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Antonymy relations

Typical and atypical cases from the domain of speech act verbs

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Antonymy is a relation of lexical opposition which is generally considered to involve (i) the presence of a scale along which a particular property may be graded, and hence both (ii) gradability of the corresponding lexical items and (iii) typical entailment relations. Like other types of lexical opposites, antonyms typically differ only minimally: while denoting opposing poles on the relevant dimension of difference, they are similar with respect to other components of meaning. This paper presents examples of antonymy from the domain of speech act verbs which either lack some of these typical attributes or show problems in the application of these. It discusses several different proposals for the classification of these atypical examples.

1. Introduction

This contribution deals with the antonymy relations of speech act verbs. The term **antonymy** will be used to include cases of gradable antonymy as well as those of complementarity. This use of the expression **antonymy** reflects the fact that its German equivalent **Antonymie** is sometimes employed as a cover term subsuming both **konträre** and **kontradiktorische Antonymie**, i.e. gradable antonymy and complementarity respectively (cf. Lang 1995: 32–33). In the English literature on oppositeness of meaning, the term **antonymy** is often used as a synonym of **gradable antonymy** and does not extend to cases of complementarity (cf. Cruse 1986; Hofmann 1993; Lehrer 2002). This paper presents and discusses cases of meaning contrast from the domain of speech act verbs which appear to be instances of gradable antonymy and/or complementarity but do not fit in exactly with the way in which these relations have traditionally been defined (as, for example, by Lyons 1977; Cruse 1986; Lehrer 2002; Löbner 2003). Other types of

oppositeness of meaning such as converseness, reversiveness¹ and duality will not be discussed, because they have been shown to be only marginally relevant to the domain of speech act verbs (cf. Proost 2007a). The discussion of the antonymy relations of speech act verbs will also be restricted to opposites which are stored as such in the lexicon and do not depend on contextual information in order to be interpreted as opposites. Such opposites are variously referred to as “canonical opposites” (cf. Cappelli 2007: 195) or instances of “systemic semantic opposition” (cf. Mettinger 1994: 61–83). Cases of non-systemic semantic opposition, including examples of words which are not stored as opposites in the lexicon but may be construed as such and interpreted accordingly, will not be taken into account.

Since the cases discussed all concern the antonymy relations of speech act verbs, the next section will be concerned with the meanings of these.

2. The meaning of speech act verbs

Speech act verbs are verbs used to refer to linguistic actions. They characteristically lexicalise combinations of speaker attitudes such as the speaker's propositional attitude (i.e. the attitude of the speaker towards the proposition of his or her utterance), the speaker's intention and the speaker's presuppositions concerning the propositional content, the epistemic attitude of the hearer and the interests of the interlocutors (cf. Harras 1994; Harras & Winkler 1994; Harras 1995; Winkler 1996; Proost 2006; Proost 2007b). Examples of speech act verbs include *to claim*, *to inform*, *to request*, *to promise*, *to praise*, *to criticise* and *to thank*.

The antonymy relations of speech act verbs will be represented against the background of the system used to describe the meaning of German speech act verbs in the *Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben*, a textbook on German speech act verbs which consists of two volumes, a dictionary volume and a theoretical volume representing the lexical structures of German speech act verbs by means of lexical fields (cf. Harras et al. 2004; Harras/Proost/Winkler 2007). The description of the meaning of German speech act verbs in this reference work is based on a situation type referred to by all speech act verbs. Following Barwise/Perry, this situation type is called the “General Resource Situation Type” (cf. Barwise/Perry 1983: 32–39). It involves the use of language and is characterised by the presence of four situation roles: a speaker, a hearer, a complex communicative attitude of the speaker and an utterance which – in the prototypical case – contains a proposition (see Figure 1). These four elements are part of any

1. The relation holding between reversives is variously called “reversiveness” (for example in Cruse 1979: 960), “reversity” (ibid: 957) and “reversivity” (as in Cruse 2002: 507).

Figure 1. Elements of the General Resource Situation Type

Figure 2. Specifications of the roles 'Utterance' and 'Attribute of S'

situation referred to by speech act verbs; they constitute the common core of the meaning of these verbs (cf. Verschueren 1980: 51–57; Verschueren 1985: 39–40; Wierzbicka 1987: 17–19; Harras et al. 2004: 9–22).

