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GERMAN EU STUDIES *ODER* EU STUDIES IN GERMANY?

Post-World War II (West) Germany's history has been as interwoven with the process of European integration as (West) German political science with EU Studies. While binding West Germany by supranational institutions was a major rationale for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), West Germany employed European integration as a means to regain its sovereignty. Likewise, some of the fathers of European integration theories were German social scientists who had emigrated to the U.S. and whose experience of Germany's role in two World Wars profoundly shaped their views of regional integration as a means to move beyond the nation state. Karl Deutsch's and Ernst Haas' thinking about regional integration did not only lay the foundations for (neo)functionalist approaches. It also inspired the political program of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet to foster the transfer of national sovereignty rights by functional cooperation in areas of «low politics».

Konrad Adenauer, Walter Hallstein and other West German statesmen played a crucial role in driving European integration forward. The theorizing of the process, however, was mostly done on the other side of the Atlantic. Although the European Communities never really fit the classical image of an international organization, American International Relations (IR) scholars treated it as an instance of international cooperation. Consequently, the European Community (EC) became subject of the various theoretical fights between the different schools of International Relations. When European integration seemed to fall into Eurosclerosis in the 1970s, Ernst Haas declared his neofunctionalism and regional integration theories as such as obsolete [Haas 1975]. He left the field to realist thinkers

like Stanley Hoffmann, on the one hand, who insisted on the resilience of national interests and state sovereignty [Hoffmann 1966] and neoliberal institutionalists, on the other, who focused on the role of European institutions helping the member states to realize absolute gains [Keohane and Hoffman 1991]. Neofunctionalist theory had a major comeback when IR scholars tried to come to terms with the Single European Act (SEA) [Sandholtz and Zysman 1989]. At the same time, Andrew Moravcsik developed his liberal intergovernmentalism as an alternative explanation for why the member states decided to propel European integration forward, while historical institutionalists emphasized the importance of path dependency [Pierson 1996]. Finally, law and politics approaches shed light on the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as the engine of European integration [Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Brunnell 1998; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998].

It was only with the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent eastern Enlargement that German scholars made noticeable contributions to the theoretical debate on why states yielded their sovereignty to supranational institutions, such as the EU. Thomas Risse, Frank Schimmelfennig Markus Jachtenfuchs, Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener pioneered the "constructivist turn" in EU studies introducing norms and identity as key explanatory variables [Diez 1999; Risse at al. 1999; Schimmelfennig 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2002; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001]. Less noted but equally important is the endeavor of Hans-Jürgen Bieling and others to apply critical (Marxist) approaches to European integration [Bieling and Steinhilber 2000].

However, German scholars left their deepest and most discernible mark on two other bodies of the EU studies literature. The first relates to the debate about «the nature of the beast» [Risse-Kappen 1996], i.e. the question of how do describe and explain the outcomes of European integration. The second concerns the more recent research on Europeanization and domestic change, within the EU

countries as well as in would-be and want-to-be-member states.

This chapter focuses on the contributions of German scholars to two of the three main research questions that have defined EU studies. Leaving aside the debate on the drivers of European integration, i.e. European integration theory, we will discuss the «governance turn» Fritz Scharpf, Beate Kohler-Koch, Arthur Benz, Ingeborg Tömmel and others promoted in studying EU institutions as well as the more policy-oriented approaches by Adrienne Héritier and again Fritz Scharpf and their students. We will then address the ever-growing literature on Europeanization on how EU policies, institutions and political processes have been affecting the domestic structures of member states, membership candidates, as well as neighborhood and third countries. In this context, German scholars also contributed to EU studies in what could be coined in methodological rather than substantial terms. Whereas Thomas König, Gerald Schneider, and others promoted the application of quantitative approaches, scientists like Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Markus Haverland dealt with general questions on research designs like case selection and causal inference. Finally, we will also discuss German contributions to diffusion research. The European Union as a most likely case for the diffusion of policies has attracted considerable attention by scholars dealing with the question of when and how policies spread across time and space. So it comes as no surprise that EU studies as well as diffusion research mutually benefitted from each other. In this regard, German scientists like Katharina Holzinger, Christoph Knill, Tanja Börzel, Thomas Plümper, Thomas Risse and others played a prominent role, too.

There is no way that one chapter can do justice to all the existing works by German scholars. We have to be selective. Hence, we will focus on German research that we consider to have left a major impact on EU studies reflecting a genuine German approach. While there is no German debate on the EU proper, neither in German nor among German scholars, there are studies inspired by a particular

way of «German» thinking, e.g. about governance or multi-level policy-making, which have informed and enriched the debates on how to describe and explain the EU and its domestic impact.

1. *The quest for the beast: EU and EU policy-making*

Theorizing the outcomes of European integration has been a constant challenge for EU scholars. Already in 1972, Donald Puchala complained that «more than fifteen years of defining, redefining, refining, modeling and theorizing have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of (...) "international integration" » [Puchala 1972, 267] About fifteen years later, students of the EU had still not come to terms with the «nature of the beast» [Risse-Kappen 1996] Most scholars agreed that the EU presented a unique system of multilevel governance that could not be compared to any other form of political order we were familiar with at the national or international level [Wallace 1983; Caporaso 1996]. Other than that, political scientists – many Germans among them – have shown a remarkable creativity in developing new concepts to capture the *sui generis* nature of the EU, describing it as a *funktionaler Zweckverband* [Ipsen 1972]; «a new, post-Hobbsian order» [Schmitter 1991]; «a post-modern state» [Ruggie 1993; Caporaso 1996], *post-nationale politische Herrschaft* [Neyer 2004], «deliberative supranationalism» [Joerges 2000; 2001] or «network governance» [Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999; Schout and Jordan 2005].

