times, for example, *wir dramtiker / we dramatists* and *das wesen des dramas / the nature of drama*. In the course of his ongoing attempts to make the seriousness of his art plausible, HN also specifies the nature of his being a *dramatist* and, thus, legitimizes the confirmation of his incumbency at the beginning (l. 314): he exposes the deeply rooted quality of his orientation to the drama as an art form which resulted from his reaction to a historical situation, a reaction which HN shared with other important artists of that time; and he insists on his competence in questions of dramatic art which has grown during a long-lasting intensive preoccupation with this art form. Evidently there is a close link between category incumbency and making experiences or following acting principles. But throughout the whole interaction HN’s dominant grounding strategy remains grounding in social categorization. The choice of this schema has strategic value: it is meant to avoid any attribution of a motivation of his art by properties of his private personality and opposing all attempts on the part of others to suggest such a thing (namely, perversity as the motive of his interest in bloody and sexual rituals).

The analysis of the next example, which shows again all elements of the core structure of grounding in social categorization, will concentrate more on the features of the contextual placement and role of the grounding schema in the play of

perspective setting and taking. The extract is taken from a mediation interaction (“The hairpiece”). A woman (Mrs. Klocke, A), complains about a coiffeur (Mr. Plack, B) who made a toupee for her which does not fit. A’s dominant perspective in the mediation is marked by her loss of trust in B’s good will; her action orientation is to look for a solution which does not depend on B. The coiffeur, after repudiating all reproaches of his customer, finally proposes that she should try once more to solve the problem together with him. B starts with a first formulation of his proposal:

824 B: frau Klocke wir möchten ihnen gerne nochmal anbieten  
*Mrs. Klocke by all means we want to invite you again*

825 B: kommen sie ruhig nochmal– \* zu uns– \* daßwir gemeinsam/  
*don’t hesitate to come again \* to us \* that together we/*

B expresses his good will marking it with the intensifier *gerne/by all means* or *readily* (l. 824), thus underlining his personal involvement as a source of the formulated orientation to problem solving. Next he projects A’s participation (l. 825). The particle *ruhig/don’t hesitate* refers to an orientation which can be paraphrased in the given context with “trustful” and which contrasts with the attitude of mistrust and deception A expressed before. The utterance presents an oppositional form of taking into account the other’s perspective: B substitutes A’s mistrusting view of him with a contrary one. Finally, B begins to describe a mode of cooperation for problem solving, using an inclusive “we” (the *we* in l. 824 as well as *uns/us* in l. 825 are exclusive and refer to B and his staff), but he stops after *gemeinsam/together*. This word refers to the kernel of A’s problem, and this property can be interpreted as motivating B’s breaking off: under the given conditions, a successful proposal of this kind needs more preparation. This is what B engages in, grounding the proposed perspective in social categorization:

826 B: wir– \* bemühen uns wirklich \* wir– \* wir sind nun  
*we \*really try seriously \* we \* we are in fact*

827 B: wirklich de”r herstellungsbetrieb– \* hie”r und– \*  
*the leading manufacturing firm \* here and \**

828 B: können auch nur von zufriedenen  
*we can only survive if our customers are satisfied*

829 B: und wi”rklich nicht von u”nzufriedenen kunden leben↓ \*  
*and really not if they aren’t \**

830 B: das kann also wirklich kein wirtschaftsunternehmen↓ \*\* [...]  
*really no business enterprise could do that \*\* [...]*

B achieves his grounding strategy in four steps: affirming a positive version of the own action orientation (l. 826); self-categorizing as *the leading manufacturing firm* and qualifying the incumbency as undeniable fact by *wir sind nun wirklich / we are in fact* (l. 827); pointing out the contextually relevant category-bound property (*only survive on satisfied customers*; l. 828/829); underlining the category-bound character of the stated property by a generalization referring to *wirtschaftsbetrieb/business enterprise* as a global term (l. 830).