Two of the four roles of the General Resource Situation Type, the role of the utterance and that of the complex communicative attitude of the speaker, may be further specified as follows: the role of the utterance is specified by the aspect of the propositional content, while that of the complex communicative attitude of the speaker is specified by the aspects of the speaker's propositional attitude, the speaker's intention, and the speaker's presuppositions (see Figure 2).

The aspect of the propositional content may be further specified by the attributes of the event type of P, the temporal reference of P and – in the case that

Figure 3. Specifications of the aspect 'Propositional Content'

P is an action – the agent of P. Each of these may be assigned different values (see Figure 3):

- The attribute of the event type of P may be assigned the values 'Action', 'Event' or 'State' (e.g. *boast*: State/Action; *claim*: Not specified; *request*: Action)
- The attribute of the temporal reference of P may have the values '[+Past]' and '[-Past]' (e.g. *boast*: [+Past], *claim*: Not specified; *request*: [-Past])
- The attribute of the agent of P may be assigned values such as 'Speaker', 'Hearer', 'Third Person', 'Speaker and Hearer', etc. (e.g. *promise*: Speaker; *request*: Hearer; *slander*: Third Person; *agree (to do something)*: Speaker and Hearer)

The aspect of the propositional attitude of the speaker may be specified as being epistemic, evaluative or emotive, or as an attitude of wanting or grading. These may be characterised as follows (see Figure 4):

- epistemic attitude: S takes to be true: P (e.g. *claim*), S takes to be true: not-P (e.g. *deny*), S does not take to be true: P (e.g. *lie*), ...
- attitude of wanting: S wants: P (e.g. *request*), S does not want: not-P (e.g. *allow*, *permit*), S wants: do P (e.g. *promise*)
- attitude of grading: S considers: P x (e.g. *judge*)
- evaluative attitude: S considers: P good/bad (e.g. *praise*, *boast*/criticise)
- emotive attitude: S feels: joy/anger/sorrow because of P (e.g. *congratulate*/scold/lament)

Figure 4. Specifications of the aspect 'Propositional Attitude of S'

The aspect of the speaker's intention may be further specified as being epistemic or evaluative or as an attitude referring to an action (see Figure 5):

- epistemic attitude: S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P (e.g. *claim*), S wants: H know: P (e.g. *inform*)
- referring to an action: S wants: H do: P (e.g. *request*), S wants: not do: H, P (e.g. *forbid*)
- evaluative: S wants: H consider: P rather good (e.g. *whitewash*)

The aspect of the speaker's presuppositions may be specified by the attributes of the expectability of P, the factivity of P, the interests of S and H, and the epistemic attitude of H. Each of these may be assigned the following values (see Figure 6):

- Expectability of P: not expectable: P (e.g. *request*), expectable: P (e.g. *warn*)
- Factivity of P: P is the case (e.g. *praise, criticise, thank*)
- The interests of S and H concerning P: in the interest of S: P (e.g. *request*); in the interest of H: P (e.g. *advise*)
- Epistemic attitude of H: H does not know: P (e.g. *inform*)

Unlike the speaker's propositional attitude and the speaker's intention, which are relevant to the meaning of all speech act verbs, the speaker's presuppositions are relevant to most but not all speech act verbs. They are irrelevant, for example, to

Figure 5. Specifications of the aspect 'Speaker Intention'

Figure 6. Specifications of the aspect 'Presuppositions of S'

the meaning of verbs like *agree* (*that something is the case*), *deny* (*that something is the case*), *ask* (*a question*) and *greet*.

Other aspects which are relevant to some speech act verbs only include:

- The position a given utterance occupies within a sequence of utterances. For example, *deny* is a reactive predicate: it is used to refer to an utterance by which a speaker reacts to an utterance of another speaker. *Insist* (*that something is the case*) is a re-reactive predicate: it indicates a second stage of reaction, a reaction of a speaker to a denial of his or her own initial request.

- The sequencing of multiple utterances. For example, *convince* and *persuade* are used to refer to linguistic actions consisting of multiple utterances making up a sequence.
- Specifications of the role of the hearer. A verb like *spread*, for example, is used to refer to an utterance addressed to several hearers.
- The manner in which something is said. An example is *entreat*, which is used to refer to a speech act performed by a speaker emphatically asking someone to do something.
- The institutional setting of the speech act referred to. For example, *accuse* (in one of its senses) is used to refer to a speech act performed in a judicial context.