Each of these concepts highlights a distinctive feature of the beast, but none seems to capture the «whole elephant». The European Union has developed far beyond an international regime or organization. It constitutes a political system, a structure of governance [Schmitter 1992; Caporaso 1996; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1995], which may be less than a state but which is definitely more than an arena for intergovernmental cooperation.

IR theories and their European integration off-springs

have great difficulties coming to terms with a system of multilevel governance, where sovereignty rights are shared and divided between supranational, national, and subnational institutions. The constitutional language of federalism, by contrast, appears to be more helpful analyzing and discussing the ways in which the division of power is organized among the different levels of government in the EU.

2. *Introducing German federalism: The joint-decision trap and asymmetric integration*

It was Fritz Scharpf, Germany's most eminent student of (comparative) federalism, who introduced the federal perspective to EU studies in the 1980s. Unlike proponents of federalism as a European integration theory, who often advocate the transformation of the EU into a federal state [Spinelli and Rossi 2006], Scharpf took federalism as a principle of organizing political authority and power – which is not necessarily wedded to statehood. By conceptualizing the EU as a system of «vertical joint-decision making» [Scharpf 1985; Scharpf 1988], Scharpf highlighted the similarities with German cooperative federalism, which still hold more than 25 years later [Börzel 2005c]. Both the EU and the Federal Republic of Germany present forms of cooperative federalism in which competencies are shared – rather than divided – between the two levels of government.

Like the German federal government, the EU does not have an autonomous sphere of competencies in the sense of holding both legislative and executive responsibilities in selected policy sectors. Moreover, even in the areas of its «exclusive competencies», the EU cannot legislate without the consent of the member states (as represented in the Council of the EU). While the vast majority of legislative competencies in the EU are currently at least *de facto* shared or concurrent, responsibilities for policy execution mostly rest with the member states. The EU has an administrative machinery that is too small in size to implement and

enforce EU policies. This functional division of competencies and the sharing of legislative powers grant member state governments a strong role in European institutions. Accordingly, the Council of the European Union (formerly, the Council of Ministers) resembles a *Bundesrat*-type second chamber of the European legislature: in the Council of the EU, member states are represented by their executives, and their voting power is weighed according to population size.

Conceptualizing the EU as system of cooperative federalism yields important lessons with regard to the distribution of competencies as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU policy-making. The interlocking of policy competencies and the unanimity requirement among the member states for any reallocation renders a disentanglement or re-nationalization next to impossible. Like in Germany, the «joint decision-trap», in which the EU has been increasingly caught, causes significant problems for both output and input legitimacy [Scharpf 1992; 1999; 2006].

The interlocking policy competencies, the functional division of labor, and a *Bundesrat*-type second chamber all work in favor of a certain asymmetry in political representation, where territorial interests dominate over functional interests. The dominance of territorially defined executive interests represented in the Council is even more pronounced than in the German cooperative federalism, where some countervailing remedies usually exist. The *Länder* enjoy strong representation in central level decision-making through the *Bundesrat*, the second chamber of the federal legislation. But the federation represented by the directly elected *Bundestag* (first chamber) and the federal government is a powerful counterweight to this, based not least on the political identity and legitimacy the federation generates, on its dominance in the legislature, and its spending power. By comparison, neither the European Commission nor the European Parliament is able to counterbalance the dominance of the Council. Moreover, political interest representation in Germany is based on a well-established system of vertical party integration in both

chambers of the federal legislature. Finally, neo-corporatist forms of interest intermediation grant German economic interests privileged access to the policy process. The EU, by comparison, still lacks an effective system of vertical party integration. There is no central arena of party competition – neither within the legislature nor within the executive. Nor do European top industrial associations and trade union federations, such as UNICE or ETUC, effectively aggregate and represent the interests of European employers and employees in the European policy process.

The executive dominance in the Council results in intense inter-administrative coordination and deliberation among national bureaucrats. Such inter-administrative networks are highly exclusive and tend to blur political responsibilities. These problems of input legitimacy are largely justified by the achievement of efficient policy outcomes [Scharpf 1999].

The efficiency of European policy-making has been indeed quite extensive in some policy areas, given the increasing diversity of interests among the member states. Yet, the problem-solving capacity of the EU is increasingly at stake since it does not have the power to perform important federal policy tasks such as macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution. At the same time, the EU increasingly inhibits member states from maintaining such functions [Scharpf 1996]: the single market and the Euro largely deprive member states of the capacity for national macroeconomic stabilization, whereas the EU as a whole does not possess these instruments (yet). What Sharpf aptly called the asymmetry between negative (market making) and positive (market correcting) integration results in considerable legitimacy problems of the EU, also on the input side, since the democratic deficit of EU institutions can no longer be compensated on the output side but, on the contrary, tends to be exacerbated by the decreasing problem-solving capacity of the EU Scharpf 2010].

Fritz Scharpf has not been the only one who applied federalism to study the EU [Sbragia 1993; Burgess 2000; Egeberg 2001; Nicolaidis and Howse 2011; Koslowski

2001]. However, his concepts of the joint decision-trap and the asymmetry between negative and positive integration, which he derived from his studies on German federalism [Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel 1976; Mayntz and Scharpf 1975], provide an original approach that has inspired many (German) studies of the EU polity and EU policy-making [Benz 1998; 2000; Börzel 2005; see the contributions to the «Journal of European Public Policy» Vol. 4, n. 4, 1997].