B reformulates his proposal and now realizes the substantial part which he left out before (to try together to solve the problem):

835 B: und ich kann ihnen wirklich nur anbieten– \* <kommen sie zu uns– \*  
*and I can really only invite you* \* *come to us*

836 B: da"ß wir gemeinsam uns alles nochmal ansehen>  
*that we examine everything together*

837 B: und nach lö:"sung suchen da"ß sie=s wirklich tragen können↓  
*and look for a solution so that you can really wear it*

This time B formulates his proposal in terms of a categorical consequence (l. 835; see *nur*). A modal shift takes place from the subjective attitude at the beginning (l. 824) to a categorical consequence. The formulation of the goal *da"ß sie=s wirklich tragen können* (*so that you can really wear it*, l. 837) addresses A's main critique *ich kann es nicht tragen / I cannot wear it*. B manifests his perspective taking, accepting her goal orientation as common perspective. This statement of perspective sharing is followed by a further backing:

838 B: denn das wollen wir ja auch gerne– \*  
*because that's what we really want too*

839 B: wir wollen ihnen keine haararbeit liefern  
*we don't want to deliver you a hair product*

840 B: wo sie nur das geld zum fenster rausgeworfen haben  
*where you only throw your money away*

844 B: und nich nutzen können↓ \* ne↑ \* das wolln wir wirklich ge"rne↓  
*and cannot use it* \* *right* \* *that's what we really want by all means*

B explicitly states the convergence of the perspectives (*auch/too*, l. 838). He picks up the formulation of his attitude of the beginning, including the intensifier *gerne*. Now the personal motivation (*that's what we want*), which is reformulated again in the closing segment, is sustained by the categorical consequence which B exposed before. Repeating the formulation for the closure of the utterance, with strong stress on *ge"rne*, B intensifies the modality of his action orientation in the sense

of “we have to and we want to cooperate”, thus qualifying the categorial property as valid ground for real action.

From line 826 on, the whole activity of grounding is rhetorically foregrounded. It is marked with the intensifier *wirklich/really* (seven occurrences: ll. 826, 827, 829, 830, 837). This intensification is part of the global foregrounding of the grounding activity which was already to be observed in the artist’s case. The recurrent intensification defines the activity as an ultimate attempt; it may be interpreted as a practice which B uses to demonstrate that he is talking from the perspective he is talking about.

Both examples analyzed in this part have the property that the explicit taking the other’s perspective into account and projecting perspectival convergence is an important part of the action context which frames the grounding (e.g., B’s proposal and its reformulation or HN’s recommending the presented perspective to his addressees), but not of the core structure of the grounding schema. The core structure shows strategic choices which rather indirectly reflect the opponents’ perspectives (e.g., *only survive if our customers are satisfied*), but as a whole it is presented as independent from the specific context and of more general validity. This property recalls the observation that in “Flat-sharing” H defocuses the others’ perspectives and concentrates exclusively on the development of his own perspective. This property is part of the specific schema of grounding in personal experience, but reconsidering this property in the light of other grounding strategies one can suppose that this is a general element.

#### 4. Perspective grounding in principles of acting

Grounding in principles of acting is based on common knowledge about ways of successful action. Principles of acting concern general qualities such as persistence in goal orientation, flexibility (e.g., changing plans in reaction to new circumstances), or rationality (e.g., in the case of problem solving).

The elaboration of this type of perspective grounding exposes elements such as: referring to a type of situation which motivates acting and is linked with a goal orientation (*we definitely have to solve the problem today*); representing generalized models of action (*in such a case one has to examine all conditions and all possible consequences before deciding on the first step*); referring to and demonstrating forms of adequate proceeding such as advancing step-by-step or reiterating initiatives with some variation (*let’s try it in another way*); evoking and applying principles of acting such as rationality (e.g., realizing inferencing processes in a demonstrative way) and of evaluative criteria of feasibility (*It is useless to try the impossible*) and desirability of possible results (*nobody can want things to go wrong*).