The specifications of the propositional content and of the different kinds of speaker attitudes may be combined in many different ways. Different combinations constitute special resource situation types which are referred to by different classes of speech act verbs. For example, the combination below represents a situation referred to by the German verbs *huldigen*, *ehren*, *würdigen* and *honorieren* and by English verbs like *honour*.²

Propositional Content:	Information Content: P
Event Type:	Action
Temporal Reference:	[+Past]
Agent:	Hearer or Third Person
Attitude of S to P:	S considers: P good
Intention of S:	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good
Presuppositions of S:	P is the case

huldigen, ehren, würdigen, honorieren

Huldigen, ehren, würdigen and *honorieren* all lexicalise the concept of a linguistic action whereby a speaker tells a hearer that s/he evaluates a past action performed by that hearer or some third person positively with the intention that the hearer also recognise the speaker's positive evaluation. Insofar as these verbs all lexicalise the same concept, they constitute a lexical field. The representation of the conceptual part of the meaning of linguistic action verbs as combinations of specifications of the propositional content and of the different types of speaker attitude allows antonyms to be searched for systematically: verbs lexicalising opposite specifications would appear to be good candidates for antonyms.

2. *Loben* (praise) does not belong to this group, because it may be used to refer to a positive evaluation of an action or a state of affairs. Hence, it lexicalises the value 'action or state of affairs' for the attribute of the temporal reference of P.

3. Complementarity and gradable antonymy: Traditional definitions

The large majority of the relations of oppositeness of meaning which speech act verbs enter into show some but not all characteristics of gradable antonymy and/or complementarity. Complementarity is traditionally defined as follows (cf. Lyons 1977:271–272; Cruse 1986:198–199; Hofmann 1993:42–43; Lang 1995:32–33; Lehrer 2002:503; Löbner 2003:127):

Complementarity: Definition

Two lexical items L(a) and L(b) lexicalising concepts a and b respectively are in a relation of complementarity if they exhaustively divide a domain into two mutually exclusive parts.

Typical examples of complementaries are *true-false*, *dead-alive*, *open-shut*, *married-unmarried* and *man-woman*.

The fact that complementaries bisect a conceptual domain is reflected by the entailment relations holding between utterances containing them (cf. Lyons 1977:271–272; Cruse 1986:199; Lang 1995:32–33): *x is a* entails and is entailed by *x is not b*, and *x is not a* entails and is entailed by *x is b*. For example, if the door is open, it cannot at the same time be shut, and if it is not open, it must be shut. This means that, when L(a) and L(b) are complementaries, (i) *x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be true (*'The door is open and shut*), and hence it is not possible that a and b are both the case; (ii) *x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be false (*'The door is neither open nor shut*), and hence it is not possible that neither a nor b is the case.

Gradable antonymy has traditionally been defined as follows (cf. Lyons 1977:272; Cruse 1986:204; Hofmann 1993:41; Lehrer 2002:498; Löbner 2003:124):

Gradable antonymy: Definition

Two lexical items L(a) and L(b) are in a relation of gradable antonymy if they denote opposite sections of a scale representing degrees of the relevant variable property.

Pairs like *big-small*, *old-new*, *good-bad* and *hot-cold* are typical examples of gradable antonymy.

Gradable antonyms do not divide a conceptual domain into two mutually exclusive parts: the scale of the relevant property denoted by gradable antonyms contains a neutral midinterval which cannot properly be referred to by either member of an antonym pair. This is reflected by the entailment relations holding between utterances containing gradable antonyms (cf. Lyons 1977:272; Lang 1995:33): *x is a* entails *x is not b*, and *x is b* entails *x is not a* but *x is not a* does not entail *x is b*, and *x is not b* does not entail *x is a*. For example, *x is short* entails that *x is not long*, and *x is long* entails that *x is not short*, but *x is not short* does not

entail that *x is long*, nor does *x is not long* entail that *x is short*. Something which is not long may but need not be short; it may also be average. This means that, when L(a) and L(b) are gradable antonyms, (i) *x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be true (*'The house is big and small'*) and hence it is not possible that a and b are both the case; (ii) *x is a* and *x is b* can both be false (*The house is neither big nor small*) and hence it is possible that neither a nor b is the case.