In a similar vein, (German) scholars delivered additional insights on EU decision-making processes by advancing econometrical techniques like statistics and formal modeling [Schneider and Lars-Erik 1994; Schneider 1995; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005; Schulz and König 2000; König 2007; 2009; Junge and König 2007; König, Luetgert and Dannwolf 2006]. Rather than focusing on the macro-institutional configurations, these studies helped to develop an understanding of the decision-making processes within the institutions of the EU. They do not only refer to the importance of institutional contexts at EU level, but highlighted the impact of member states' preferences and domestic constraints when it comes to determining the outcome of the legislative processes at the EU level. Furthermore, recent work pinpoints to the complexity of European decision-making due to logrolling [König and Junge 2009].

Although the application of methodological tools and techniques usually cuts across issues in political science, these scholars – among others – made a significant contribution to the methodological development of the field, especially as quantitative approaches to EU studies remain the exception than the rule [Nyikos and Pollack 2003; Haverland 2007]. The application of sophisticated analytical techniques to the study of the European Union allowed the spatial, temporal and issue-specific evaluation of competing approaches on EU policy-making.

3. *The Governance turn: Networks and their embeddedness*

In the 1990s, students of the EU discovered network

governance. The concept seemed to capture best the nature of the EU as «a unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors» [Hix 1998, 39]. Networks had been used before by several scholars to analyze EU policy-making, particularly in the field of structural policy [Marks 1992; Tömmel 1994; Rhodes, Bache and George 1996; Hooghe 1996; Heinelt 1996; Ansell 2000; Schout and Jordan 2005]. But Beate Kohler-Koch was one of the first to call the EU network governance [Kohler-Koch 1994; 1999]. She drew on the governance literature that emerged in the 1970s, when German social scientists working with Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf at the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne identified network governance as constitutive for governing modern societies [Mayntz and Scharpf 1995]. Inspired by Luhman's system theory, they argued that territorial and functional differentiation had resulted in a dispersion of resources and competencies necessary to make effective policies among a multitude of public and private actors [Kenis and Schneider 1991; Mayntz 1993]: «Instead of emanating from a central authority, be this government or the legislature, policy today is in fact made in a process involving a plurality of both public and private organizations» [Mayntz 1993, 5].

Network governance became not only the paradigm of the «negotiating state» in Germany [Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Benz 1994; Voigt 1995; Mayntz 1993] it also initiated the «governance turn» in EU studies [Kohler-Koch and Jachtenfuchs 1996; Jachtenfuchs 1997a; 1997b; Kohler-Koch and Rittberg 2006; Kohler-Koch and Larat 2009]. While early works on EU governance focused on the nature of the beast as a whole [Tömmel 2003], the more recent literature on what is often referred to as «new modes of governance» [Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Héritier and Rhodes forthcoming] explores to what extent the EU has made use of networks to govern its affairs. The governance turn in EU studies is also reflected by the call of the *White*

Paper on Governance[1] published by the European Commission in 2001 for more «modern forms of governance» based on networks as the most appropriate way of dealing with the challenges the EU is facing in the 21st century [Joerges, Mény and Weiler 2001].

Yet, a systematic analysis of EU policy-making reveals that the EU features far less network governance than the literature would make us believe. EU policies are largely formulated and implemented in multiple overlapping negotiation systems that can be described as multilevel policy networks. However, network relations that span across sectors and levels of government are a not a *sui generis* character of the EU but constitute a core feature of the modern state [Scharpf 1991; Benz 2001]. More importantly, like its member states, the EU can rely on a strong shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational institutions in adopting and implementing its policies [Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Héritier and Rhodes forthcoming; Scharpf 1997]. The key difference between the EU and the modern state lies in the *subordinate* role of private and public interest groups in the EU negotiation systems, which are largely dominated by governmental actors. While forms of private self-regulation or public-private co-regulation abound in the member states, we hardly find such forms of network governance at the EU-level [Börzel 2005a; 2007]. This does not imply that informal relationships between public and private actors should be discarded as irrelevant to EU policy-making [Christiansen and Piattoni 2003; Kaiser 2009]. However, these forms of informal politics are better described as governance *in* networks than governance *by* networks or network governance.

Rather than presenting a particular form of governance, the EU features various combinations that cover the entire range between market and hierarchy. Again, the German governance literature provides a conceptual tool

[1] The *White Paper on Governance* can be found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf (accessed February 18, 2009).

box to capture these governance arrangements [Benz 2004] or governance mixes [Börzel 2010a]. Fritz Scharpf has not only developed a governance typology [Scharpf 1997; 1999; 2001; 2003]. He also points to the embeddedness of governance forms by making one subordinate to the other. Inter- and transgovernmental networks often govern in the shadow of supranational hierarchy or the political competition induced by the logic of the single market [Börzel 2010a]. German scholars have done extensive mappings of the governance structures in the EU exploring their effectiveness and legitimacy, which may vary significantly across policy areas [Scharpf 2001; Héritier 1999; Grande and Jachtenfuchs 2000; Knill and Lenschow 2005; Kohler-Koch, Conzelmann and Knodt 2004; Tömmel 2008].