Participants' ways of handling principles of acting in verbal interaction shows that they consider them to be independent from other grounding elements such as social categorization. The principle of rationality, for example, has a crucial importance for problem solving and, thus, may be considered to have a link to role categories such as counselor or mediator. But grounding in principles of acting does not primarily refer to role obligations, for instance, to the fact that the speaker is a mediator and the institutional goal of mediation is to reduce conflicts, but to the fact that there is a problem which needs a solution and rational procedures of problem solving would be best to solve it, allowing an open search for ways of problem solving and overruling the actor's category-bound preferences.

In the mediation dialogue "The hairpiece" where A's, the customer's, dominant grounding strategy is exposing personal experience (negative experiences with the coiffeur and his wife) and B's, the coiffeur's, grounding is in social categorization, the mediator (C) grounds his attempts to persuade A to accept B's ultimate proposal (see Part 3) in a demonstration of rational problem solving. The sequence of C's attempt shows a negotiation in four steps:

a. In reaction to the consensus proposal of B which is manifestly supported by the mediator, A continues to resist (*also äh ich zögere im moment noch- / well euh for the moment I still hesitate*). First, B and C react in an accepting or confirming way, but the situation changes when A continues with reformulating her perspective of distrust which she presents as a natural consequence of her experiences (*ganz einfach deshalb weil ich des vertrauen natürlich jetzt auch dadurch durch des ganze- ziemlich äh:- gestört ist- / simply because I lost my trust because of because of all this is rather euh disturbed*). This formulation refers back to her elaborated grounding in personal experience which she had exposed earlier.

b. In reaction to A's insisting on her perspective of distrust, C starts again an attempt to convince her:

871 C: |äh | äh- |frau Klocke äh | äh-  
Mrs. Klocke euh euh

872 A: ge|stört is- |  
disturbed

873 C: |zweitausend-| \* dreihundert- \*  
two thousand \* three hundred \*

874 A: |ja- | |>ja-< |  
yes yes

875 C: zweitausend|zwei|hundert\*dreißig- \* |ma:rk-| \* um die es  
two thousand three hundred and thirty mark \* which are

- 876 A: ja” kann ich mir nicht leisten  
*yes I cannot afford*
- 877 C: hier geht↓  
*at stake here*
- 878 A: |daßes in der ecke |liegt↓  
*that it lies around without use*
- 879 C: |schreibt man ja nicht–| schrei/ schreibt man nich  
*one does not write them off one does not simply*
- 880 A: |¬ nei”n kann| ich mir auch nich
- 881 C: einfach so:– |ab sondern– |  
*write them off but*
- 882 A: leisten↓←
- 883 C: versu:cht– \* zumindest da”s– \*\* den weg– \* zu  
*one tries \* at least this \*\* to take \* the way*
- 884 C: beschreiten– \*\* selbst wenn er einem von vornherein nicht so  
*\*\* even if from the beginning it doesn’t look*
- 885 A: |natürlich↓| |>ja↓<|  
*of course yes*
- 886 C: sympa”thisch ist↓ \* |aber | man versucht |den | weg  
*very sympathetic \* but one tries to take the way*
- 887 C: zu beschreiten↑ \* der offensichtlich der einzige is↑ \* um  
*\* which evidently is the only one \* to*
- 888 A: ja↓ \*3\* >gut↓ <  
*yes \*3\* okay*
- 889 C: noch=en bißchen was zu erreichen↓  
*achieve still a little bit*