Summarising what has been said so far, there are two conditions which two lexical items L(a) and L(b) must fulfil to qualify as complementaries or gradable antonyms. The first of these is relevant to complementaries as well as gradable antonyms:

Condition I (complementarity and gradable antonymy):

a and b cannot both be the case. (*x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be true)

Additionally, two lexical items L(a) and L(b) must fulfil Condition IIa to qualify as complementaries and Condition IIb to be classifiable as gradable antonyms:

Condition IIa (complementarity):

It is not possible that neither a nor b is the case. (*x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be false.)

Condition IIb (gradable antonymy):

It is possible that neither a nor b is the case. (*x is a* and *x is b* can both be false.)

The following section presents verb pairs from the domain of speech act verbs which fulfil conditions (I) and (II) in an untypical way. The cases discussed are selected from the inventory of antonym pairs in the *Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben* (cf. Proost 2007a), which lists 18 antonymous groups of German speech act verbs. Each group corresponds to a lexical field constituted by verbs lexicalising the same concept, as demonstrated for the field {*huldigen*, *ehren*, *würdigen*, *honorieren*} ({*honour*}). For each of these groups, there is also a corresponding group containing verbs lexicalising one or more features involving opposite values. For example, verbs like *tadeln*, *kritisieren* and *verurteilen* (*criticise*, *fault* and *condemn*) lexicalise features such as 'S considers: P bad' and 'S wants: H recognise: S considers: P bad', which are opposites of the features 'S considers: P good' and 'S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good' lexicalised by verbs like *huldigen*, *würdigen*, *ehren* and *honorieren*. Hence, {*huldigen*, *würdigen*, *ehren*, *honorieren*} and {*tadeln*, *kritisieren*, *bemängeln*, ...} are antonymous groups: any verb of one group is an antonym of any verb belonging to the other. None of the 18 antonymous groups appeared to fulfil the conditions on gradable antonymy and complementarity (I)–(II) in a straightforward fashion.

The examples discussed in the next section are representative of the different kinds of problem which apparently antonymous speech act verbs pose for the traditional definitions of gradable antonymy and complementarity.

4. Antonymy relations of speech act verbs

4.1 Some apparently typical examples

Example 1: Pairs of verbs like *zustimmen*-*abstreiten* (*agree (on the truth of something)*-*deny*)

The first example of antonymous speech act verbs are pairs of verbs like *zustimmen* and *abstreiten* (*agree* and *deny*). Verbs like *zustimmen* (*agree*) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that s/he takes something (an action, event or state of affairs) to be true and intends that the hearer recognises this, the speaker's utterance being a reaction to a previous utterance of H stating the truth of something (P). The situation type referred to by verbs like *zustimmen* may be represented as in Table 1 below. Other verbs which may also be used to refer to this kind of situation are *beipflichten* and *bestätigen* (*assent* and *confirm*).

Verbs like *abstreiten* (*deny*) differ from those like *zustimmen* (*agree*) in that they are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that s/he takes something (an action, event or state of affairs) not to be true and intends the hearer to recognise this; S's utterance is a reaction to a previous statement from H that P is true. The situation referred to by verbs like *abstreiten* may be represented

Table 1. Resource situation type referred to by *zustimmen* vs. *abstreiten* (*agree (that something is the case)* vs. *deny*)

Characterisation of resource situation type	Verbs	
	<i>zustimmen, beipflichten, bestätigen, bejahen (agree, assert, confirm)</i>	<i>abstreiten, bestreiten, verneinen, leugnen (deny, negate, disagree)</i>
Propositional Content	Information Content: P	Information Content: P
Event Type (P)	Not specified	Not specified
Temporal Reference (P)	Not specified	Not specified
Agent (P)	Not specified	Not specified
Attitude of S to P	S takes to be true: P	S takes to be true: not P
Speaker Intention	S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P	S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: not P
Utterance	Reactive	Reactive

as in Table 1. The same type of situation may also be referred to by *bestreiten*, *verneinen* and *leugnen* and by the English verbs *negate* and *disagree*.

Since verbs like *abstreiten* differ from those like *zustimmen* only in that the propositional content embedded in the propositional attitude and in the speaker's intention is negated, they may be regarded as antonymous groups: any verb of one group is an antonym of any verb belonging to the other.