4. *Policy matters!: Regulatory competition and implementation*

Much of the German governance literature originated in detailed policy studies at the domestic and the EU level. With European integration taking up speed in the late 1980s, students of comparative politics and public policy could no longer ignore the importance of Brussels. Being used to multilevel policy-making in cooperative federalism, German political scientists had no difficulties accommodating the EU in their research. Adrienne Héritier and her collaborators were among the first to explore how the EU, the central state and the regional level interacted in three different member states. Using environmental policy as a case study, they demonstrated how German, French and British policy-makers sought to upload domestic policies to the EU level and shape EU policies accordingly [Héritier et al. 1994; Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996]. By systematically linking the ascending (formulation and decision-making) and descending (implementation) states of the EU policy circle, Héritier convincingly argued that member states have a strong incentive to shape EU policies, because it reduces the need for legal and administrative adaptation in taking or «downloading» EU policies. The more a Euro-

pean policy fits the domestic context, the lower the costs of adaptation in the implementation process. Second, shaping EU policies prevents competitive disadvantages for domestic industry. While high-regulating member states seek to impose their strict standards on low-regulating countries, the latter oppose any attempts of European harmonization that may increase their production costs [Héritier 1994]. This regulatory contest among member states, which also takes place in other policy areas, accounts for the absence of an EU model; rather, EU legislation resembles a «regulatory patchwork» [Héritier et al. 1996].

Adrienne Héritier and her team were among the first German scholars to conduct comprehensive studies on the implementation of EU policies in the second half of the 1990s [Héritier et al. 1996; Héritier et al. 1994; Siedentopf and Ziller 1988]. Such implementation studies have given way to and have been refined into research on compliance with EU law [Haverland 1999; Knill and Lenschow 2000; Falkner et al. 2005; Zürn and Joerges 2005; Kaeding 2007; Börzel, Hofmann and Sprungk 2003; Börzel et al. 2011]. Their findings have significantly influenced the Europeanization literature since the effective implementation of EU policies is a major cause of domestic change in case of policy misfit.

Together with the work of Fritz Scharpf on negative and positive integration, Adrienne Héritier's approach inspired many German EU scholars to do similar policy studies [Grande 1993; Schmidt 1998; Eising 2000; Genschel 2002]. Moreover, by introducing implementation research into EU studies, she pioneered the Europeanization and domestic change literature.

5. *The transformation of the state? Europeanization and domestic change*

The (German) governance and policy literature on the EU converge in their focus on what EU institutions and policies have done to the member states. For decades, re-

search in EU studies had adopted what later became called a «bottom-up» perspective seeking to conceptualize and explain the effect of member states on processes and outcomes of European integration. Theoretical debates were dominated by two competing paradigms of European integration that significantly disagreed on the role that member states played at the European level (for the intellectual history of the debate see Caporaso and Keeler 1993). Intergovernmentalist approaches take member states and their governments as the principal agents driving European integration and policy-making to protect their geopolitical interests and the economic concerns of their constituencies [Hoffmann 1982; Taylor 1991; Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1998]. Neofunctionalism and multilevel governance approaches, by contrast, privilege domestic interests (such as business associations, trade unions, and regions) that press for further integration to promote their economic or political interests, as well as supranational actors (particularly the European Commission and the ECJ) that seek to increase the power of European institutions over the member states [Haas 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001].

German EU scholars took either side of the debate or simply decided to ignore the paradigmatic turf wars. Theoretical arguments they developed on their own, like the *Fusionsthese* of Wolfgang Wessels [Wessels 1997; Wessels 1998], have not made much headway outside Germany.

6. *When Europe hits home: The Europeanization of the member states*

Things started to change in the 1990s, when students of European integration became increasingly interested in how the member states responded to the impact of European policies, processes and institutions. The first generation of such «top-down» studies focused on the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority of the member states. In order to theorize the

domestic impact of Europe, the explanatory logics of the two major paradigms of European integration were essentially turned around. If intergovernmentalist approaches were correct in assuming that member states' governments controlled European integration while supranational institutions themselves exercised little independent effect, the power of the member states would not be challenged. Rather, European integration should enhance the control of national governments over domestic affairs since it removed issues from domestic controversy into the arena of executive control at the European level [Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994]. Proponents of neofunctionalist or supranationalist approaches suggested exactly the opposite, namely that European integration provided domestic actors such as regions and interest groups with independent channels of political access and influence at the European level enabling them to circumvent or by-pass their member states in the EU policy process [Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996].

One of the first Germans to enter the debate was Beate Kohler-Koch. She rejected the zero-sum game conception of the relationship between the EU and its member states, in which one level was to be empowered at the expense of the other. She argued that the different levels of government would become increasingly dependent on each other in EU policy-making. As a result, European integration would neither strengthen nor weaken but transform the member states by fostering the emergence of cooperative relationships between state and non-state actors at the various levels of government [Kohler-Koch 1996; 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Rometsch and Wessels 1996].

Adrienne Héritier and her collaborators had arrived at similar conclusions but refrained from making sweeping generalizations based on a single policy study [Héritier 1994; Héritier et al. 1996]. Their empirical findings, first in the field of environment, and later in transport policy, clearly demonstrated that the domestic impact of Europe was differential [Héritier 2001; Knill 1995; 2001;

Lehmkuhl 1999; Kerwer 2001]. Consequently, Europeanization research started to focus on «mediating factors» and different causal mechanisms that could account for why some member states underwent deeper changes than others. Policy and institutional misfit, domestic veto players, norm entrepreneurs, institutional culture, differential empowerment, socialization, regulatory competition, and framing are theoretical concepts advanced by German scholars [Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Börzel 1999; Héritier 2001; Börzel and Risse 2000; 2003; Knill and Lenschow 2005].