Using throughout the generalized reference to *man/one* or impersonal constructions C characterizes the representation of activities as a model of action. It includes a situation which motivates action – the economic interest which is presented as normal, intersubjectively shared (see the particle *ja* which often is used to mark the reference to the given and unquestionable); handling specific difficulties or barriers (such as emotional attitudes), clearing conditions and possibilities, and making a decision (*the way ... which evidently is the only one*). C’s concession (*even if...*) refers to A’s resistance to further cooperation with B. The qualification as *not very sympathetic* means a reinterpretation of her position which is now qualified as a mere feeling, leaving out the grounding experiences. This reinterpretation is

used to contrast with rationality as the leading principle of acting. The rationality principle is represented in different ways: the rational economic interest overrules emotional attitudes (*even if from the beginning it doesn't look very sympathetic*); the relation of conditions and consequences is marked by a modality of necessity (*the way ... which evidently is the only one*, that is, after examination of all possibilities); and an orientation to feasibility, that is a realistic definition of the obtainable result, is expressed in *um noch n bißchen was zu erreichen* (*to achieve still a little bit*). In this way, C presents the modeled action as a normal form of acting which is guided by rationality.

At several occasions, A agrees rapidly (ll. 874 and 876–878), in the course of C's utterance or immediately after the end of an utterance unit. In this way A confirms all elements of the case to which C refers in a generalized form which are relevant elements in her perspective too, with the exception of the proposed way. At the end, A agrees weakly (l. 888), without reformulating the result herself and still hesitating or waiting (see the rather long silence); *gut/okay* is realized with low intensity and does not really sound as definitive agreement. At least B interprets A's reaction as a continuation of her hesitation when he offers her more time for deliberation (in the short passage left out). C insists that A should decide herself in the actual situation (*das halt ich für sinnvoll / that seems appropriate to me*; see l. 903).

c. A starts a recapitulation of her possibilities in the given situation. This activity is to be interpreted as opposition against C's qualification of the proposed way to be *the only one to achieve still a little bit*. The passage is interesting because, on the one hand, A's activity of recapitulating her possibilities adopts the proposed rational orientation referring to an ordered procedure of examining all existing possibilities. But, on the other hand, it turns out to be a strategy of hesitation:

902 A: HOLT LUFT |äh: also um noch=e=mal äh- | \* ku=äh  
*BREATHES IN euh so to resume once again*

903 C: |>das halt ich für si"nnvoll↓< |  
*that seems appropriate to me*

904 A: zusammenzufassen äh: es sind drei möglichkeiten entweder  
*euh there are three possibilities either*

905 A: ich geh auf des angebot ein daß ich bei herrn plack  
*I agree with the proposal of Mr. Plack*

906 A: noch=e=mal- \* äh versuche- \* das gemeinsam- \*\* hinzukriegen↑  
*to try again to manage it together*

907 A: +zweitens- \* äh en sachverständigen dazu zu holen was  
*second \* euh to call an expert what*



- 908 B: +ja↓  
yes
- 909 A: mit kosten verbunden ist oder das dritte äh eben– \* mit=em  
*would entail expenses or the third euh \* with a*
- 910 A: rechtsanwalt↓ is=es richtig die drei möglichkeiten↓  
*lawyer is it correct these three possibilities*
- 911 C: ja↓  
yes

Speaker A lists three possibilities which she differentiates by her formulation. Only the first one is represented as personal action; the other two are formulated in impersonal constructions. The second one, calling an expert, is specified by a – negative – comment concerning the costs, and the third is reduced to a short hint and remains unspecified. This differentiation reflects the weight which had been attributed to the mentioned possibilities in the previous discussion. C reacts to this differentiation commenting only on the third possibility:

- 912 A: ja↓ weiß ich  
yes I know
- 913 C: die möglichkeiten gibt es ja in jedem fall↑ nu”r↑  
*these possibilities exist in any case but*
- 914 A: ich wollte |des jetzt nur wissen↓| ja–  
*I only wanted to have it confirmed now yes*
- 915 C: |was was soll=en | anwalt↑ en anwalt  
*what could a lawyer do a lawyer*
- 916 A: auch nicht |gut des is mir  
*neither well I am conscious*
- 917 C: kann– \* die verjährung– |nich vom tisch  
*cannot make the limitation disappear*
- 918 A: bewußt das ist mir klar↓ | daß  
*of that it is clear to me that*
- 919 C: fegen und en gericht auch nicht↓| also:–  
*and neither a law court so*
- 920 A: |das vorbei ist↓|  
*it is over*