Pairs like *zustimmen-abstreiten* seem to be relatively straightforward cases of antonymy: since *X agrees on Y* and *X denies Y* cannot both be true, the general condition on antonymy (Condition I) is fulfilled. However, the question of exactly what type of antonymy is exemplified by pairs like *zustimmen-abstreiten* cannot easily be answered. On the one hand, *agree* (*that something is the case*) and *deny* appear to be complementaries, because their meanings incorporate those of the adjectives *true* and *false* respectively, which are clear cases of complementaries. On the other hand, the fact that it is possible for a speaker to neither agree on something nor to deny it indicates that pairs like *agree-deny* fulfil Condition IIb on gradable antonymy. However, it is only possible for a speaker neither to agree on Y nor to deny Y, if s/he either does not say anything or performs a completely different speech act. This means that pairs like *zustimmen-abstreiten* on the one hand and typical examples of gradable antonyms like *long-short* on the other fulfil Condition IIb on gradable antonymy in different ways. If something is neither long nor short, it is still being estimated as being of a certain length. If, by contrast, a speaker neither agrees on Y nor denies Y, we are no longer dealing with the dimension of assertion, i.e. the dimension of expressing that something is true or not true. No such change of dimension is involved in the antonymy of *long* and *short*, *good* and *bad*, *big* and *small* etc.

The change of dimension evoked when someone neither agrees on something nor denies it is likely to be due to the fact that antonyms like *agree* and *deny* are not gradable. Though intensifications or attenuations of epistemic attitudes may be expressed in actual language use (for example by utterances such as *X is more/less true than Y*),³ there are no speech act verbs which lexicalise the grading of epistemic attitudes, at least not in German. What may be graded is not the epistemic attitude itself but the propositional content it embeds, i.e. P or not-P. Speech act verbs which lexicalise the epistemic attitude 'S takes to be true: rather P' are lacking in German, but the epistemic attitude 'S takes to be true: rather

3. Cruse, for example, points out that "... while definitions of sense relations in terms of logical properties such as entailment are convenient, they are also partially misleading as a picture of the way natural language functions. This is because complementarity (for instance) is to some extent a matter of degree" (Cruse 1986: 200).

not-P' is lexicalised by *anzweifeln* and *bezweifeln* (both *doubt*) and by *einräumen* and *einlenken* (*concede* and *admit*).

Example 2: Pairs of verbs like *huldigen-tadeln* (*honour-criticise*)

As pointed out before, verbs like *huldigen* (*honour*) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that s/he evaluates a past action of that hearer or some third person positively, the speaker's intention being that the hearer recognise this. Verbs like *tadeln* (*criticise*) appear to be antonyms of verbs like *huldigen* in that they differ from these only with respect to the type of evaluation they lexicalise: while *huldigen* expresses a positive evaluation of S to P, *tadeln* expresses a negative one. Other verbs expressing the same combination of speaker attitudes as *tadeln* are *rügen*, *rüffeln*, *kritisieren*, *beanstanden*, *bemängeln*, *monieren*, *missbilligen*, *verurteilen*, *anprangern* und *schelten*. In addition to *criticise*, the corresponding class of English verbs includes *fault*, *deplore*, *condemn* and *denounce*. The opposite evaluations expressed by verbs like *huldigen* on the one hand and verbs like *tadeln* on the other are embedded in the propositional attitude and the speaker's intention that they lexicalise (Table 2).

Though the opposition of *huldigen* and *tadeln* reflects the more basic opposition of *good* and *bad*, which are gradable antonyms, it is not at all clear whether the gradability of *good* and *bad* is in fact inherited by *honour* and *criticise*. If we say that a speaker honours someone more than someone else, what is being graded is the content of the propositional attitude ('P good') or the intensity with which the speaker expresses his/her positive evaluation rather than the propositional attitude itself ('S considers: P good').