Moreover, in their attempts to integrate the various factors and mechanisms into coherent causal models, (German) scholars did not only draw on rational choice institutionalism but also took on the «constructivist turn» in EU studies [Jørgensen 2001; Christiansen et al. 2001]. Thomas Risse was key in introducing identity, and later public sphere, as dependent and independent variables of Europeanization [Risse 2001; 2004; 2010][2]. Risse also emphasized the importance of norm-guided and communicative action in how the EU has impacted the domestic structures of its member states [Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Börzel and Risse 2002; 2007].

Rational choice institutionalism argues that the EU facilitates domestic change through changing opportunity structures for domestic actors. In a first step, misfit between the EU and domestic norms creates demands for domestic adaptation. It takes agency, however, to translate misfit into domestic change. In a second step, the downloading of EU policies and institutions by the member states are shaped by cost/benefit calculations of strategic actors, whose interests are at stake. Institutions constrain or enable certain actions of rational actors by rendering some

[2] For German studies on Europeanized public spheres see also [Eder and Kantner 2002; Adam 2007; Eder 2000; Eder, Hellmann and Trenz 1998; Eder and Kantner 2000; Kantner 2004; Kantner 2006; Kantner 2009; Koopmans 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Pfetsch 2004; Pfetsch 2008; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner 2008; Trenz 2002; Trenz and Eder 2004; Trenz 2006].

options more costly than others. From this perspective, Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure that offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals. Domestic change is facilitated, if the institutions of the member states do not allow domestic actors to block adaptation to EU requirements through veto points or if, on the contrary, they empower domestic reform coalitions by providing them with additional resources to exploit the opportunities offered by Europeanization.

Sociological institutionalist approaches, by contrast, conceive of actors as guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially accepted behavior. These collective understandings and intersubjective meaning structures strongly influence the way actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational action. Rather than maximizing their egoistic self-interest, actors seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. From this perspective, Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures. If there is such a misfit, it also takes agency for bringing about domestic change. But the ways in which domestic actors facilitate reforms are different. Norm entrepreneurs, such as epistemic communities or advocacy networks, socialize domestic actors into new norms and rules of appropriateness through persuasion and social learning who redefine their interests and identities accordingly. The more active norm entrepreneurs are and the more they succeed in making EU policies resonate with domestic norms and beliefs, the more successful they will be in bringing about domestic change. Moreover, collective understandings of appropriate behavior strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors download EU requirements. First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Second, a consensus-oriented

political culture allows for a sharing of adaptation costs which facilitates the accommodation of pressure for adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptation costs upon a social or political minority, the «winners» of domestic change compensate the «losers».

An alternative typology of mechanisms through which Europeanization can affect the member states was advanced by Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl [Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; 2000]. They distinguish between institutional compliance, where the EU prescribes a particular model which is «imposed» on the member states and which dominates areas of positive integration. The domestic impact of negative integration is more indirect since the EU does not require any specific policy or institutional changes. Rather, the mandated removal of national barriers to foreign competition works through the changing domestic opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources between domestic actors. Finally, in areas where the EU has no or only weak decision-making power, it can still impact domestic structures by way of policy framing, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors.

Beside the focus on different causal mechanisms driving Europeanization processes, German scholars have also tried to disentangle conditional factors accounting for the differential impact of Europe[3]. Broadly speaking, the literature found evidence for the significance of rule-specific as well as country and policy-specific variables [Börzel et al. 2011; Haverland and Romeijn 2007; Thomson, Torenvlied and Arregui 2007; Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009]. Whereas rule-specific factors refer to difference in the adaption requirements and characteristics of EU norms (e.g. the level of discretion), country- and policy-specific related factor refer to domestic configurations like administrative capacities or policy-preferences of national decision-makers.

Probably the strongest (and most controversial) impact on Europeanization research to the conceptual con-

[3] For an overview see [Mastenbroek 2005] or [Treib 2006].

certo inspired by (some) German thinking is the notion of «match or mismatch» [Héritier et al. 1996], «misfit» [Börzel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2003] or «goodness of fit» [Risse et al. 2001]. It refers to the assumption that the European impact on the policies, politics and polity of member states depends on the compatibility between European policies and institutions and their domestic counterparts. This can be due to adaption costs related to changing existing institutional arrangements [Knill and Lenschow 1998; Börzel 2005b]. Another causal logic refers to the need to internalize and develop new norms, ideas and understandings [Héritier 2001; Knill 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003]. In cases of socialization and persuasion processes a successful incorporation of European norms into existing domestic institutions seem more likely if European and national ideas, structures, and meanings are more similar to each other.

Misfit between European and domestic constitutes a necessary condition for Europeanization effects [Risse et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003]. Why should a domestic policy change happen when European and domestic arrangement are in perfect sync? Perhaps due to its clear predictions on the effects of Europeanization, the misfit hypothesis significantly coined the study of Europeanization [Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Treib 2006]. It also triggered strong theoretical, methodological and empirical controversies. Some scholars contended that misfit was a special case of Europeanization rather than an explanatory concept [Radaelli 2003; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2000]. Without a specific European model to be implemented it seemed problematic to identify some kind of misfit. Different conceptions and measurements of both the misfit as well as the dependent variable developed in the literature made it difficult to systematically compare levels of misfit and adjudicate their explanatory power [Radaelli 2004; Falkner et al. 2005]. Moreover, misfit was also criticized for its deterministic approach and Europeanization [Radaelli 2003]. Rather than resisting adaptation, domestic decision-makers often want to change domestic arrangement. Final-

ly, the empirical record of the misfit hypothesis was questioned [Mastenbroek 2005; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006]. Thus, the study by Gerda Falkner and her team on the implementation of six EU social policy directives in the member states pointed to the limits of misfit as a driver of Europeanization [Falkner, Hartlapp and Treib 2007; Falkner et al. 2005][4].