A's reactions to C's comments show that she already knows the relevant points which correspond with C's preceding juridical clarification (l. 192 and ll. 916–920) and that she just wanted to have it confirmed again (l. 914). Thus, A stops or slows

down the progression from clearing conditions to drawing consequences which C set into motion.

d. In reaction to A's strategy of hesitation C elaborates his procedure of a rational examination and decision making in a clearly contoured form (e.g., by slower tempo, which is continued to the end in line 938). He realizes an examination for excluding two of the three possibilities and, thus, produces an elaborated backing for his questioned proposition of the first way as *the only one* which is reasonable under the given conditions:

921 C: |← die von ihnen–| \* aufgezeigten lösungsmöglichkeiten zwei  
*the possible \* solutions two and three which you have drawn up*

922 A: ja↓  
yes

923 C: und drei" sind mit kosten verbunden↑ und– \* da" sie mit  
*involve costs and \* since they*

924 C: kosten verbunden sind– \*\* muß man eben vo"rher prüfen↑ \*\*  
*involve costs \*\* you have to check first \*\**

925 A: |ja↓ |  
yes

926 C: ob das ge"ld dafür sinnvoll ausgegeben wird |oder| nicht↑ \*  
*whether the money would be well spent on them or not \**

The decisive condition *to involve costs* is first introduced as a matter of fact in the form of a statement. It is then reformulated as a reason (accentuated *da"/since*) which is followed by the consequence. This two-step procedure displays the establishing of a standpoint. The elements of the consequence (*vo"rher prüfen / to check first* and *ge"ld sinnvoll ausgegeben / money well spent*) represent core elements of the rational economic model of calculating costs and benefits and, thus, defines the perspective for the ongoing problem solving. This perspectivation refers to the consensus between C and A concerning the importance of economic aspects. A agrees immediately at the first point of possible completion of C's utterance (l. 925).

Then, C reformulates the results of the previous discussion as standpoint-defining conditions, using an expanded IF–THEN-construction, and now realizes the procedure of decision making:

927 C: und we=man von vornherein wei"ß und wir wissen es ja jetzt↓  
*and if one knows from the start and we know it now*

928 C: \* daß im e"rnstfall– \* das heißt bei einer  
*that when it gets serious \* that is in*

- 929 C: auseinandersetzung vor geri"cht ↑ \*3\* jedenfalls hi"lfsweise  
*legal proceedings at least alternatively*
- 930 C: immer der– \* hinweis kommt ich berufe mich auf verjäh"rung–  
*always \* comes the indication I refer to the limitation*
- 931 A: mhm–  
*mhm*
- 932 C: we=man das wei"ß und we=man zu"sätzlich weiß – \* daß  
*if one knows this and if one also knows \* that*
- 933 A: |mhm| gut das ist mir  
*mhm okay I am not*
- 934 C: dieser hinweis nicht zu entkrä"ften |ist– |  
*this objection can not be devaliated*
- 935 A: nicht bewußt ↓  
*conscious of this*
- 936 C: dann äh ka=man ja: die möglichkeiten  
*then euh one can no longer recommend*
- 937 A: |mhm–| ja ↓ \* >gut ↓ <  
*yes \* okay*
- 938 C: |zwei | und drei >schon nich mehr empfehlen ↓ → <  
*the possibilities two and three*
- 939 A: \*\* gut also dann erklär ich mich einverstanden daß ich äh  
*\*\* good then I agree on that that I euh*

C introduces two conditions. The first one, concerning the *limitation* (l. 927–930) is first formulated in a generalized hypothetical condition (*wenn man von vornherein weiß / if one knows from the start*), and then it is stated as definitely given (*und wir wissen es ja jetzt / and we know it now*). C underlines the modal status of this condition as “shared given knowledge”. He continues to emphasize the conditions of given knowledge with reformulating the first step and going on to the second (*this objection can not be devaliated*, ll. 932–934), and after this expanded presentation of precedents, he presents the conclusion which is formulated from a generalized advisor’s perspective (*one can no longer recommend the possibilities two and three*, ll. 936–938).