Table 2. Resource situation type referred to by *huldigen* vs. *tadeln* (*honour* vs. *criticise*)

Characterisation of resource situation type	Verbs	
	<i>würdigen, honorieren, huldigen, ehren</i> (<i>honour</i>)	<i>tadeln, rügen, rüffeln, kritisieren, beanstanden, bemängeln, monieren, missbilligen, verurteilen, anprangern, schelten</i> (<i>criticise, fault, deplore, condemn, denounce</i>)
Propositional Content	Information Content: P	Information Content: P
Event Type (P)	Action	Action
Temporal Reference (P)	[+Past]	[+Past]
Agent (P)	H or 3rd Person	H or 3rd Person
Attitude of S to P	S considers: P good	S considers: P bad
Speaker Intention	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P bad
Presuppositions of S	P is the case	P is the case

According to Condition I, *huldigen* and *tadeln* (as well as *honour* and *criticise*) are antonyms, because *X honours Y* and *X criticises Y* cannot both be true. However, here again, it is not easy to decide whether *huldigen* and *criticise* are complementaries or gradable antonyms. To the extent that the meanings of these verbs incorporate the opposition of *good* and *bad*, which are clear-cut examples of gradable antonyms, they appear to be instances of gradable antonymy rather than complementarity. Pairs like *honour-criticise* do fulfil Condition IIb on gradable antonymy: *X honours Y* and *X criticises Y* can both be false. However, these utterances can both be false only when X either does not do anything or performs a completely different speech act. Cases like these no longer relate to the dimension of the linguistic expression of evaluations. Typical examples of gradable antonyms like *good-bad* do not involve any such changes of dimension: if something is considered neither good nor bad, it may still be evaluated as being average, which means that it may still be considered relative to the dimension of evaluation.

On the whole, we may conclude that pairs like *agree-deny* and those like *honour-criticise* show some properties of gradable antonyms and/or complementaries but do not fit in exactly with the way in which either one of the corresponding relations has traditionally been defined.

4.2 A less typical example

Example: Pairs of verbs like *huldigen-vorwerfen* (*honour-reproach*)

We have been concerned so far with antonym pairs whose members differ only with respect to the propositional attitude and the speaker's intention they lexicalise. These components both involve negation (e.g. *agree-deny*: 'S takes to be true: P' vs. 'S takes to be true: not-P'; *honour-criticise*: 'P good' vs. 'P bad' – good is 'not bad' and vice versa). Verbs differing only in those components of their meaning which involve negation may be said to differ only minimally. There are a relatively large number of speech act verbs which differ not only in meaning components involving negation but also with respect to other features. Examples are pairs consisting of a verb like *huldigen* (*honour*) and a verb like *vorwerfen* (*reproach*). Verbs like *reproach* are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that s/he disapproves of a past action performed by that hearer. Other verbs which may be used to refer to the same type of situation are *vorhalten* and *zurechtweisen*. Apart from *reproach*, the corresponding English field also contains the verbs *rebuke*, *reprove*, *reprimand* and *admonish*. The resource situation type referred to by verbs like *vorwerfen* may be represented as in Table 3:

Table 3. Resource situation type referred to by *huldigen* vs. *vorwerfen* (*honour* vs. *reproach*)

Characterisation of resource situation type	Verbs	
	<i>würdigen, honorieren, huldigen, ehren</i> (<i>honour</i>)	<i>vorwerfen, vorhalten, zurechtweisen</i> (<i>reproach, rebuke, reprove, reprimand, admonish</i>)
Propositional Content	Information Content: P	Information Content: P
Event Type (P)	Action	Action
Temporal Reference (P)	[+Past]	[+Past]
Agent (P)	H or 3rd Person	H
Attitude of S to P	S considers: P good	S considers: P bad
Speaker Intention	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P bad
Presuppositions of S	P is the case	P is the case

As may be seen in Table 3, verbs like *vorwerfen* differ from those like *huldigen* not only in the propositional attitude and in the speaker attitude they lexicalise (the features involving negation), but also with respect to the Agent of P. While *huldigen* is used to refer to speech acts whereby a speaker expresses a positive evaluation of an action by either the hearer or some third person, *vorwerfen* is used to refer to speech acts whereby a speaker expresses a negative evaluation of an action performed by that hearer only. Since *huldigen* and *vorwerfen* differ not only in such features of their meaning which involve negation but also in an additional one, they do not differ only minimally. Typical complementaries or gradable antonyms differ only minimally, i.e. with respect to only one aspect of their meaning. Since the speaker intention expressed by speech act verbs always varies along with the propositional attitude they express, antonymous speech act verbs should be regarded as differing only minimally if they differ only with respect to these two components. Since pairs like *huldigen-vorwerfen* differ with respect to more than just these features, they are not typical examples of antonymy. It is in fact questionable whether pairs like these should at all be regarded as antonyms. Once we accept that antonyms differ more than only minimally, it is not clear how tolerant we should be. Any decision on how many components are allowed to be different would be completely arbitrary. Cases of verb pairs like *huldigen-vorwerfen* (*honour-reproach*) will be referred to as “antonyms in the broad sense of the term” to set them apart from verb pairs like *huldigen-tadeln* (*honour-criticise*), which are “antonyms in the narrow sense”.