The debate on the misfit provoked new thinking on alternative theoretical frameworks for analyzing the differential impact of Europeanization processes focusing on policy-specific explanations based on actor-centered variables like domestic preferences and beliefs, especially of national governments[Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Panke 2010], and cultural factors [Falkner and Treib 2008; Falkner et al. 2005]. The compliance study by Falkner argues that different families of nations could be distinguished among EU member states denoting a «specific national culture of digesting adaption requirements» [Falkner et al. 2005, 319]. The first family called the «World of Law Observance» is characterized by cultural conventions leading to a complete and rapid implementation of European requirements, regardless of opposing domestic politics like contradictory interest constellations. This is different from countries belonging to the «World of Domestic Politics» where Europeanization outcomes are a function of domestic interest constellation of national governments and of the most important pressure groups. The «World of Neglect» then has been described as heavily dependent on domestic problems and interests as they are considered to have higher priority and legitimacy than European norms and rules[5].

[4] Interestingly, the misfit hypothesis gained steam again by more recent quantitative studies showing results consistent with the assumption that different level of policy misfit between European directives and national legislation can have a significant impact on the compliance record of Member States [Thomson 2007; 2009; Thomson et al. 2007].

[5] Falkner and Treib were reconsidering the families of nations [Falkner and Treib 2008]. Extended their sample to the new CEE member states, they also identified the «World of Dead Letters».

Last but not least, methodological discussions in EU studies benefitted from the misfit debate too. Again, although methodological questions usually cut across all areas of political science, a specific methodological problem in EU studies has also been put on the agenda by (German) scholars: the question if domestic policy change is really EU-driven or if there are alternative explanations for policy change like globalization [Levi-Faur 2004; Hix and Goetz 2000; Goetz 2000; Eising 2003; Haverland 2006; Olsen 2002]. German scholars argued in favor of increasing variance by incorporating cases into the analysis that are not (or less) subject to EU impacts or by using qualitative approaches, such as process tracing or counterfactuals, to strengthen the theoretical argument of a significant EU impact [Haverland 2006; see also Ebbinghaus 1998]. Still, methodological discussions in Europeanization research are rather rare as a recent mapping of the field according to different methodological approaches used has shown [Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009].

7. *When Europe hits across its borders: External Europeanization*

Eastern enlargement created a unique opportunity for the next generation of Europeanization research to test the approaches that had emerged to account for the conditions and causal mechanisms through which the EU triggers domestic change. Two German scholars have been key in extending the research to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) accession countries. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier took the two logics of Europeanization – rationalist and sociological institutionalist – and adapted them to the context of «accession Europeanization» [Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007]. Their empirical findings corroborated the differential impact of Europe, which they largely explained with the varying success of their «external incentive model» – «reinforcement through rewards» only

worked if the misfit between EU and domestic policies and institutions was not too big, domestic veto players were not too powerful and the rewards the EU promised proved to be sufficiently credible and speedy.

Overall, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier convincingly showed that Europeanization approaches were well equipped to explain the (differential) impact of pre-accession or enlargement Europeanization in the CEE candidate countries. While domestic mediating factors played a less prominent role than in membership Europeanization, they did mitigate the domestic impact of accession, particularly beyond the legal implementation of EU policies. The dominance of differential empowerment through conditionality has given rise to concerns about «shallow Europeanization» [Goetz 2005, 262] since sustainable compliance with (costly) EU policies ultimately requires internalization. The CEE countries formally adopted a massive amount of EU legislation, which, however, has often not been properly applied and enforced and thus, has not changed actors' behavior [Falkner et al. 2008; Börzel 2009].

With Europeanization research moving east, implementation and compliance studies followed suit (see above). The CEE countries provided a valuable testing ground. First findings concur on the importance of administrative capacity for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU policies [Knill and Tosun 2010; Bauer, Knill and Pitschel 2007; Falkner, Treib and Holzleitner 2008; Börzel 2009; see also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006]. They, thus, put the external incentive model based on membership conditionality into context, since a rational choice on the basis of cost-benefit calculations presupposes sufficient resources to act upon the choice made. This is all the more relevant when studying the European Neighborhood Countries (ENC), which do not even have an accession perspective.

The EU can influence both the willingness and capacity necessary for domestic change by providing additional incentives and resources. It successfully did so in the case of the CEE accession countries. Yet, the ENC are in a

completely different situation. Not only do they lack a membership perspective, the ENC also score much lower on democracy and state capacity than the CEE. Again, German EU scholars were at the forefront of those exploring «neighborhood Europeanization» [Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2009; Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichmann 2007; Lavenex 2008; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2009; Mattli and Plümper 2004; Börzel 2010b]. They show how limited state capacity and defect democracy have mitigated and constrained the domestic impact of the EU when it seeks to hit beyond its borders with its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). High misfit imposing prohibitive costs to incumbent governments, weak to nonexistent EU conditionality and the absence of domestic reform coalitions render domestic change induced by Europeanization extremely unlikely in the ENC. Their unwillingness to engage in substantive reforms is reinforced by their limited capacities.