A who followed C engaging in a rational procedure of examination still confirms the first condition which C presents, but not very expressively (l. 931). The presentation of the second condition which had also been discussed before provokes her remark that this element is not part of her knowledge and, thus, does not define her perspective (*das ist mir nicht bewußt / I am not conscious of this*,

ll. 933–935). This provides a foundation for her initiative of examining juridical possibilities. The *mhm* in overlap with the formulation of the consequence (l. 937) indicates her work of realizing the second condition. At the end of C's utterance, A starts without delay the formulation of her agreement on the mediator's position (*ja*↓ \* >*gut*↓< / *yes* \* *okay*, l. 937) and expresses her decision as a consequence of her accepting the coiffeur's proposal (*dann/then*, l. 939ff.).

The analyzed elements of C's activity characterize his rhetorical *mise en scène* of rational problem solving. First C represents the which contains already all relevant elements of his way of problem solving. Then, in a form of dramatization or *mise en scène* C enacts core operations of rational problem solving. The rationality principle is demonstrated by a step-by-step realization of inferencing, introducing the relevant conditions, stating the givenness of the necessary knowledge (*and we know it now*) and concluding in the modality of impossibility (*one can no longer recommend*). The whole passage is highly contoured by the parallelism of the constructions as well as by prosodic means (slower tempo and strong accentuation).

C's defocusing of A's grounding in personal experience (*even if from the beginning it doesn't look very sympathetic*, ll. 884/886) is part of the devices used to establish the dominance of the grounding in an acting principle. But it manifests also a strategic choice of C as a mediator. Generally mediators aim at reducing the parties' emotional involvement in the conflict as a condition of conflict reduction. In the mediation case the distribution of the different grounding schemata is quite significant and can be understood as result of the participants' strategies which are narrowly connected with their roles and starting positions in the interaction – there is a clear affinity between the victim's role and the self-categorization as experiencer on the customer's side, between the coiffeurs' role of the defendant who avoids the interpretation of being personally part of the problem and his perspective grounding in social categorization, and finally the mediator's choice of the grounding in acting principles and his role strategy of the distance of someone who is not involved and has no personal interests.

## 5. Final remarks

Looking at verbal practices of perspectivation in interaction from the standpoint of a rhetorically oriented conversation analysis, one can list general elements of perspectivation such as representing the core elements of perspectivity, the dynamic of perspectives, multiperspectivity (differentiation and relating of perspectives), the claim of relevance for others, the modality of "having a perspective" including the relation of talking about and talking from a perspective (Part 2). Especially

in elaborated perspectivation the operations of displaying perspectives are salient and their occurrence allows insights in general aspects of perspectivation as well as in the specific features of different types such as perspective grounding.

The most important strategies of perspective grounding are: grounding in personal experience which focuses the subject's knowledge and perception; his/her having experiences and being or becoming aware of situations and inner states and of their changes (Chapter 3); grounding in social categorization which relies on the common knowledge of social types and of their properties which can be defined as ways of acting and as habitual perspectives (Chapter 4); and grounding in principles of acting which is based on the common knowledge about ways of successful action and which concern general qualities such as persistence, flexibility, or rationality (Chapter 5). These different conceptual schemata determine the specific core structures of the grounding strategies which, on the other hand, share features of grounding such as the strengthening of the relation between conditions, perspectives, and deriving orientations or actions. In perspective grounding, participants formulate their perspectives as a natural, logical, and necessary consequence of given conditions.

Relative to their local context, realizations of grounding schemata are contoured as complex units with an elaborated textual structure and foregrounded as a whole by rhetorical means such as parallelism, dense accentuation, rhythmicization, and other elements of rhetorical form. They are placed and marked as reactions to the foregoing interaction and its problems of perspective setting and taking. The general rhetorical elements of foregrounding and the schema-specific aspects of strengthening the expression of "having a perspective" mark the perspective grounding often as an ultimate effort or attempt to establish the claim of social relevance and to enhance the addressees' perspective taking.