Table 4. Resource situation type referred to by *jubeln* vs. *poltern* (*rejoice* vs. *thunder*)

Characterisation of resource situation type	Verbs	
	<i>jubeln, jubilieren, frohlocken, jauchzen, zujubeln</i> (<i>rejoice, exult, cheer</i>)	<i>poltern</i> (<i>thunder, storm, bluster</i>)
Propositional Content	Information Content: P	Information Content: P
Event Type (P)	Not specified	Not specified
Temporal Reference (P)	[+Past]	[+Past]
Agent (P)	Not specified	Not specified
Attitude of S to P	S feels: joy because of P	S feels: anger because of P
Speaker Intention	S wants: H recognise: S feels: joy because of P	S wants: H recognise: S feels: anger because of P
Presuppositions of S	P is the case	P is the case
Manner of speaking	Emphatically	Emphatically

4.3 A special case

Example: Pairs of verbs such as *jubeln-poltern*

Verbs like *jubeln* (*rejoice*) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that s/he feels joy because of something (P) and intends the hearer to recognise this. The resource situation type referred to by verbs like *jubeln* may be represented as in Table 4. Other verbs which may be used to refer to this type of situation are *jubilieren*, *frohlocken* and *jauchzen*. The corresponding English field includes the verbs *rejoice*, *exult* and *cheer*.

If emotions like joy and anger may be regarded as opposites, a verb like *poltern* (*thunder, storm, bluster*) may be considered an antonym of verbs like *rejoice* when used in its sense as a speech act verb. *Poltern* and verbs like *rejoice* differ only with respect to the propositional attitude and the speaker's intention that they lexicalise: while *rejoice* lexicalises the propositional attitude 'S feels: joy because of P' and the corresponding intention that the hearer recognise this, *poltern* expresses the propositional attitude 'S feels: anger because of P' and the corresponding intention that the hearer recognise this (Table 4).

Since *poltern* and verbs like *jubeln* differ only with respect to the propositional attitude and the speaker's intention that they express (the features involving negation), they differ only minimally. For this reason, they may be considered antonyms in the narrow sense.

Since *X rejoices* and *X thunders* cannot both be true, pairs like *rejoice-thunder* (*jubeln-poltern*) fulfil the first Condition on Antonymy. Though these pairs are clearly antonyms, it is more difficult to decide exactly what type of antonymy they

instantiate. To the extent that *X rejoices* and *X thunders* can both be false, pairs like *rejoice-thunder* appear to be gradable antonyms. However, *X rejoices* and *X thunders* can both be false only when the speaker either does not do anything or performs a completely different speech act. Cases like those no longer concern the dimension of the expression of joy or anger. Typical cases of gradable antonymy such as *good-bad*, *long-short* and *big-small* do not involve any such change of dimension. This means that pairs like *rejoice-thunder* on the one hand and those like *long-short* on the other fulfil Condition IIb on gradable antonymy in different ways.

Postulating a relation of gradable antonymy between *poltern* and verbs like *jubeln* is also problematic, because these verbs do not denote different sections of a single scale but rather refer to a particular section of two different scales (the joy-scale and the anger-scale respectively).

4.4 Word-internal oppositeness of meaning

Example: Evaluations expressed by *boast*

A last example of an antonymy relation from the domain of speech act verbs concerns verbs like *angeben* (*boast*). *Boast* is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses the fact that s/he evaluates one of his/her own past actions or one of his/her own qualities (or those of someone associated with him/her) positively with the intention that the hearer not only recognise this but also adopts the speaker's positive evaluation. The resource situation type referred to by *boast* may be represented as follows:

Propositional Content:	Information Content: P
Event Type (P):	Action/State
Temporal Reference (P):	[+Past]
Agent (P):	Speaker
Attitude of S to P:	S considers: P good
Speaker Intention:	S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good S wants: H consider: P good
Presuppositions of S:	P is the case