These findings are corroborated by the literature on the EU's Mediterranean neighborhood. Its Southern neighbors are consolidated states with authoritarian regimes (the exception being Israel). Since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, the EU has sought to export security, stability and prosperity to the Mediterranean. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance have been mainstreamed into the Barcelona Process [Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Van Hüllen and Stahn 2009]. Yet, the Mediterranean countries have experienced a kind of «authoritarian stability» and rising income levels, which are higher than those of the ENC [Noutcheva and Emerson 2007, 87]. Unlike in Eastern Europe, political elites hardly pretend to be democracies and do not lean on the European project to legitimize their domestic agenda. Being increasingly under pressure from Islamist forces, the Southern Arab regimes are far less receptive to the norms and values promoted by the EU, which does not consider them to be eligible for membership in the European club either. Not being able to call on common values, the EU has been reluctant to push good

governance emphasizing economic reforms and offering market access as an incentive [Youngs 2001]. The EU's economic leverage, however, is weakened by the more symmetric relations with some Mediterranean states for their importance for its energy supplies (Algeria) and the trade concessions already granted (Tunisia). While the EU has employed democracy assistance and political dialogue, it «has sought a "depressurizing" liberalization of Middle Eastern regimes that helps to stabilize governments rather than the kind of short-term systemic political change that may bring to power Islamist parties» (Youngs 2009, 911). Closer relations with the EU have done next to nothing so far to improve the democratic quality of Mediterranean regimes [Sedelmeier 2007; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2009].

German scholars have done a lot to advance research on Europeanization and domestic change, within and across the borders of the EU. But rather than engaging within the boundaries of EU Studies, German scholars were trying to intersect Europeanization and related concepts like policy diffusion. By utilizing and enhancing theoretical and methodological knowledge on common research questions they were turning from EU studies to more general concepts of policy change.

8. *Broadening the debate: The role of German EU studies in the diffusion of public policy*

The concept of policy diffusion mainly refers to processes leading to the transfer and adaption of policies through national governments. Whereas Europeanization research adopts a specific regional and causal focus, the concept of diffusion refers to «any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters» [Strang 1991, 325]. Despite theoretical, methodological, and empirical overlaps [Jordan 2005], the concept of policy diffusion has been largely absent from the debates on

Europeanization and vice-versa. Its explicit application to the study of the EU remains the exception rather than the rule [Radaelli 2005]. The same holds true for diffusion research. While studying the political system of the EU provides important insights on the complex interplay between vertical and horizontal diffusion mechanisms [Bulmer and Radaelli 2005; Radaelli 2003], the diffusion literature tends to neglect the EU. The EU has been conceptualized as explanatory factor for analyzing (regional) patterns of diffusion. Yet, the institutional structure of the EU is a most-likely case for policy diffusion and a «valuable laboratory» [Bulmer and Padgett 2004, 104] for gaining theoretical and empirical insights to refine the concept of policy diffusion. Providing a shared set of relevant research questions, common methodological standards, cumulative theoretical and empirical findings should enhance analytical leverage and avoid redundancy [Graham, Volden and Shipan 2008]. Starting from research on Europeanization, several (German) scholars have engaged in providing the missing link between both strands of research.

9. *Unlocking the field of policy diffusion: mechanism-based thinking*

The study of policy diffusion has become popular among political scientists [Bennett 1991, 2, Holzinger and Knill 2005, 775; Rogers 2003; Tews 2005, 2]. The research agenda on policy diffusion is fed by diverse array of its subdisciplines [Graham et al. 2008]. Consequently, diffusion research covers a wide range of theoretical and empirical questions: What processes lead to patterns of policy adoption? Why do dissimilar countries adopt similar polices? What internal and external factors determine the adoption of different policies? How do processes leading to policy transfer develop, how do they operate? Which policies diffuse? What are the effects and the outcome of these processes? And, more specifically, what factors determine the functioning and efficiency of diffusion mechanisms?

Here a first German contribution referred to the systematic mapping of the existing literature on policy diffusion (see the contributions to JEPP 2005 Vol. 12, n. 5 and PVS special issue 28 from 2007). Similar to Europeanization research, German scholars were able to contribute to streamlining the field according to the underlying causal mechanisms driving diffusion processes.

Advocates of policy diffusion usually provide responses to models of policy change merely focusing on internal determinants for explaining policy change [Berry and Berry 2007; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008b]. They highlight interdependent decision-making asking to cope with the «consequences of diffusion processes», or «Galton's problem» [Jahn 2006, 401]. This notion that is already inherent in the very meaning of concepts describing the political system of the EU, like network- and multilevel governance. Students of diffusion identify several causal mechanisms leading to the diffusion and transfer of policies, such as coercion, learning, imitation, and competition [Braun and Gilardi 2006; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Meseguer 2005; Shipan and Volden 2008; Weyland 2005]. Yet, much research still tests specific diffusion models such as leader-laggards models [Berry and Berry 2007] or investigates a single causal mechanism underlying social action (e.g. socialization) [Zürn and Checkel 2005]. The comparative analyses of different diffusion processes and mechanisms only emerged recently [Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Daley and Garand 2005; Karch 2007; Shipan and Volden 2008; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008a; Simmons and Elkins 2004]. Consequently, diffusion research has ended up in a diverse and mostly unconnected array of theoretical assumptions that rely both on rational as well as constructivist reasoning [Braun and Gilardi 2006; Braun et al. 2007]. German scholars have therefore called for mapping and streamlining theoretical arguments. Following the Europeanization approach, they identified different mechanisms disentangling constructivist and rationalist logics

[Braun and Gilardi 2006; Braun et al. 2007; Börzel and Risse 2009][6]. Thus, Börzel and Risse have identified five categories of diffusion mechanisms in the current literature on diffusion: coercion, manipulation of utility calculations, socialization, persuasion, and emulation [Börzel and Risse 2009].