All analyzed cases present a picture of the individuals' position in society. The participants explicitly act as individuals who not just follow an authority or a collective action program. The central concepts of individuality and equality which are involved in the guiding ideology of social interaction and problem solving take different accentuations in the specific grounding strategies. The claim of individuality is the strongest in grounding in personal experience and is based on the mutual assumption of reciprocity. Grounding in social categorization relies much more on established social structures which incorporate asymmetries and notions of complementary reciprocity; this type of grounding is often used to claim specific rights. Grounding in principles of action relies on the assumption of collectively shared models of action which are part of the competent members' knowledge of problem solving. These differences play an important role in the participants' strategic choices of their grounding strategies.

The observations presented in this chapter can be considered as representative of the indicated type of verbal interaction and not of other social situations

with different preferences, for the strategy of silence, e.g., or for indirect conflict management, avoiding explicit representations of problems and conflicts (see, e.g., Kallmeyer & Keim 1996). But the analysis of the distribution of these different orientations and their interplay in the communication structure of specific social worlds would be another topic.

## Notes

1. See McHugh 1969 for the concept of the definition of the situation, Schütz 1962 and Schütz and Luckmann 1975 for the basic social idealizations of the interchangeability of the standpoints of the congruence of the relevance systems, and Garfinkel 1963 and 1967 for the role of such idealisations in the construction trust and the normality of the everyday routine activities. See also the discussion of concepts of communality, mutuality, and reciprocity in Graumann 1995.
2. For the multiplicity of perspective indicating linguistic elements in German see Lindemann 1993; Sandig 1996. There is a rich linguistic literature on deictic categories and related operations of perspectivation in setting scenes in verbal descriptions, starting with Bühler 1965; see Fillmore 1968; Langacker 1989; Storrer 1996; Liebert, Redeker, and Waugh 1997.
3. See the early formulation of the concept of “participants’ work” in contrast to “structural provision” in Jefferson 1972:315 and the concept of “natural rhetoric” in d’Urso and Leonardi 1984.
4. These short quotations are taken from the corpus, but not presented in their context here.
5. The concept of account in Scott and Lyman 1968 inspired a whole tradition of research; see Schönbach 1990. For the role of practical descriptions in the ethnomethodological literature, see Garfinkel 1967; and Garfinkel and Sacks 1970. The concept of grounding in communication is used in a broader sense in Clark and Brennan 1991.
6. See also Foppa, this volume, for the differentiation of knowledge and belief from the participants’ point of view.
7. The dialogue is a role play of professionals working in an AIDS center and which is used for instruction. See Bliesener 1990.
8. The transcription uses the signs of the German alphabet in analogy to the rules of pronunciation in German for the representation of the phonological and phonetic features of the spoken language, including dialectal speech. In addition, we use the following notation for prosodic features:
 

*, **	short pause, longer pause
↑, ↓, -	rising, falling and middle intonation
←, →	slower, faster tempo
<, >	louder, softer voice
”	strong accent
:	strong lengthening
=	slurring manner of articulation, linking different words

|..... overlap passages  
# # extension of comments

The English translation tries to keep close to the sequential structure of the German utterance if possible.

9. See Keim, this volume, for the analysis of severe troubles of consistency in perspectivation.
10. See Kallmeyer 1996 and Streeck and Kallmeyer 2000 for other forms of verbal *mise en scène*.
11. The conversationalist discussion of this topic is profoundly influenced by Sacks 1972a and b on categorization and category bound expectancies.
12. The expression “incumbent” which Sacks introduced allows avoidance of expressions such as *member* which does not fit the relation between category and categorized; see Sacks 1972a and b.
13. The German expression “Aktionskünstler” denotes an artist whose work incorporates theatrical performance.
14. This type of focus is sometimes called “*Verum focus*”; see Höhle 1992.

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