Verbs like *boast* not only express a positive evaluation by the speaker of the resource situation but also an additional evaluation by another speaker reporting on the act of self-praise of the first one. Following Barwise/Perry, the reporting situation is referred to as the “discourse situation” (cf. Barwise/Perry 1983: 32–39). Both types of situation have the same inventory of situational roles: a speaker (S), a hearer (H) and an utterance with a propositional content (P) (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. The inventory of situational roles of the resource and the discourse situation (S_{RS} : Resource Situation Speaker, P_{RS} : Proposition of the utterance made by S_{RS} , H_{RS} : Resource Situation Hearer, S_{DS} : Discourse Situation Speaker, P_{DS} : Proposition of the utterance made by S_{DS} , H_{DS} : Resource Situation Hearer) (from Harras et al. 2004: 10)

By using a descriptive verb like *boast*, the discourse situation speaker indicates that s/he considers the positive evaluation expressed by the resource situation speaker to be exaggerated. The evaluation of the resource situation speaker's act of self-praise as being exaggerated is a negative evaluation. This means that *boast* lexicalises two opposite evaluations: a positive one by the speaker of the resource situation (the reported situation) and a negative one by the speaker of the discourse situation (the reporting situation). The presence of two opposite evaluations in the meaning of a single word represents a special case of oppositeness of meaning also exemplified by synonyms of *boast* such as *prahlen*, *protzen*, *aufschneiden*, *sich brüsten* and *sich aufspielen* (*boast* and *brag*), by verbs like *verklären* (*glorify*) and by such like *beschönigen*, *schönreden* and *schönfärben* (*whitewash*). The type of oppositeness of meaning exemplified by these verbs differs from gradable antonymy and complementarity in that it is not a relation holding between separate lexical items. It is also different from the kind of word-internal oppositeness of meaning which Lutzeier has called "Gegensinn" (cf. Lutzeier 2007: xvii). While the latter concerns cases of meaning contrast between the different senses of polysemous words, the type of oppositeness of meaning instantiated by verbs like *boast* relates to only one of the senses of these words.

5. Conclusion

The discussion of the examples presented has shown that, for the lexical domain of German speech act verbs, antonymous speech act verbs typically differ with respect to at least two components of their meaning: the speaker's propositional attitude and the speaker's intention. Speech act verbs differing only with respect to these two components are antonyms in the narrow sense of the word. Speech act verbs differing in more than these two features are antonyms in a broader sense. Most of the antonymy relations of speech act verbs are in fact of this rather loose kind. Of the antonymous groups belonging to the domain of speech act verbs, only three represent cases of antonymy in the narrow sense. These cases have been discussed in this paper: verbs like *zustimmen* (*agree*) vs. those such as *abstreiten* (*deny*), verbs like *huldigen* (*honour*) vs. those such as *tadeln* (*criticise*), and verbs like *jubeln* (*rejoice*) vs. those such as *poltern* (*thunder*).

Being cases of antonymy in the narrow sense, these types of pairs of speech act verbs are candidates for gradable antonymy or complementarity. All three of them fulfil Condition I, the general condition on antonymy ("*x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be true"). None of them fulfils Condition IIa ("*x is a* and *x is b* cannot both be false") and hence none of the pairs of antonymous speech act verbs discussed seems to be a candidate for complementarity. To the extent that all instances of the three types discussed do fulfil Condition IIb ("*x is a* and *x is b* can both be false"), they are all candidates for gradable antonymy. They do not turn out, however, to be typical examples of gradable antonymy, for the following reasons:

- i. They are not obviously gradable, because it is not clear with respect to exactly what component of their meaning they are gradable and hence they do not fulfil Condition IIb on gradable antonymy in the way typical examples of gradable antonymy do. (This is true of pairs of verbs like *zustimmen-abstreiten*, *huldigen-tadeln* and *huldigen-poltern*.)
- ii. Some of them do not relate to a single scale. (This is true of pairs of verbs like *jubeln-poltern*.)

For these reasons, it may be desirable if the twofold distinction which is traditionally drawn between complementarity and gradable antonymy were replaced by the distinction between complementarity and contrariety. The latter has been defined as a relation of meaning contrast between two lexical items fulfilling Condition IIb (cf. Lang 1995). Contrariety could then be taken to subsume not only cases of gradable antonymy but also those of antonymy relations between lexical items whose gradability is questionable.

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