Despite theoretical clarifications on the causes and functioning of diffusion processes and their underlying causal mechanisms, studies on diffusion seem to be unsure about the actual effects of diffusion processes.

10. *Measuring the effects of diffusion processes: Convergence and the dyadic approach*

Most diffusion studies follow a process-orientated understanding of diffusion [Elkins and Simmons 2005, 36]. They assume that diffusion processes increase the probability for policy adoption and transfer in such a way that in times of globalization and growing interdependence more policy change is to be expected [Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007]. Other authors emphasize the ambivalence and complexity of diffusion processes and their impacts [Mooney 2001] and/or the stickiness of national institutions [Börzel 2005b]. The question remains to what degree we can expect policy change and what the direction of change is, i.e. which policies are usually adopted? German scholars have provided different conceptualization and tools to examine the scope, degree and direction of policy change.

For considering the effects of diffusion processes in terms of policy change, (some) German scholars were utilizing the notion of convergence as one potential outcome of diffusion processes [Heichel, Pape and Sommerer 2005;

[6] For a mechanism-based approach drawing on different strands of research see e.g. [Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2007; Holzinger and Knill 2005].

Holzinger 2006; Plümper and Schneider 2009; Jahn 2006]. Cross-national policy convergence can be defined as «the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances» [Kerr 1983, 3]. This definition encompasses different conceptualizations of convergence, such as sigma-, beta-, delta- or gamma- Convergence or (un-)conditional convergence [Heichel et al. 2005; Plümper and Schneider 2009; Holzinger et al. 2007]. However, to grasp the domestic impact of diffusion processes and their underlying mechanisms two types of policy convergence seem especially important: sigma and delta convergence. Sigma convergence refers to the understanding of convergence as the decrease in variation of domestic policies over time. A decreasing coefficient of variation describes an increase in policy transfer. Although this indicates the strength of diffusion impacts, the analysis of sigma convergence alone does not necessarily tell us whether growing policy similarity also means a closer proximity to a certain policy model to be adopted[7]. Or to put it differently, it cannot tell us if a specific policy has been transferred. This can be a policy regarded as successful or a model promoted by an international organization like the EU. The concept of delta convergence therefore focuses on the adoption of specific policies. By measuring the minimization of the distance to a reference model, i.e. the specific policy to be adopted, over time one can examine the direction of policy change.

Furthermore, when it comes to measuring and/or estimating diffusion effects in terms of convergence and policy adoption (German) scholar were also advocating dyadic approaches [Holzinger 2006, Verschuren and Art 2004; Volden 2006; Gilardi and Füglister 2008; Neumayer and Plümper 2010]. The so-called Method of Paired Comparison (MPC) offers several advantages over analyzing single country units [Holzinger 2006, Verschuren and Art 2004]. It allows using both categorical and metrical data (e.g. in

[7] The so-called «policy innovation» [Rogers 2003].

contrast to the analysis of the variation coefficient). Furthermore, both types of variables (and various policy dimensions respectively) can be integrated into one quantitative model with the degree of policy similarity as dependent variable. This is different than traditional approaches. Whereas aggregated data only describe complete samples (or subgroups), for instance, by analyzing the variation coefficient, MPC relies on information incorporating every country pair. Correspondingly, MPC is less sensitive to outliers as it involves any policy change between all pairs of countries. Also, as the unit of analysis is country dyads, it enables researchers to increase the number of cases available for statistical processing [Holzinger 2006, 280f]. Last but not least, rather than measuring diffusion effects in terms of variance, dyadic approaches can help to avoid using aggregates and estimate diffusion effects instead [Plümper and Schneider 2009; Neumayer and Plümper 2010].

11. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, we focused on major contributions German scholars have been making to the field of EU studies. These relate to three broad fields in literature. First, German scholars advanced what became the «governance turn» in EU studies. Whereas research on the EU used to study the development of the European Union, governance approaches provide a different perspective that is arguably more appropriate to capture the nature of the beast since it is not wedded to statehood. Moreover, the European polity becomes exogenous shifting the theoretical and empirical focus towards the impact of the EU's institutional structure on both European policies and politics as well as on the polities of the member states themselves. Second, German scholars pioneered research on Europeanization and domestic change exploring the impact of the EU on its member states, more recently expanding the research agenda to the external dimension of Europeanization, i.e. member-

ship candidates, as well as neighborhood and third countries. Third, German scholars helped broaden the debate on Europeanization by combining insights from EU studies and the diffusion of public policies identifying different causal mechanisms by which ideas and policies diffuse within the EU and from the inside out.

There is no way that one chapter can do justice to all the contributions German scholars have made to the field of EU studies. Although being selective, our chapter shows that there is no genuine *German* debate on the EU. Rather, drawing on specific approaches dominant in German political science, German scholars have helped advance the field, both theoretically and methodologically and pushed it into new directions.

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